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PREFACE 
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November 2009. Professor Ivar Wangensteen from the Department of Electrical Power 
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SINTEF Energy Research and adjunct professor at NTNU, was co-supervisor. During 
the autumn of 2009, Kjell Sand acted as the main supervisor during Ivar Wangesteen’s 
sabbatical leave. 
 
The thesis has been written as a part of the project “Risk based distribution system asset 
management” (RISK DSAM), funded by the Research Council of Norway and 
companies within electricity distribution in Norway, France and Sweden. 
 
 
Trondheim, December 2009 
 
 
 
Dag Eirik Nordgård 
 
 
                                                 
 
1 The count-in for I saw her standing there, the first song on the first album by The Beatles, Please Please 
Me, issued 1963. 
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SUMMARY 
 
 “Here comes the sun”3 
 
During the last 10 to 15 years electricity distribution companies throughout the world 
have been ever more focused on asset management as the guiding principle for their 
activities. Within asset management, risk is a key issue for distribution companies, 
together with handling of cost and performance. There is now an increased awareness of 
the need to include risk analyses into the companies’ decision making processes. 
 
Much of the work on risk in electricity distribution systems has focused on aspects of 
reliability. This is understandable, since it is surely an important feature of the product 
delivered by the electricity distribution infrastructure, and it is high on the agenda for 
regulatory authorities in many countries. 
 
However, electricity distribution companies are also concerned with other risks relevant 
for their decision making. This typically involves intangible risks, such as safety, 
environmental impacts and company reputation. In contrast to the numerous 
methodologies developed for reliability risk analysis, there are relatively few 
applications of structured analyses to support decisions concerning intangible risks, 
even though they represent an important motivation for decisions taken in electricity 
distribution companies. 
 
The overall objective of this PhD work has been to explore risk analysis methods that 
can be used to improve and support decision making in electricity distribution system 
asset management, with an emphasis on the analysis of intangible risks. 
 
The main contributions of this thesis can be summarised as: 
- An exploration and testing of quantitative risk analysis (QRA) methods to 
support decisions concerning intangible risks. 
- The development of a procedure for using life curve models to provide input to 
QRA models. 
- The development of a framework for risk-informed decision making where 
QRA are used to analyse selected problems. 
 
In addition, the results contribute to clarify the basic concepts of risk, and highlight 
challenges related to risk terminology, risk perception and risk communication that are 
                                                 
 
3 Song by George Harrison, issued on the Abbey Road album, 1969. 
 
 
 
vi 
relevant to electricity distribution companies in their asset management. The work has 
also exemplified that it is hard to find statistical data sources that can provide the basis 
for numerical estimates of model parameters when analysing intangible risks. The use 
of expert judgment to estimate model parameters is hence of great importance. 
 
When dealing with risk analysis, it should be kept in mind that uncertainty about future 
outcomes is one basic prerequisite for risk. This uncertainty can be explored through 
risk analyses, but it can never be eliminated. The aim of risk analysis should therefore 
be to contribute to problem understanding and to make robust decisions, rather than 
trying to provide the “right” answer. 
 
The results presented in this thesis show that quantitative risk analysis can provide 
useful decision support, for example through making it easier to compare alternatives in 
a decision situation. It will however require more labour compared to simplified risk 
analysis, and QRA should therefore be used with some caution. 
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THE STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
 
“Paperback writer”4 
 
This thesis is written for professionals and scientists with knowledge and understanding 
of the basic – and sometimes more advanced – concepts of electricity distribution 
system asset management. Some basic knowledge about risk and risk management 
would also be favourable to help the reader to understand the findings. 
 
The thesis consists of two parts: Part I – Main report and Part II - Papers. 
 
Part I – Main report summarises the work that has been done, and highlights the main 
results and contributions. 
 
Chapter 1 introduces the background for the work, and the motivation for the selection 
of research area. The objectives and delimitation of the work are also stated here. 
Chapter 2 describes the scientific approach for the work and the context in which the 
work has been performed. In Chapter 3, the concepts of asset management are 
presented, followed by an introduction to risk and risk management in Chapter 4. 
 
Chapter 5 summarises the main results from the work, with reference to the papers 
where the details are documented. The intention is that it should be possible to read Part 
I - Main report separately and get an overview of what is treated in more detail in the 
papers. Therefore, examples and descriptions from the papers are included in Chapter 5, 
in order to enhance the understanding and readability of this chapter. 
 
Chapter 6 discusses the results, before conclusions and ideas for further work are 
presented in Chapter 7. 
 
Part II – Papers consists of seven papers already published or submitted to 
international conferences or journals. The papers describe different parts of the topics 
addressed in this thesis, and they are listed in the next section, together with comments 
concerning the author’s5 contributions to each. 
 
                                                 
 
4 Song by John Lennon and Paul McCartney, issued on the Paperback writer/Rain single, 1966. 
5 “The author” refers to the author of this thesis, Dag Eirik Nordgård. 
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NOTATION 
 
“The word”6 
 
Important words and phrases 
 
Risk The combination of the probability of an event and its consequence 
(ISO/IEC, 2002). 
Intangible risk For the purpose of this thesis, intangible risk is used to denote risks 
whose consequences are hard to quantify in economic terms, even 
though it is possible to measure them in other terms. Intangible 
risks particularly refer to risks related to safety and environmental 
impact, but the term can also include reputational risk, political 
risks and similar. 
Performance For the purpose of this thesis, performance is used to denote how 
well a distribution company achieves results with regards to given 
criteria, e.g. financial aspects, health and safety aspects and 
environmental aspects. Performance denotes what is actually 
achieved, in contrast to risk which focuses on potential future 
outcomes. 
 
Risk analysis Systematic use of information to identify and to estimate the risk 
(ISO/IEC, 2002). 
Risk assessment Overall process of risk analysis and risk evaluation 
(ISO/IEC, 2002). 
Risk management Coordinated activities to direct and control an organization with 
regard to risk (ISO/IEC, 2002). 
  
 
Abbreviations 
 
BN 
(BBN) 
Bayesian Network 
– in some cases referred to as Bayesian Belief Network (BBN) 
CENS Cost of Energy Not Supplied. Norwegian regulation concerning 
customer interruptions. 
CPT Conditional probability table 
                                                 
 
6 Song by John Lennon and Paul McCartney, issued on the Rubber Soul album, 1965. 
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DSAM Distribution System Asset management 
DSB Direktoratet for samfunnssikkerhet og beredskap 
Directorate for Civil Protection and Emergency Planning 
ETA Event Tree Analysis 
FTA Fault Tree Analysis 
HAZOP Hazard and operability analysis / study 
LV Low Voltage (< 1 kV) 
MCDM Multi Criteria Decision Making 
MV Medium Voltage (1 – 36 kV) 
NPV Net Present Value 
NTNU Norges Teknisk-Naturvitenskapelige Universitet 
Norwegian University of Science and Technology 
NVE Norges vassdrags- og energidirektorat 
Norwegian Water Resources and Energy Directorate 
PAS 55 Publicly Available Specification 55, (BSI, 2008a) and  
(BSI, 2008b) 
PDCA Plan-Do-Check-Act (principles of continual improvement) 
PLL Potential Loss of Life 
QRA Quantitative Risk Analysis 
RISK DSAM Risk Based Distribution System Asset management, a competence 
building project at SINTEF Energy Research of which this PhD-
work is a part. www.energy.sintef.no/prosjekt/RISKDSAM 
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PART I – MAIN REPORT 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
”…may I introduce to you, the act you’ve known for all these years…”7 
 
This chapter gives a brief introduction to the background for the work presented in this 
thesis, and also introduces some of the topics addressed. It also outlines the objectives 
for the work, along with the delimitation and scope. 
 
 
1.1 BACKGROUND 
 
Electricity distribution is a vital part of the infrastructure of modern society. In 
industrialized countries, most of the electricity distribution systems already exists as an 
infrastructure - most of which has been built during the last 50 years. Hence, electricity 
distribution companies are now faced with the challenges associated with managing a 
generally ageing infrastructure, see e.g. (Hughes, 2005, Sinclair, 2009). 
 
During the last 10 to 15 years, electricity distribution companies throughout the world 
have been ever more focused on asset management8 as the guiding principle for their 
activities – see e.g. (Kostic, 2003, Brown and Spare, 2004, Berende et al., 2009, 
Pschierer-Barnfather, 2009). 
 
The concept of asset management in general has developed during this same period of 
time, and reflects input from a number of industrial sectors – such as water supply, 
transportation and energy supply. All of these sectors share a reliance on an 
infrastructure of physical assets that provides the foundation for their businesses (BSI, 
2008a, BSI, 2008b). 
 
Asset management in electricity distribution companies is about the complex balancing 
of cost, performance and risk – taking into account various aspects such as economic 
performance, quality of supply, safety and environmental impact (Brown and 
Humphrey, 2005, Hughes and Pears, 2007). These aspects may constitute counteracting 
drivers in a decision making context and there is a need for structured methods to 
                                                 
 
7 Text line from the song Sgt. Pepper’s Lonely Hearts Club Band by John Lennon and Paul McCartney, 
issued on the Sgt. Pepper’s Lonely Hearts Club Band album, 1967. 
8 The origin of the term asset management is from economics, referring to composition of an institution’s 
financial assets – e.g. its portfolio of loans, securities, and cash. The assets may also be extended to 
include also intangible assets such as company reputation and market trust. 
 
 
 
4 
analyse and evaluate them – in order to support asset management decisions. Together 
with handling cost and performance, the management of risk is therefore a key issue for 
electricity distribution companies, and there is now an increased awareness about taking 
risk assessment into account in the decision making context (Sinclair, 2009). 
 
Risk analysis methods have evolved significantly since the mid 1960’s (Bernstein, 
1996). In electricity distribution system management, there has been much focus on 
developing reliability analyses, see e.g. (Fangxing and Brown, 2004, Janjic and 
Popovic, 2007, Bertling et al., 2005). This focus is understandable, since reliability of 
supply surely is an important feature of the product delivered by the electricity 
distribution infrastructure and a focus for regulatory authorities in many countries 
(Eurelectric, 2005). 
 
However, electricity distribution companies are also concerned with other important 
risks that are relevant for their businesses. 
 
In a survey presented in (Sand et al., 2007), different risk consequence categories for 
distribution companies are grouped into the following: 
- Economic risk, 
- Safety risk, 
- Environmental risk, 
- Quality of supply risk, 
- Reputational risk, 
- Vulnerability risk, and 
- Regulatory risk. 
 
Several of these consequence categories are what can be called intangible risks9 – 
meaning that they can be hard to quantify, at least in economic terms. Safety, 
environmental impacts and company reputation impact are typical examples of this, see 
e.g. (Sand et al., 2007, Hughes, 2005, Hamoud et al., 2007). It should also be noted that 
several of the consequence categories can be related and overlapping. For example, 
safety and environmental issues may have a significant impact on company reputation. 
 
In some cases, intangible risks are made tangible by converting the consequences to a 
common measure – usually money. An example of such an approach is presented in 
(Hughes et al., 2009), where network performance and environmental, safety and 
financial consequences are merged into one economic risk measure. This raises difficult 
ethical questions, such as the quantification of the economic value of human health, as 
                                                 
 
9 For the purpose of this thesis intangible risk is used to denote risks whose consequences are hard to 
quantify in economic terms; even though being possible to measure in other terms (e.g. litres oil spilled, 
potential loss of life etc.). Intangible risks cover specially risks related to safety and environmental 
impacts, but the term can also include reputational risk, political risks and others. 
 
 
 
5 
discussed in e.g. (Vatn and Aven, 2009). There is no easy answer to this with regards to 
what is right or wrong. In the work presented in this thesis, the consequences of 
intangible risks have deliberately not been converted into economic terms, but rather 
each risk has been analysed on its own – with the goal of using the results as input to a 
formal or informal multi-criteria decision framework in the final decision, for example 
as described in (Nordgård et al., 2003, Istad et al., 2008, Catrinu and Nordgård, 2010). 
 
In contrast to the numerous methods developed for reliability calculations and decision 
support (Billinton et al., 2001, Schilling et al., 2009), there are few applications of 
analyses to support decisions concerning intangible risks. This is a bit of a paradox, 
since such risks represent an important motivation for decisions taken in electricity 
distribution companies. 
 
Hence, there is a need to find and develop methods to analyse and evaluate also the 
intangible aspects of the electricity distribution companies’ risks. This is one of the 
driving motivations for the research project Risk based Distribution System Asset 
management, RISK DSAM10 – of which this PhD work is a part. 
 
                                                 
 
10 RISK DSAM is a competence building project sponsored by the Research Council of Norway in the 
RENERGI programme, and companies within electricity distribution in Norway, France and Sweden. The 
project started in 2006 and ends in 2010. 
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1.2 OBJECTIVES 
 
The main objective for the work presented in this thesis was to explore risk analysis 
methods that can be used to support decision making in electricity distribution system 
asset management, with an emphasis on the analysis of intangible risks. 
 
In order to make this objective more manageable, it has been divided into the following 
sub-objectives: 
1. Describe the basic concepts of risk and risk management. 
2. Elaborate on challenges related to risk communication and perception. 
3. Test and evaluate methods for quantitative risk analysis for distribution system 
asset management decision support, focusing on bow-tie models and Bayesian 
networks. Included in this is to explore uncertainty in risk analysis. 
4. Elaborate on challenges and possible solutions related to acquiring numerical 
input data for quantitative risk analyses. 
5. Establish a framework for risk-informed decision making in distribution system 
asset management, emphasising the use of risk analysis, and: 
6. Test and exemplify results from the above stated sub-objectives, through 
realistic cases. 
 
The grouping of the sub-objectives is illustrated in Figure 1. The two lower parts of the 
figure represent general aspects of risk – including risk communication and perception, 
while the four other parts of the figure illustrate objectives that are more specific to 
applications in electricity distribution system asset management. 
 
Specific to electricity distribution system asset management
Concepts of risk and 
risk management
Challenges related to risk
communication and perception
Methods for QRA
in distribution 
system asset management
Framework for risk-informed 
decision support in distribution
system asset management
Challenges related to acquring 
numerical input data
to risk analysis
Cases to test and exemplify
risk analysis
General aspects of risk
 
 
Figure 1  Schematic illustration of sub-objectives of the PhD work. 
 
 
 
7 
Each of the sub-objectives constitutes parts of the puzzle of risk-informed decision 
making in asset management. However, it should be noted that the sub-objectives do not 
provide the whole picture, but rather illuminate parts of it. 
 
 
1.3 DELIMITATION 
 
The work presented in this thesis mainly addresses challenges related to risk and risk 
management faced by electricity distribution companies in their asset management. The 
focus has been on analysing intangible risks - other than economic and reliability risks. 
Safety and environmental impacts are typical examples of such risks. 
 
The operating framework that applies to Norwegian electricity distribution companies 
forms the background for the work. One example is the regulation of cost of energy not 
supplied, CENS, which makes risks related to reliability failure an economic risk for the 
distribution companies (Langset et al., 2001, Kjølle et al., 2008). This is also one 
motivation for not including reliability analysis in the analysis of intangible risks. This 
may typically not be applicable in other countries with other regulatory regimes, 
although similar penalty schemes are getting more common (CEER, 2008). 
 
The ambition of the work has been to use existing risk analysis methods to provide 
decision support in this new area of application, with a focus on testing bow-tie models 
(combining fault tree and event tree analysis) and Bayesian networks. It has been 
beyond the scope of this PhD work to develop new risk analysis methods. 
 
Throughout the work, the emphasis has been on the potential practical application of 
risk analysis methods in electricity distribution company decision making. This has 
motivated for a rather high-level approach, without going into detailed discussions 
about the computational concepts that apply to the methods. 
 
Even though the work has been performed in this context, the results are not restricted 
solely to these applications and the overall thinking and concepts should be generally 
applicable to other risk related situations and to distribution companies in other 
countries. 
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2 ABOUT THE PHD WORK 
 
“The long and winding road”11 
 
This chapter describes the scientific approach that was used in the PhD work, and 
states the context in which the work was performed. 
 
 
2.1 SCIENTIFIC APPROACH 
 
This thesis addresses different aspects of risk management in electricity distribution 
system asset management, and the overall ambition of the research has been to address 
methods and topics that have potential for practical application in Norwegian electricity 
distribution companies. 
 
Risk covers technical, sociological and psychological dimensions of the topic. The 
research has therefore involved input from various scientific areas. 
 
However, the main research approach was testing of risk analysis methods and the 
development of frameworks for risk analysis. The following methods were used in the 
work: 
- Bayesian networks, 
- Bow-tie models (Fault tree and event tree analysis), 
- Sensitivity analysis, 
- Reliability importance indicators, 
- Monte Carlo simulation, 
- Life curve modelling. 
 
The motivation for choosing the first five methods was that they are well recognised in 
the risk literature, and they are among the methods most often referred to. The last 
method, Life curve modelling, is a method which have recently been developed (Welte, 
2008a) and which is being further tested for application among Norwegian distribution 
companies. 
 
The methods were tested on several cases based on input from electricity distribution 
companies, and the results were discussed with researchers and electricity distribution 
professionals in various settings. 
                                                 
 
11 Song by John Lennon and Paul McCartney, issued on the Let It Be album, 1970. 
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2.2 THE CONTEXT OF THE WORK 
 
The work reported in this thesis has been performed as an independent piece of work, 
organized as one of the work packages in the RISK DSAM project at SINTEF Energy 
Research. Although it was conducted independently, the work has been performed in 
interaction with other projects and activities at NTNU and SINTEF Energy Research. 
 
Figure 2 gives a schematic illustration of the context in which the PhD work was 
performed. A brief description of the different aspects is provided in the following. 
 
 
PhD work
Other research 
projects
Industry 
experience
and input
Dissemination
of results
Development 
of study
course
Risk analysis
methods
Review of
literature
 
 
Figure 2  Schematic illustration of the context of the PhD work. 
 
 
PhD work 
The work has focused on the overall objective of exploring methods for risk analysis in 
asset management decision making. The work has been performed based on the present 
status of risk analysis in electricity distribution companies, collecting input from the risk 
literature and applications in other industrial sectors. 
 
Other research projects 
During the work there has been a mutual exchange of information between the work 
done in this PhD and other research activities at SINTEF Energy Research. This applies 
especially to the RISK DSAM project. 
 
 
 
 
 
11 
 
Industry experience and input 
Risk management challenges have been discussed with various stakeholders both in 
Norwegian and international electricity distribution companies. The discussions have 
been useful in understanding the challenges that companies face. 
 
Review of literature 
Throughout the PhD study, input from risk literature has been sought and used to 
increase understanding about risk management in the electricity distribution sector as 
well as in other businesses and scientific disciplines. 
 
Risk analysis methods 
One important part of the work has been to explore methods for risk analysis. The 
methods have all been applied previously in other industrial sectors, so the work has 
mainly focused on the use of the methods in this new area of application. 
 
Development of study course 
Results from the PhD work have been used to develop a post-qualifying course at 
NTNU - “Risk based maintenance and renewal of distribution grids”. This has been 
done in cooperation with senior researcher Eivind Solvang at SINTEF Energy Research. 
The results from the PhD work have contributed to a structured basis for using risk 
analysis in electricity distribution system asset management. 
 
Dissemination of results 
Throughout the work, results have been published and presented at conferences, 
seminars, courses, etc. This has been done as a part of the quality assurance of the work, 
through getting feedback from other researchers and engineers. 
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“The road” – original artwork by Øystein, 3 years old. 
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3 ASSET MANAGEMENT 
 
“Here, there and everywhere”12 
 
This chapter provides a brief introduction to the concept of asset management, and how 
it applies to electricity distribution. 
 
 
3.1 BACKGROUND AND DEFINITIONS 
 
During the last 10 to 15 years, asset management has been adopted as the ruling 
paradigm for the management of electricity distribution companies (Hammond, 2000, 
Brown and Humphrey, 2005). The principles of asset management have been developed 
in industries that are heavily dependent on the performance of physical infrastructure 
assets – such as water supply, transportation and energy supply. The widespread 
application of asset management has led to the formulation and publication of the 
publicly available specification PAS 55 “Asset Management” (BSI, 2008a, BSI, 2008b) 
by the British Standards Institution. PAS 55 is being used as a guide in many electricity 
distribution companies throughout the world, see e.g. (Hughes, 2005, Berende et al., 
2009, Pschierer-Barnfather, 2009). 
 
The literature includes several definitions of asset management. In (Brown and Spare, 
2004), asset management is somewhat poetically described as the art of balancing cost, 
performance and risk, with the further statement that asset management is a business 
philosophy designed to align corporate goals with asset spending decisions. In this lies 
the idea of making it possible to follow high-level corporate objectives down to the 
management of specific assets. 
 
In (BSI, 2008a), a more formal definition of asset management is given as: 
“Systematic and coordinated activities and practices through which an organization 
optimally and systematically manages its assets and asset systems, their associated 
performance, risks and expenditures over their life cycles for the purpose of 
achieving its organizational plan.” 
 
                                                 
 
12 Song by John Lennon and Paul McCartney, issued on the Revolver album, 1966. 
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The two definitions state that the management of risk is one of three core elements of 
asset management, together with cost and performance. Hence, risk analysis and 
management will be important parts of a holistic asset management approach. 
 
 
3.2 ASSET MANAGEMENT ROLES AND FRAMEWORK 
 
As the definitions indicate, asset management covers a broad range of issues, and 
describes a philosophy rather than a limited process. 
 
Asset management includes three major roles that are often referred to as: 
- Asset owner, 
- Asset manager, 
- Service provider. 
 
The asset owner is responsible for setting the overall decision criteria, the asset 
manager’s task is to translate these criteria into an asset plan, while the service provider 
executes the plan and provides feedback (Brown and Spare, 2004). 
 
The three roles and their focal areas each address parts of the life-cycle management of 
the assets. The idea behind this decoupling is that each of the roles should focus on its 
core processes, while still contributing to one overall asset management framework, as 
illustrated in Figure 3. 
 
Business
values
Corporate 
strategy
Corporate 
objectivesData 
reporting
Asset 
plan
Capital 
planning
Operations 
planning
Maintenance 
planning
Project evaluation
Life cycle costing
Risk management
Budgeting
Capital  
structure Regulatory  
management
Financial 
targets
Procurement
Construction
Operations
Condition 
monitoring
Maintenance
Outage 
response
Inspections
Asset owner
Asset 
manager
Service  
provider
 
 
Figure 3  Asset management framework, (Brown and Spare, 2004). 
 
 
 
 
15 
Risk analysis and management have their rightful places in several of the tasks of the 
framework in Figure 3, for example: 
- Corporate strategy making, 
- Operation planning, 
- Maintenance planning, 
- Project evaluation, 
- Construction, 
- Operation, and 
- Maintenance. 
 
All of these tasks require methods to analyse risk problems and to provide input to 
decision making. 
 
The asset management framework follows a Plan-Do-Check-Act (PDCA) principle, 
known as the principle of continual improvement. This principle is a widely recognised 
way of thinking in many business disciplines, as described in e.g. (Deming, 2000 p. 23). 
According to (BSI, 2008a), the PDCA phases of asset management corresponds to: 
- Plan: Establish asset management strategies, objectives and plans, 
- Do: Implement the asset management plans, 
- Check: Monitor and measure results, 
- Act: Take actions to ensure that objectives are reached, and improve the asset 
management system. 
 
The PDCA principle applies to all three asset management roles and the tasks in the 
asset management framework, with the goal of identifying improvement potentials and 
optimizing existing practices. This principle will also apply to the risk analysis that 
supports decisions in different parts of the framework. 
 
 
3.3 ASSET MANAGEMENT IN ELECTRICITY DISTRIBUTION 
 
The principles of asset management cover widely, as described in the previous sections. 
In the context of electricity distribution, these principles will influence tasks throughout 
the organisation, such as: 
- Investment planning, 
- Maintenance strategy making, 
- Reinvestment planning, 
- Execution of plans. 
 
Electricity distribution companies in general face the challenge of managing an already 
existing – and ageing infrastructure (Nordgård et al., 2008, Sinclair, 2009). 
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This has led to an increased focus on maintenance and reinvestments, as these are two 
correlated ways of controlling the occurrence of different undesired events, and hence 
of controlling the distribution companies’ risks. 
 
Therefore, the challenges related to maintenance and reinvestments are high on the 
agenda of electricity distribution companies in many countries (Sand et al., 2007, 
Hughes et al., 2009, Sinclair, 2009). This has also been the foundation for the work 
reported in this thesis. 
 
In the end, asset management is about making decisions to create a robust electricity 
distribution system, balancing cost, performance and risk. Risk analysis is hence a 
concept that is very suitable for the asset management toolbox. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“Power lines with birds” – original artwork by Bjørnar, 7 years old. 
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4 RISK AND RISK MANAGEMENT 
 
“We can work it out”13 
 
This chapter gives an introduction to risk, risk management and risk analysis in 
general, and how these concepts apply to electricity distribution system asset 
management. 
 
 
4.1 RISK 
 
Risk is related to future events and their consequences (Aven, 2008 p. 17). Risk analysis 
is relevant in most decision situations since by assessing risk, we seek to look into the 
future and to this insight to make good decisions. 
 
The foundations of risk and risk analysis can be traced back through history, following 
many steps that contribute to what we today recognise as parts of risk management, see 
e.g. (Covello and Mumpower, 1985, Bernstein, 1996). 
 
Even though the concept has developed over literally thousands of years, a review of 
different literature sources shows that there has been no convergence towards an 
interdisciplinary definition of risk – see e.g. (Kaplan, 1991, Aven and Renn, 2009). 
There is still an ongoing debate over how risk should be defined and about the 
appropriateness of the different definitions, see e.g. (Steen and Aven, 2009, Aven and 
Renn, 2009, Grøtan et al., 2010). 
 
The following anecdote quoted from (Kaplan, 1997) illustrates the complexity involved 
in developing an interdisciplinary definition of risk: 
“One of the first initiatives from the Society for Risk Analysis14 was to establish 
a committee to define the word risk. The committee laboured for 4 years and 
then gave up, saying in its final report, that maybe it is better not to define risk 
and let each author define it in his own way, emphasizing that each should 
explain clearly what way that is.” 
 
                                                 
 
13 Song by John Lennon and Paul McCartney, issued on the Day Tripper/We can work it out single, 1965. 
We can work it out is the only Beatles song where a reference is made to risk. 
14 The Society for Risk Analysis is an international society that provides an open forum for all those who 
are interested in risk analysis, www.sra.org. 
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Hence, there are a number of definitions available – originating from many sources in 
different disciplines. A listing of selected definitions is presented in (Aven and Renn, 
2009): 
 
1. Risk equals the expected loss. 
2. Risk equals the expected disutility. 
3. Risk is the probability of an adverse outcome. 
4. Risk is a measure of the probability and severity of adverse effects. 
5. Risk is the combination of probability of an event and its consequences. 
6. Risk is defined as a set of scenarios si, each of which has a probability pi and a 
consequence ci. 
7. Risk is equal to the two-dimensional combination of events/consequences and 
associated uncertainties (will the events occur, what will be the consequences). 
8. Risk refers to uncertainty of outcome, of actions and events. 
9. Risk is a situation or event where something of human value (including humans 
themselves) is at stake and where the outcome is uncertain. 
10. Risk is an uncertain consequence of an event or an activity with respect to 
something that humans value. 
 
Some of the definitions are quite specific (e.g. no. 2 and 3), while others are more open 
in their formulation (e.g. no. 9 and 10). 
 
Even though the debate about different definitions can be on a rather philosophical 
level, it is important to be aware of the potential diverging interpretations of the terms 
when presenting results from risk analyses. 
 
For the purpose of the work presented in this thesis, the definitions of risk presented in 
(ISO/IEC, 2002)15 and (Kaplan, 1997) were used, corresponding to no. 5 and 6 
respectively in the above listing. The definitions were chosen because they are 
recognised as robust approaches to defining risk for engineering purposes, see e.g. 
(Vatn, 2006, Sand et al., 2007), and they have shown to be applicable to the risk 
problems that have been investigated in this work. Kaplan’s definition provides a 
framework for how to think about risk, while the definition of ISO/IEC focuses on the 
applications in risk analyses. In such a context the definition of (ISO/IEC, 2002) can be 
seen as a subset of the definition of (Kaplan, 1997). 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
15 In November 2009, (ISO, 2009) was issued to replace (ISO/IEC, 2002). The definition of risk was here 
changed to “risk: effect of uncertainty on objectives”, commenting in a note that the definition from 
(ISO/IEC, 2002) is a definition often used. For the purpose of this thesis, the definition from (ISO/IEC, 
2002) is still considered appropriate, and is therefore kept. 
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Kaplan captures the essence of “What is the risk?” for a given process or activity by 
answering a triplet of questions (Kaplan, 1997): 
- What can go wrong? 
- How likely is that to happen? 
- If it does happen, what are the consequences? 
 
The answers to these three questions will give a picture of the risks, where the answer to 
the first question is called a risk scenario that describes some kind of undesired event16; 
the answer to the second is a probability statement, while the answer to the third 
question is a description of potential consequences – which typically will be multi-
dimensional. For example, if a specified undesired event occurs, it may have economic, 
reputational and safety consequences. Even though the questions may look simple, the 
answers still pose significant challenges with regards to risk identification, probability 
estimates and consequence estimates. 
 
(ISO/IEC, 2002) provides a more narrow definition stating that risk is the combination 
of the probability of an event and its consequence. This is illustrated in Figure 4. 
 
Event
Risk
Consequence
Probability
 
 
Figure 4  The relationship between event, probability, consequence and risk 
 – based on (ISO/IEC, 2002). 
 
This definition is in line with Kaplan’s triplet of questions, where the event is the 
answer to the first question, the probability is the answer to the second, and the 
consequences are the answer to the third. The terminology of risk and risk management 
in (ISO/IEC, 2002) forms the basis for the terminology used in this thesis, as well as in 
the RISK DSAM project (Sand et al., 2007). 
 
The definitions of (Kaplan, 1997) and (ISO/IEC, 2002) are broader than the often-used 
definition stating that Risk equals the product of probability and consequence (of an 
undesired event), corresponding to number 1 in the listing on page 18, which 
presupposes that both the probability and consequence can be formulated numerically. 
This will often not be the case, for example when using simplified risk analyses in 
combination with risk matrices, see e.g. (Nordgård et al., 2007b, Nordgård and Samdal, 
                                                 
 
16 In this thesis the term “Undesired event” is used to describe an event which answers to the question 
“What can go wrong?”. Undesirable event (Aven 2008) and Unwanted event (Nordgård et.al.2005) are 
equivalent terms. 
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2010). The definitions of Kaplan and ISO/IEC allow for both a qualitative and a 
quantitative description of risk, and hence provide a more versatile basis for risk 
analysis. 
 
For simplified risk analyses, the combination of probability and consequence terms will 
typically be a qualitative evaluation, while for numerical analyses using model-based 
methods, the combination of the probability of an undesired event and the consequences 
of that event, will be represented by their product or their distributions. 
 
 
4.2 RISK MANAGEMENT 
 
The literature also provides several proposed frameworks to define and describe risk 
management, emphasising different aspects to be included in the term, see e.g. (Ale et 
al., 2010). Some examples of risk management frameworks can be found in (ISO/IEC, 
2002), (AS/NZS, 2004) and (Haimes, 2009 p. 62). 
 
In (ISO/IEC, 2002), risk management is defined as coordinated activities to direct and 
control an organization with regard to risk, stating that risk management generally 
includes the sub-processes: 
- Risk assessment, 
- Risk treatment, 
- Risk acceptance, and, 
- Risk communication. 
 
Risk management
Risk assessment
Risk analysis
Risk estimation
Source identification
Risk evaluation
OK?
Risk treatment
Risk retention
Risk optimization
Risk transfer
Risk avoidance
No
Yes
Risk acceptance Risk communication
Decisions
 
 
Figure 5  Risk management process – from Paper VII (Nordgård, 2008b) 
- based on the structure and terminology from (ISO/IEC, 2002). 
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For the purpose of this thesis, the structure and terminology of the risk management 
process from (ISO/IEC, 2002) was used, as illustrated in Figure 5. The work of this 
thesis has mainly focused on risk analysis (as a part of risk assessment), and risk 
communication. 
 
 
4.3 METHODS FOR RISK ANALYSIS 
 
During the last decades, numerous methods have been developed to analyse risk, see 
e.g. (Aven, 2008 p. 57-84) and (Rausand and Utne, 2009 p. 133-254). Three main 
categories of risk analysis methods are presented in (Aven, 2008 p.4) and are listed in 
Table 1. 
 
The three categories represent an increasing degree of formalism and modelling 
sophistication, and the choice of method will depend on several factors, including the 
risk problem at hand, the purpose of the risk analysis, the input data that are available, 
etc. The need for data is significantly increased from simplified risk analyses to the 
model-based analyses. 
 
There may be no single method that can address all the different dimensions of a given 
risk problem. For example, (Aven, 2008 p. 34) states that it can be necessary to perform 
several risk analyses in sequence, first performing an initial (and relatively simple) risk 
analysis, followed by more in-depth studies where applicable. 
 
Table 1  Categories of methods for risk analysis – from Paper V (Nordgård et al., 2010a). 
Grouping based on (Aven, 2008). 
Category Type of analysis Description Examples of methods 
Simplified risk  
analysis 
Qualitative 
Informal procedures that 
analyses risk using e.g. 
brain-storming sessions 
and group discussions. 
- Coarse risk analyses 
- Brainstorming sessions 
Standard risk  
analysis 
Qualitative or  
quantitative 
More formalized 
procedures in which 
recognized risk analysis 
methods are used. Risk 
matrices are often used 
to present the results. 
- Risk analysis assisted by  
  HAZOP (Hazard and  
  operability analysis) 
- Risk matrices 
- Job safety analysis 
Model-based risk 
analysis 
Primarily quantitative 
Formal methods using 
e.g. event tree analysis 
(ETA) and fault tree 
analysis (FTA) are used 
to calculate risk. 
- Fault tree analysis 
- Event tree analysis 
- Reliability analyses 
- Bayesian networks 
- Electrical system simulation 
- Benchmarking methods 
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4.4 RISK ANALYSIS METHODS IN ELECTRICITY DISTRIBUTION 
SYSTEM ASSET MANAGEMENT 
 
There is a trend among electricity distribution companies towards using risk analysis as 
one of the inputs in their asset management processes, see e.g. (Sand et al., 2007, 
Sinclair, 2009). 
 
Several of the regulations that apply to the electricity distribution sector also state that 
risk analyses and evaluations should be performed to ensure the safe operation of the 
system, see e.g. (DSB, 2005 § 2.2). However, the regulations do not state how the risk 
analyses should be carried out. 
 
As described in section 1.1, there are different consequence categories which are 
relevant for electricity distribution companies (Sand et al., 2007): 
- Economic risk, 
- Safety risk, 
- Environmental risk, 
- Quality of supply risk, 
- Reputational risk, 
- Vulnerability risk, and 
- Regulatory risk. 
 
All of these risks consequence categories are not applicable to every decision in the 
electricity distribution companies, but together the categories constitute a whole 
describing the different aspects of distribution company risk. 
 
The risk consequence categories also have their differences with regards to the type of 
their impact. Paper V (Nordgård et al., 2010a) provides a description of three types of 
impacts which can be used to characterise this: 
- Local impact – denoting impacts coming from dedicated components that cause 
“concentrated” accidents or incidents. 
- System impact – denoting when failure in component(s) or sub-systems gives 
widespread impact affecting extensive parts of the distribution system. 
- Corporate impact – denoting risks that affect the foundation for conducting 
business. This may be as a consequence of an earlier local or system impact, or 
due to an independent incident. 
 
Paper V (Nordgård et al., 2010a) further presents an overview of risk analysis methods 
that are being used in the analysis of risks in Norwegian electricity distribution 
companies. A summary of the risk consequence categories, their predominant impacts 
and risk analysis methods is presented in Table 2. 
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Table 2  Summary of risk consequence categories, their predominant impacts and risk analysis 
methods – based on Paper V (Nordgård et al., 2010a). 
Risk impact 
Type of risk analysis 
method** 
Risk consequence 
categories 
L
oc
al
 
Sy
st
em
 
C
or
po
ra
te
 
Si
m
pl
ifi
ed
 
St
an
da
rd
 
M
od
el
-
ba
se
d 
Methods used 
Economic risk   +  + + 
NPV-analyses 
Coarse risk analysis* 
Safety risk +  + + +  
Brain-storming, 
Coarse risk analysis* 
Environmental risk + (+) + + +  Coarse risk analysis* 
Quality of supply risk + +  + + + 
NPV-analyses, 
Power system analysis 
Reputational risk +  + + +  Coarse risk analysis* 
Vulnerability risk  + + + + + 
Coarse risk analysis* 
Power system analysis 
Regulatory risk   +  + + 
Coarse risk analysis* 
Simulation (e.g. data  
envelopment analysis) 
* Coarse risk analyses are very often used in combination with risk matrices. 
** The categories of risk analysis methods are listed in Table 1. 
“+” indicates the relevance of the types of risk impact and risk analysis method for each consequence 
category.  “(+)” denotes partial relevance. 
 
Table 2 shows that type of impact and type of methods used diverge across the various 
consequence categories (perhaps excepting the use of coarse risk analysis, which in 
principle can and has been used for most categories). Due to the diversity in risk 
consequence categories, there is no single risk analysis method that covers all of the 
different risks. Different methods are hence used for different purposes, each of which 
constitutes a part of the total picture. This acknowledgement is also made by (Haimes, 
2009 p. 194) who states that no single model can capture all the dimensions of risk 
assessment and risk management. 
 
There are alternatives to this division of risk analyses, such as to monetise all the 
various consequence categories as discussed and exemplified in e.g. (Vatn et al., 1996, 
Hughes et al., 2009), and merge the inputs into a net present value (NPV) calculation. 
Such approaches have not been widely used by Norwegian electricity distribution 
companies, and have neither been investigated in this PhD work. 
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4.5 INTANGIBLE RISKS IN ELECTRICITY DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM 
ASSET MANAGEMENT 
 
Several of the risks related to the consequence categories listed in section 4.4, are what 
can be called intangible risks. For the purpose of this thesis, intangible risk is used to 
denote risks whose consequences are hard to quantify in economic terms, even though it 
is possible to measure them in other terms. Intangible risks particularly refer to risks 
related to safety and environmental impact, but the term can also include reputational 
risk, political risks and similar. 
 
There is an increasing awareness among electricity distribution companies on 
developing holistic asset management strategies covering the different relevant risk 
consequence categories, as described in e.g. (Nordgård et al., 2005, Nordgård et al., 
2007a), and then there is a need to analyse the different risks in a structured manner – 
since they all constitute input to asset management decision making. 
 
Previously, intangible risks have usually been addressed using simplified or standard 
risk analysis methods, see for example (Nordgård et al., 2005, Nordgård et al., 2007b, 
Nordgård and Samdal, 2010). 
 
QRA methods have not been widely applied for analysing intangible risks in electricity 
distribution systems. Only a few applications have been found in the literature, see 
(Houbaer and Seddon, 1995, Hamoud et al., 2006, Hamoud et al., 2007). 
 
Houbaer and Seddon report on the application of fault tree and event tree analysis to 
calculate expected frequencies for flashover hazard (reflecting safety risk) for 
transmission line spans. Hamoud et al. report in the two references on quantifying safety 
risks associated with the catastrophic failures of transmission station or substation 
equipment, through estimating a safety index representing the frequency of occurrence 
of potential safety incidents. 
 
This PhD work has focused on the quantitative analysis of intangible risks, with the aim 
to provide decision support in electricity distribution system asset management. 
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5 MAIN RESULTS FROM THE WORK 
 
“Come together”17 
 
This chapter presents the main results of the work, divided into the work’s six sub-
objectives. 
 
As described in section 1.2, the main objective for the PhD work was to explore risk 
analysis methods which can be used to support decision making in electricity 
distribution system asset management, emphasising on the analysis of intangible risks. 
This objective was further elaborated into the following six sub-objectives: 
 
1. Describe the basic concepts of risk and risk management. 
2. Elaborate on challenges related to risk communication and perception. 
3. Test and evaluate methods for quantitative risk analysis for distribution system 
asset management decision support, focusing on bow-tie models and Bayesian 
networks. Included in this is to explore uncertainty in risk analysis. 
4. Elaborate on challenges and possible solutions related to acquiring numerical 
input data for quantitative risk analyses. 
5. Establish a framework for risk-informed decision making in distribution system 
asset management, emphasising the use of risk analysis, and: 
6. Test and exemplify results from the above stated sub-objectives, through 
realistic cases. 
 
Each of these sub-objectives is addressed in the following sections. Most of the results 
from the work are documented in the papers included in Part II - Papers, but to support 
the understanding and readability of this chapter, excerpts of examples from some of the 
papers are included. 
 
                                                 
 
17 Song by John Lennon and Paul McCartney, issued on the Abbey Road album, 1969. 
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5.1 THE CONCEPTS OF RISK 
 
The results corresponding to this sub-objective are to a large degree described in 
Chapter 4. Therefore only a brief description is given here. 
 
In order to use risk analysis in asset management decision support, it is necessary to 
explore some of the basic concepts of risk. 
 
This part of the work was mainly conducted through a review of different literature 
sources. There is relatively little to be found in the electrical engineering literature 
concerning this topic, and hence the relevant sources have been found in the general risk 
literature. 
 
The main findings concerning this sub-objective are mainly presented in Chapter 4, as it 
has its natural place as part of the background description for the work. The sub-
objective is also briefly treated in Paper VI (Nordgård, 2009b) and Paper VII 
(Nordgård, 2008b). 
 
The following results summarise the work related to this sub-objective: 
 
¾ There is no convergence in the risk literature on an interdisciplinary definition of 
risk, and there is still an ongoing debate as to how risk should be defined and 
what should be included in risk management concepts. 
¾ For the purposes of the work presented in this thesis, the definitions of risk that 
are presented in (Kaplan, 1997) and in (ISO/IEC, 2002) have shown to provide a 
sufficient foundation for risk analysis in electricity distribution asset manage-
ment. Kaplan’s definition provides a framework for how to think about risk, 
while the definition of ISO/IEC applies more specifically to the analysis of risk. 
¾ There are several frameworks that describe risk management. The framework 
based on (ISO/IEC, 2002) was used for the purposes of this thesis. This 
framework has proven suitable for the work, specifically through highlighting 
that risk communication has a significant part in the concept of risk 
management. 
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5.2 RISK PERCEPTION AND COMMUNICATION 
 
As stated in the risk management framework in (ISO/IEC, 2002), illustrated in section 
4.2, risk communication plays an important role within risk management as a whole. A 
lot of research has been done within this topic (as outlined in e.g. (Drottz-Sjöberg, 
2003), but little has been done with regards to application within the electricity 
distribution sector. 
 
The aim of this part of the work has been to examine the aspects of risk communication 
that have relevance to electricity distribution system asset management. Paper VII 
(Nordgård, 2008b) describes the main findings concerning this sub-objective. 
 
The topic is – at a minimum – twofold, and involves: 
- The terminology of risk (described in section 5.2.1). 
- Aspects influencing stakeholders’ perception of risks 
(described in section 5.2.2). 
 
5.2.1 The terminology of risk 
As described in section 4.1 and 5.1, there are a number of definitions of risk available in 
the literature. 
 
Differences in risk terminology can therefore pose a challenge when communicating 
risk analysis results, as described in Paper VII (Nordgård, 2008b). It is important to be 
aware of this, and particularly to try to avoid terminology problems by clearly stating 
what is meant by the different terms when performing and documenting risk analyses 
(Sand et al., 2007 p. 11-16). 
 
5.2.2 The perception and acceptability of risk 
Risk perception is the judgement that stakeholders make about the characteristics and 
severity of a given risk, and their perception of risk will further influence the way they 
act on risk information. The acceptability of a given risk lies in the “eyes of the 
beholder”, and is therefore dependant on the stakeholder, see e.g. (Slovic, 1998, Starr, 
1969, Fischhoff et al., 1981 p. 134-140). Hence, what one stakeholder finds to be 
acceptable risk can be unacceptable for another. 
 
There are several aspects that influence stakeholders’ perception of risks. The 
pioneering work of Chauncey Starr (Starr, 1969) points out two main aspects; the first is 
the voluntariness of being exposed to a risk, and the second is the benefits that are 
perceived from the risk exposure. Fundamentally, it is much easier to accept risk that is 
of your own choosing, rather than risk which you feel is forced on you. It is also much 
easier to accept a risk from which you benefit yourself. 
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(Covello and Sandman, 2001) provide a comprehensive summary of aspects that 
influence stakeholders’ perception of risk. Excerpts from this listing are presented in 
Paper VII (Nordgård, 2008b), with key points presented in Table 3. 
 
Table 3  Aspects affecting stakeholders’ perception of risk.  
Excerpts from (Covello and Sandman, 2001). 
Risk aspect Description 
Voluntariness 
Risks from activities considered to be involuntary or imposed (e.g., exposure to 
chemicals from an industrial facility) are judged to be greater, and are therefore 
less readily accepted, than risks from activities that are seen to be voluntary (e.g., 
smoking or sunbathing). 
Controllability 
Risks from activities viewed as under the control of others (e.g., releases of toxic 
chemicals by industrial facilities) are judged to be greater, and are less readily 
accepted, than those from activities that appear to be under the control of the 
individual (e.g. driving a car). 
Familiarity 
Risks from activities viewed as unfamiliar (e.g. chemicals or radiation from 
waste disposal sites) are judged to be greater than risks from activities viewed as 
familiar (such as household work). 
Benefits 
Risks from activities that seem to have unclear, questionable, or diffuse personal 
or economic benefits (e.g. waste disposal facilities) are judged to be greater than 
risks from activities that have clear benefits (jobs, monetary benefits, automobile 
driving). 
Catastrophic 
potential 
Risks from activities viewed as having the potential to cause a significant number 
of deaths and injuries grouped in time and space (e.g., airplane accidents) are 
judged to be greater than risks from activities that cause deaths and injuries that 
are scattered or random in time and space (e.g. automobile accidents). 
Uncertainty 
Risks from activities that are relatively unknown or that pose uncertain risks 
(e.g., risks from genetic engineering) are judged to be greater than risks from 
activities that appear to be well known to science (e.g. actuarial risk data related 
to automobile accidents). 
Effects on children 
Risks from activities that appear to put children specifically at risk (e.g., milk 
contaminated with toxic chemicals, pregnant women exposed to radiation or 
toxic chemicals) are judged to be greater than risks from activities that do not 
(e.g. workplace accidents). 
Trust 
Risks associated with institutions or organizations lacking in trust and credibility 
(e.g. industries with poor environmental track records) are judged to be greater 
than risks from activities associated with those that are trustworthy and credible. 
Media attention 
Risks from activities that receive considerable media coverage (e.g. accidents at 
nuclear power plants) are judged to be greater than risks from activities that 
receive little attention (e.g., on-the-job accidents). 
 
It is important also in electricity distribution asset management to be aware of the 
mechanisms that affect how people perceive risk, and that attention should also be paid 
to these non-technical aspects of risk management. 
 
The perception of risk will not be static, and can change through building of knowledge 
and better problem understanding. In this setting the results from risk analyses can play 
an important part. 
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There are several stakeholder interfaces where risk communication is of significance in 
distribution system asset management, as illustrated in Figure 6. Examples of risk 
problems that may be relevant for these stakeholder interfaces are described in Paper 
VII (Nordgård, 2008b). 
 
Governmental body 1
(NVE)
Governmental body 2
(DSB) Asset manager
Service provider
Board of directors
General public
Asset owner
Distribution company
 
 
Figure 6  Schematic mapping of internal and external stakeholders and stakeholder interfaces  
- from Paper VII (Nordgård, 2008b). 
 
The following results summarise the work related to this sub-objective: 
 
¾ Diverging risk terminology can pose a challenge when communicating risk. It is 
important to be aware of this, and try to avoid terminology problems by clearly 
stating what is meant by different terms when risk analyses are performed and 
documented. 
¾ The acceptability of a given risk lies in the “eyes of the beholder”, and is 
therefore stakeholder dependant. It is hence impossible to objectively state what 
is acceptable risk. 
¾ In distribution system asset management, there are several stakeholder interfaces 
where risk communication is of significance. Due to the different viewpoints of 
stakeholders, it is likely that there will be differences in how risks are perceived. 
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5.3 QUANTITATIVE RISK ANALYSIS METHODS USED FOR DECISION 
SUPPORT 
 
One major part of the work presented in this thesis was to explore methods for 
quantitative risk analysis (QRA) to support decisions in electricity distribution system 
asset management. 
 
In the work regarding this sub-objective, two types of QRA methods were tested: 
- Bayesian networks, and 
- Bow-tie models (that combine fault tree and event tree analysis). 
 
The motivation for choosing these methods was that they are well recognised in the risk 
literature, and they are among the methods most often referred to, see e.g. (Rausand and 
Utne, 2009 p. 171-204, Aven, 2008 p. 57-84). The two methods have also been used for 
risk analysis in many different settings, see for example (Trucco et al., 2009, Antão et 
al., 2009) (Bayesian networks), and (Vatn et al., 1996, Vatn, 2006) (Bow-tie models). 
 
There are obviously other risk analysis methods available, but due to the fact that they 
not as widely used and that they often are developed aiming at more specialised 
applications, they have not been further pursued in this work. 
 
The following sub-sections describe what was done in this work with regards to: 
- Bayesian networks (described in section 5.3.1), 
- Bow-tie models (described in section 5.3.2), 
- Exploring uncertainty in input data for quantitative risk analysis (described in 
section 5.3.3). 
 
The results from the work related to this sub-objective are summarised in section 5.3.4. 
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5.3.1 Bayesian networks 
 
The work regarding Bayesian networks is presented in Paper I (Nordgård and Sand, 
2009). In this section, the application of Bayesian networks is exemplified using 
excerpts from the case described in this paper. 
 
A Bayesian network is a modelling framework that has been used in many applications, 
such as in diagnostic systems and general reliability modelling (Langseth, 2007, 
Kjærulff and Madsen, 2008). 
 
Bayesian networks offer a compact presentation of the interactions in a stochastic 
system by visualizing system state variables and their dependencies. It has therefore 
been of interest to test the usefulness of Bayesian networks to model and analyse risk 
problems in electricity distribution system asset management, as described in Paper I 
(Nordgård and Sand, 2009). 
 
A Bayesian network consists of a qualitative and a quantitative part. The qualitative part 
is a directed acyclic graph where the nodes mirror the random variables and the edges of 
the graph represent the conditional dependence between variables. The quantitative part 
is a set of conditional probability functions, stating the relations between the nodes. 
Some basic properties of Bayesian networks are illustrated in the following example. 
 
Example: Simple illustration of Bayesian network 
Figure 7 presents a simple example of a Bayesian network18 that models the decision as 
to whether to change to winter tyres on a bicycle. 
 
Weather forecast
No frost
Frost
66.0
34.0
Change to winter tyres
Change
Not change
58.0000
80.0000
Weather
No frost
Frost
80.0
20.0
Satisfaction
 
Figure 7  Example of a Bayesian network for deciding whether to change to winter tyres. 
 
The network has two nature nodes representing the weather forecast in the evening for 
the coming morning (No frost or Frost) and the actual weather in the morning (No frost 
                                                 
 
18 Bayesian networks containing decision nodes and / or utility nodes are also referred to as Influence 
diagrams or Decision networks. For the purpose of this thesis Bayesian networks are used, regardless of 
the presence of such nodes or not. 
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or frost). It has a decision node as to whether or not change to winter tyres, and a utility 
node that represents the decision maker's level of satisfaction. 
 
There is a link from Weather to Weather forecast, which captures the correlation that is 
presumed to exist between the two. There is also a link from Weather forecast to 
Change to winter tyres indicating that the decision maker will know the forecast when 
making the decision, but no link from Weather to Change to winter tyres; since if the 
decision maker knew for certain how the weather was going to be, it would be easy to 
decide whether or not to change tyres. Weather is hence said to be a parent node to both 
Weather forecast and Change to winter tyres. Figure 8 shows how conditional 
probability tables were modelled for this case. 
 
Weather forecast Weather No frost Frost 
No frost 80.0 20.0 
Frost 10.0 90.0 
 
 
 
 
Weather Change to winter tyres Satisfaction 
No frost Change 50 
No frost Not change 100 
Frost Change 90 
Frost Not change 0 
 
Figure 8  Probability assumptions used in the example modelling. 
 
There are also links from Weather and Change to winter tyres to Satisfaction, capturing 
the idea that the bicyclist is most happy when there is no frost and he or she doesn't 
change to winter tyres (utility = 100). The next most satisfying situation is when there is 
a frost and he or she has changed tyres (utility = 90). The bicyclist dislikes using winter 
tyres when there is no frost (utility = 50), but feels the least satisfaction (and most 
danger...) if there is frost and the bike still has summer tyres (utility = 0). 
 
Figure 7 shows that with the basic assumptions for the weather (80 % chance of no 
frost, 20 % chance of frost), the satisfaction is highest for not changing to winter tyres. 
But if the model is updated, stating that the weather forecast says it will be frost, then 
the largest satisfaction is for changing, as shown in Figure 9. 
Change to winter tyres Weather 
forecast Change Not change 
No frost 10.0 90.0 
Frost 90.0 10.0 
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Weather forecast
No frost
Frost
   0
 100
Change to winter tyres
Change
Not change
71.1764
47.0588
Weather
No frost
Frost
47.1
52.9
Satisfaction
  
Figure 9  Updated model with weather forecast Frost. 
End of example. 
 
A summary of the case from Paper I (Nordgård and Sand, 2009) is presented in the 
following. A more detailed description of the modelling can be found in the paper. The 
Bayesian network software tool Netica19 was used to model the case. 
 
5.3.1.1   Case: Analysis of safety risk concerning air-insulated switches  
In Paper I (Nordgård and Sand, 2009), a Bayesian network was used to model a safety 
risk problem related to 12 kV air-insulated switches in MV/LV substations. The 
switches have been identified as a safety risk due to the hazard related to the 
uncontrolled burning of an electric arc if the switch does not work as intended. The 
safety risk was identified in a qualitative risk screening, described in (Nordgård et al., 
2005). 
 
The main factor contributing to the uncontrolled burning of an electric arc is considered 
to be slow switch operation. A Bayesian network was established to model this case, as 
shown in Figure 10. The network contains 11 different nodes altogether, of which 6 
have conditional probability tables that are functions of their parent nodes. 
 
Bayesian network model 
The following factors have been identified by company experts as relevant for 
modelling the risk related to the switches (the node numbering refers to Figure 10): 
- Age of switch (node I), 
- Operating environment (node II), 
- Maintenance interval (node III), 
- Encapsulation of the switch (node IV), 
- The use of protective clothing (node V). 
 
Two states were identified as being critical with regards to the correct operation of the 
switch:  
- If the switch poles are stuck (node VI), and 
- If the operating mechanism moves slowly (node VII). 
                                                 
 
19 Information about Netica can be found on the producer’s homepage www.norsys.com. 
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The maintenance action functional control was modelled to affect both of these states, 
and the time interval between these functional controls was modelled as a decision node 
in the network (node III). 
 
To establish a mathematical representation of the Bayesian network, conditional 
probability functions were formulated for each of the nodes that have parent nodes. 
 
 Operating environment
Clean
Exposed
50.0
50.0
Maintenance interval
1
2
4
6
8
12
      0
0.00179
      0
      0
      0
      0
Age switch
Age 1 to 25
Age 25 and above
60.0
40.0
10.6 ± 12
Switch poles stuck
No
Yes
97.2
2.80
Slow operating mechanism
No
Yes
99.0
 1.0
Slow switch operation
Normal
Slow
95.9
4.08
Burning electric arc
Yes
No
3.06
96.9
Protective clothing
Yes
No
90.0
10.0
Encapsulation switch
Full encapsulation
Semi encapsulation
Wire fence encaps
50.0
40.0
10.0
Personell injury
No
Small
Severe
99.2
0.68
0.14
PLL
I II III
IV V
VI VII
VIII
IX
X
XI
 
Figure 10  Bayesian network for a safety risk model for air-insulated switches  
– based on a figure from Paper I (Nordgård and Sand, 2009). 
 
Input data 
When analysing intangible risks, experience shows that it is hard to find statistical data 
which can support the choice of model parameters. The input to the case is therefore 
provided through discussions with distribution company experts. 
 
The switch age was divided into two classes; up to 25 years and 25 years and above. 
The operating environment was also split into two classes, clean and exposed 
environment. These modelling choices were made based on discussions with 
distribution company experts (Nordgård et al., 2005). 
 
It was further assumed that a switch aged 25 years or older had a failure rate that was 
twice the failure rate of newer switches, while a switch operating in a clean environment 
was assumed to have a failure rate 1/3 the failure rate of a switch in an exposed 
environment. The base failure rate, λpole (for a switch younger than 25 years, operating 
in a clean environment), was assumed to be 0.01. 
 
 
 
35 
To estimate the unavailability of the switch poles, qpole, i.e. the probability that the 
switch poles are stuck, the following equation was used (based on (Vatn, 1997)): 
 
 
2
mpole
poleq
τλ ⋅=  (1)
 
where τm is the maintenance interval in years. 
 
Figure 11 illustrates how the availability of the switch poles, ppole = 1 - qpole, varies for 
different combinations of the input parameters operating environment, switch age and 
maintenance interval. 
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Figure 11  Availability of switch poles as function of maintenance interval for different alternatives 
– from Paper I (Nordgård and Sand, 2009). 
 
The curves from Figure 11 were transferred to a conditional probability table (CPT), as 
shown in Table 4. The CPT was used as an input to the Bayesian network modelling. 
 
Other CPTs were similarly established for the remaining nodes with parent nodes in the 
Bayesian network. This is explained in more detail in Paper I. 
 
Barriers 
Three encapsulations were considered in this case, as indicated in node IV in Figure 10: 
- Full encapsulation, 
- Semi encapsulation, 
- Wire fence encapsulation. 
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Table 4  Example: Conditional probability table for the node Switch poles stuck. 
Switch poles stuck Maintenance 
interval [years] 
Age switch 
Operating 
environment No Yes 
1 < 25 years Clean 99.5 0.5 
1 < 25 years Exposed 98.5 1.5 
1 ≥ 25 years Clean 99.0 1.0 
1 ≥ 25 years Exposed 97.0 3.0 
2 < 25 years Clean 99.0 1.0 
2 < 25 years Exposed 97.0 3.0 
2 ≥ 25 years Clean 98.0 2.0 
2 ≥ 25 years Exposed 94.0 6.0 
4 < 25 years Clean 98.0 2.0 
4 < 25 years Exposed 94.0 6.0 
4 ≥ 25 years Clean 96.0 4.0 
4 ≥ 25 years Exposed 88.0 12.0 
6 < 25 years Clean 97.0 3.0 
6 < 25 years Exposed 91.0 9.0 
6 ≥ 25 years Clean 94.0 6.0 
6 ≥ 25 years Exposed 82.0 18.0 
8 < 25 years Clean 96.0 4.0 
8 < 25 years Exposed 88.0 12.0 
8 ≥ 25 years Clean 92.0 8.0 
8 ≥ 25 years Exposed 76.0 24.0 
12 < 25 years Clean 94.0 6.0 
12 < 25 years Exposed 82.0 18.0 
12 ≥ 25 years Clean 88.0 12.0 
12 ≥ 25 years Exposed 64.0 36.0 
 
The reason for the different encapsulations is that the substations have been built over 
quite a long time period, during which technical approaches have improved, from the 
wire fence to the full encapsulation.  
 
The use of protective clothing was also included as an additional barrier in the analysis, 
assuming that in 90 % of the cases protective clothing was used by the operator. 
 
Safety risk 
To aggregate the impact of injuries into a single safety risk measure, the concept of 
Potential Loss of Life (PLL) was used to weight the severity of the various types of 
injuries (Jonkman et al., 2003). The following weights were applied in the model: 
- No injury, PLL = 0 
- Small injury, PLL = 0.1 
- Severe injury,  PLL = 0.8 
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Based on the established Bayesian network model, different factors’ influence on the 
safety risk were estimated (measured in E(PLL)). 
 
This is illustrated in Figure 12, which shows the following: 
- The safety risk was estimated to be approximately 20 times higher for the 
switches in the wire fence encapsulations compared to the full encapsulation. 
- The doubling of maintenance intervals less than doubles the estimated PLL. 
- Significantly larger maintenance intervals can be used for the fully or semi 
encapsulated switches as compared to the wire fence ones, while still achieving 
the same level of risk. 
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Figure 12  Estimated PLL for three different encapsulations as function of maintenance interval  
– from Paper I (Nordgård and Sand, 2009). 
 
The quantitative safety risk analysis model established in the Bayesian network can be 
used to increase the experts’ understanding of the problem and to see how their input 
data result in estimated PLL for the alternative configurations. 
 
It should however be emphasised that the absolute value of PLL should be used with 
caution, since there are few results or data to calibrate the model against. The results for 
different alternatives will however give comparable results that can be used to quantify 
the differences between alternatives. 
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5.3.2 Bow-tie models 
 
The work on the application of bow-tie models is mainly presented in Paper II 
(Nordgård, 2010), Paper III (Nordgård, 2010) and Paper IV (Nordgård et al., 2010b). 
This section expands on the use of bow-tie models using excerpts from a case in Paper 
III (Nordgård, 2010). 
 
A bow-tie model is a risk analysis model that explicitly establishes cause / effect 
relationships for an undesired event, see e.g. (Vatn et al., 1996, Vatn, 2006 p. 14). 
 
In this thesis, the cause analysis was performed using fault tree analysis (FTA), and the 
effect analysis was performed using event tree analysis (ETA). Spreadsheet models 
were used to perform the FTA and ETA calculations. 
 
A conceptual bow-tie model is illustrated in Figure 13. Bi represents basic initiating 
events in the fault tree analysis, which lead to an undesired event through a sequence of 
logical gates. Sk represents different barriers, or other statements of potential outcomes, 
while Cj represents possible end event consequences resulting from the event tree 
analysis. CΣ is the aggregation of the consequences of all end events into a common risk 
measure. 
 
S1
C1
S2
S3
C2
C3
C4
B1
B2
B3
Fault tree analysis (FTA) Event tree analysis (ETA)
Undesired
event
CΣ
 
 
Figure 13  Conceptual bow-tie model – from Paper II (Nordgård, 2009a). 
 
A summary of the example from Paper III (Nordgård, 2010) is presented in the 
following. A similar application of a bow-tie model is also given in Paper II, but since 
Paper III also deals with the inclusion of uncertainty – which is treated in section 5.3.3 
– the case from Paper III has been chosen to exemplify the bow-tie model. A more 
detailed description of the modelling can be found in the paper. 
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5.3.2.1   Case: Analysis of potential oil spill from transformers 
The case is based on a quantitative risk assessment model established in (Nordgård and 
Solum, 2009), and further described in Paper III (Nordgård, 2010). The case evaluates 
risk related to potential oil spills from MV/LV distribution transformers located in the 
drainage basin of a drinking water reservoir. 
 
Fault tree analysis 
Two main failure modes were identified through discussions with company experts: 
- Oil spill due to degradation of the transformer casing, 
- Oil spill due to lightning strikes destroying the transformer. 
 
These two failure modes were modelled in a fault tree as shown in Figure 14, 
contributing to the top event “Oil spill from transformer”. 
 
  
OR
Oil spill from 
transformer
Failure due to 
degradation
Failure due to 
lightning
 
 
Figure 14  Fault tree - Oil spill from transformer - from Paper III (Nordgård, 2010). 
 
The following information was provided by distribution company experts: 
- Approximately 1 - 5 out of 1500 transformers have a leakage due to degradation 
each year. 
- Approximately 2 – 3 out of 1500 transformers experience breakage due to 
lightning strikes each year. 
 
Based on this information, the following estimates were chosen for the fault tree 
parameters: 
- qDegradation = 2.0·10-3 [events/year] 
- qLightning = 1.5·10-3 [events/year] 
where qDegradation and qLightning expresses the probabilities for leakage due to casing 
degradation and lightning strikes respectively. 
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The probability of occurrence for the top event is computed according to equation (2): 
 
 LightningnDegradatioLightningnDegradatiospillOil qqqqq ⋅−+=  (2)
 
With the above stated input data, this gives qOil spill = 0.0035. If a distribution company 
has 25 transformers in a drinking water drainage basin, this gives 0.0875 occurrences of 
the top event per year – i.e. one can expect the event to occur on average every 11 years. 
 
Event tree analysis 
In order to establish the event tree shown in Figure 15, the following barriers were 
considered: 
- Whether an oil collector is present, 
- Whether less than 10 litres of oil leaks, 
- Whether the transformer is located near a waterway (stream or river) leading 
directly to the drinking water reservoir. 
 
The amount of oil spilled cannot be considered to be an ordinary barrier, but rather a 
statement of a possible outcome. 
 
The following numerical estimates were chosen for these barriers: 
- qOil collector = 0.9, i.e. only 10 % of the transformers in the area have oil collectors 
- q< 10 liters = 0.8, i.e. in only 20 % of the cases is the oil spill less than 10 litres 
- qFar from waterway = 0.6, i.e. 60 % of the transformers are located near a stream or 
river leading directly into the drinking water reservoir. 
 
The background for choosing these probability estimates was input from distribution 
company experts. 
 
 
Oil spill from 
transformer Oil collector?
y
n
(1) No oil spill, 0 liters
(2) Insignificant oil spill, not visible 
(3) Minor oil spill, 10 liters
(5) Severe oil spill - 250 liters
< 10 liter oil 
spilled?
y
n
Far from 
waterway?
y
n
Far from 
waterway?
y
n
(4) Significant oil spill - 100 liters
0.1
0.9
0.2
0.8
0.4
0.4
0.6
0.6
 
 
Figure 15  Event tree model for possible outcomes following the start event  
Oil spill from transformer - from Paper III (Nordgård, 2010). 
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The results presented in Table 5 were obtained based on the fault tree analysis, the 
structure of the event tree in Figure 15 and the probability estimates for the barriers. 
 
Table 5  Results from the event tree analysis - from Paper III (Nordgård, 2010). 
End event 1 2 3 4 5 Sum 
Oil spill1) 0 1 10 100 250 - 
Frequency2) 0.009 0.006 0.009 0.025 0.038 - 
Time3)  114 159 106 40 26 - 
E(oil spill) 4) 0.0 0.0 0.1 2.5 9.5 12.1 
1) Estimated oil spill of the end event, [Litres]. 
2) Frequency of occurrence of end event I [year-1] 
3) Expected time between occurrences [years] 
4) Expected annual contribution to oil spill from end event i [Litres] 
 
The results in Table 5 show that the total expected oil spill is estimated to be 12.1 
litres/year. The most critical end event (End event 5) – with an oil spill of 250 litres – 
will occur on average every 26 years. 
 
To judge whether this potential oil emission is acceptable or not, is also for the decision 
maker to evaluate. In Paper III (Nordgård, 2010), the results were compared to a 
taxonomy proposed in (Wessberg et al., 2008), evaluating the risk according to five 
probability categories and three consequence categories, as illustrated in Table 6. 
 
Table 6  Risk categorisation - from Paper III (Nordgård, 2010), based on (Wessberg et al., 2008). 
 Moderate Extensive Serious 
5 - More than once a month II I I 
4 - More than once a year II I I 
3 - More than once in 10 years III II I 
2 - Once in a lifetime1) IV III II 
1 - Situation is known2) IV IV IV 
1) The lifetime of the industrial site. 2) It has happened sometimes somewhere. 
Risk categories  I: Risk elimination actions must be started immediately. 
II: Risk reduction needed. Proposals for actions as soon as possible. 
III: Proposals for actions to risk reduction should be given within a year. 
IV: No actions needed. 
 
The estimated expected consequence for this case was estimated to be in the categories 
Moderate to Extensive, while the probability of occurrence was estimated to be in 
categories 2 or 3 – resulting in a risk category estimate of category II - IV. From this, 
the conclusion was drawn that the risk can not be considered unconditionally 
acceptable, and that proposals for risk reduction should be considered. 
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5.3.3 Exploring uncertainty in input data for QRA 
 
Uncertainty in decision problem data is an inherent property of risk analyses. It is 
therefore important to explore this when analysing risk. This can be done through 
investigating the “what-ifs” – by performing analyses where the effects of changing 
input parameters are investigated and evaluated. 
 
Paper III (Nordgård, 2010) presents and examines three approaches for exploring the 
effects of input data uncertainty: 
- Reliability importance measures, 
- Sensitivity analysis, 
- Monte Carlo simulations. 
 
The approaches were chosen due to the fact that they represent recognised ways of 
including uncertainty in QRA, see e.g. (Rausand and Utne, 2009 p. 253), addressing the 
problem in different ways and requiring different computational efforts. 
 
Reliability importance measures 
Reliability importance measures can be used to provide information concerning how a 
risk model will behave with regards to changes in input parameters. The literature 
presents a variety of different types of such measures, see e.g. (Holen et al., 1988 p. 
145-157, Aven, 1992 p. 113-116, Hilber, 2008 p. 20-22). Two classic measures are used 
in Paper III (Nordgård, 2010): 
- Improvement potential, and 
- Birnbaum’s measure of reliability. 
 
The improvement potential, IAi can be described by the following equation: 
 hhI i
A
i −=  (3)
where h is the reliability of the system and hi is the reliability assuming that component 
i is in the best state (Aven, 1992 p. 113). Hence, IAi expresses the systems improvement 
potential if element i in the risk model is replaced with a fault-free element. 
 
The Birnbaum’s measure of reliability, IBi, can be described by the following equation: 
 
i
B
i p
hI ∂
∂=  (4)
To compute IBi the following formula is often used: 
 
 ),0(),1( phphI ii
B
i −=  (5)
where h(·i,p) = h(p1,p2,…,pi-1,·, pi+1,…,pn). 
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IBi expresses the system’s sensitivity with regards to changes in element i and is hence a 
measure for how small changes in i will affect the system (Aven, 1992 p. 114). 
 
IAi and IBi can both provide information concerning how sensitive the analysis results are 
with respect to changes in input parameters and where to look for efficient ways of 
reducing risk. 
 
Sensitivity analysis 
Sensitivity analysis is performed using repetitive analyses to see how changes in model 
parameters affect the estimated risk. Through this, information can be obtained 
concerning the robustness of the solution. 
 
For the purpose of the case presented in Paper III (Nordgård, 2009b), the effects of 
changing only one parameter at a time were assessed. 
 
Monte Carlo simulations 
In Monte Carlo simulations, input parameters are represented by probability 
distributions, and results are obtained through repetitive calculations sampling from 
these distributions. Monte Carlo simulations require larger modelling efforts compared 
to sensitivity analyses. In the case in Paper III (Nordgård, 2010), several input 
parameters were modelled using probability distributions, where expert judgments were 
translated into probability distributions that again were the basis for the simulations. 
The software @Risk20 was used to perform the Monte Carlo simulations. 
 
5.3.3.1   Case: Exploring uncertainty in input data for QRA 
The various methods for exploring uncertainty are illustrated in Paper III (Nordgård, 
2010). The bow-tie model used for the case is already presented in section 5.3.2, and is 
not repeated in this section. A description of the model and the parameters that are 
referred to in this section, can hence be found in section 5.3.2. 
 
Paper III (Nordgård, 2010) elaborates on the three methods presented above. Table 7 
shows the calculated improvement potentials and Birnbaum’s measures for the model 
parameters. 
 
                                                 
 
20 Information about @Risk can be found on http://www.palisade.com/ 
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Table 7  Calculated reliability importance measures for the input parameters  
- from Paper III (Nordgård, 2010). 
Model parameter 
Improvement 
Potential, IAi 
Birnbaum’s 
measure, IBi 
qDegradation 6.9 3448.8 
qLightning 5.2 3448.8 
qOil collector 12.1 5.7 
q< 10 litres 11.6 6.2 
qFar from waterway 5.8 4.1 
 
The improvement potential, IA,i, is largest for the model parameter qOil collector. It should 
be noted, however, that the values for the improvement potential are dependent on the 
values chosen as the base case reference (the value of h in equation (3)). 
 
The Birnbaum’s measures, IB,i, indicate that the estimated oil spill is clearly most 
sensitive to the changes in the two fault tree parameters qDegradation and qLightning, but 
since the failure probabilities here already are very small numbers – the improvement 
potential is not very large. 
 
Sensitivity analysis  
Sensitivity analyses were performed for low, best and high estimates for the input 
parameters. The parameter estimates are shown in Table 8. 
 
Table 8  Parameter estimates used for sensitivity analysis  
– values from Paper III (Nordgård, 2010). 
Model parameter Low estimate Best estimate High estimate 
qDegradation 1.0·10-3 2.0·10-3 3.0·10-3 
qLightning 1.33·10-3 1.5·10-3 1.67·10-3 
qOil collector 0.85 0.9 0.95 
q< 10 litres 0.6 0.8 1.0 
qFar from waterway 0.5 0.6 0.7 
 
The sensitivity analyses were performed by iterative calculations where one parameter 
was changed at a time. The results for low, best and high parameter estimates are shown 
in Figure 16. 
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Figure 16  Variation of E(annual oil spill) for low / best / high parameter values 
 - from Paper III (Nordgård, 2010). 
 
Monte Carlo simulations 
A Monte Carlo simulation model was established to investigate the effect of including 
probability distributions for the input parameters. Triangular distributions were used to 
represent the five input parameters listed in Table 8, with the distributions’ mean values 
equal to the best estimates, and low and high values giving the low and high ends. The 
resulting distribution from a simulation of the estimated annual oil spill is shown in 
Figure 17. 
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Figure 17  Monte Carlo simulation results of annual oil spill  
 - from Paper III (Nordgård, 2010). 
 
The Monte Carlo simulation provides a centre of gravity for the results corresponding to 
the expected value that was computed earlier (12.1 litres/year, see Table 5), but there is 
a more widespread variation of results around this value – wider than what is obtained 
when varying only one parameter at a time, as was done in the sensitivity analysis. 
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5.3.4 Summary of results 
 
The following results summarise the work related to the third sub-objective: 
 
¾ Papers I – IV illustrate that QRA methods can be applied to analyse intangible 
risks in asset management decision problems. 
¾ Both Bayesian networks and bow-tie models can be used to structure and 
visualise risk problems, and to put the knowledge and assumptions of company 
experts into a structured analytical framework. 
¾ Uncertainty is an inherent property of risk analyses, which is important to 
explore. Reliability importance measures, sensitivity analyses and Monte Carlo 
simulation are all methods capable of providing the analyst(s) and decision 
maker(s) with information concerning this aspect. 
¾ QRA requires numerical inputs for various model parameters. The cases 
illustrate that it is hard of to find statistical data that can support the choices of 
such parameters. This calls for the systematic use of expert judgment as input to 
the risk modelling, as further described in section 5.4 and in Paper IV (Nordgård 
et al., 2010b). 
¾ Compared to a simplified risk analysis, QRA will provide a better basis for 
comparing alternatives: however, it requires more labour. Using a combination 
of the methods can therefore be a practical solution – as described in section 5.5 
and Paper VI (Nordgård, 2009b). 
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5.4 NUMERICAL INPUT DATA FOR QUANTITATIVE RISK ANALYSES 
 
A continuing challenge with the use of quantitative risk analysis methods is acquiring 
data to use in the calculations. One of the sub-objectives of the work has addressed this 
topic. 
 
According to (Løvås, 2004 p. 65), there are in principle three approaches for acquiring 
numerical data: 
1. If all outcomes have the same chance of occurring, reasoning can be used to find 
the theoretical probabilities (For example by stating the probability of throwing 
4 on a fair die). 
2. Probabilities can be estimated by conducting a series of experiments and noting 
the relative frequency of the occurrence of an event. 
3. Probabilities can be estimated expressing degrees of belief regarding the 
occurrence of an event. 
 
The first approach is not considered relevant for the types of problems encountered with 
QRA in electricity distribution. The second approach will typically require having 
representative statistical material to rely on when establishing the probability estimates. 
The third approach requires input from people with expertise in the given field of 
application. 
 
When analysing intangible risks, electricity distribution companies will rarely have 
relevant data that can support the use of statistical approaches to obtain data for the 
analysis, see e.g. (Nordgård et al., 2007b). It is therefore often necessary to rely on input 
from company experts to estimate the numbers used for probabilities and consequences 
in the analysis. 
 
There are many possible ways for using expert judgement as input to QRA models, see 
e.g. (Keeney and von Winterfeldt, 1989, Clemen and Winkler, 1999). 
 
In the work presented in this thesis, expert judgment was used in two ways: 
- To provide direct estimates of failure probabilities based on expert statements, 
and  
- To provide failure probability estimates using life curve models. 
 
The first approach was used in Papers I-III and VI, while the latter was used in Paper 
IV, (Nordgård et al., 2010b) based on the methodology presented in (Welte, 2008a), and 
exemplified in (Heggset et al., 2007, Welte and Skjølberg, 2009). 
 
The main reason for exploring the use of life curve models was that the method has 
proven to be valid for hydropower production components (Welte, 2008a), and is in the 
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process of being tested for its usefulness for distribution system components through an 
ongoing project supported by Norwegian distribution companies21, see e.g. (Welte and 
Skjølberg, 2009). 
 
5.4.1 Using direct estimates 
 
Direct estimates were used to quantify failure rates and barrier probabilities in Papers I-
III and VI, by using expert’s opinion on how probable a failure was, and how well a 
barrier was assumed to function. 
 
The basis for making such estimates can obviously be questioned, since there often will 
be significant uncertainty related to the knowledge upon which the experts rely for their 
judgments, see e.g. (Keeney and von Winterfeldt, 1989). But by making such estimates 
and using them in an analytical model, the judgments are made explicit and it is 
possible to discuss the inputs and results on a more transparent basis (Keeney and von 
Winterfeldt, 1989, Apostolakis, 2004). 
 
The use of direct estimates shown in the papers indicates that this approach is also 
applicable for electricity distribution system asset management. 
 
5.4.2 Using life curves models as an input to quantitative risk analysis 
 
Paper IV (Nordgård et al., 2010b) presents a procedure for structured use of expert 
judgement as an input to QRA, through the use of life curve models. 
 
The procedure uses expert judgment to establish life curves (Anders and Endrenyi, 
2002), which in turn are used to estimate time varying failure probabilities, using a 
semi-Markov process to model the degradation of a component. By applying phase-type 
distribution theory (Neuts, 1981 p. 41-80, Welte, 2008b), the semi-Markov process is 
converted into an ordinary Markov process, which finally provides a model for 
calculating failure probabilities. The life curve model concept is illustrated in Figure 18. 
 
                                                 
 
21 The project of Energi Norge: Tilstandskontroll og restlevetid for nettkomponenter (Condition 
monitoring and residual lifetime for electric grid components). 
http://www.energinorge.no/alle/tilstandskontroll-og-restlevetid-for-nettkomponenter-article7034-302.html 
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Figure 18  Concept of life curve and Markov process  
 - from Paper IV (Nordgård et al., 2010b). 
 
The resulting failure probabilities can be used as input to a bow-tie model, resulting in a 
risk measure that varies with time, as illustrated in Figure 19. 
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Figure 19  Conceptual model where the output from life curves is used as an input  
to a bow-tie model – from Paper IV (Nordgård et al., 2010b). 
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Paper IV (Nordgård et al., 2010b) proposes a seven-step procedure for risk-informed 
decision making, using life curves as an input to a QRA model: 
 
1. Identification of the risk problem. 
2. Identification of critical failure modes. 
3. Establishing life curves for one or more failure mode(s). 
4. Establishing a bow-tie model for quantitative risk analysis. 
5. Analysing the model 
6. Evaluating the risk analysis results 
7. Making the decision 
 
The procedure was applied to a case that analysed the same basic risk problem as 
described in Paper I (Nordgård and Sand, 2009); an analysis of safety risk related to 
12 kV air-insulated switches. 
 
Even though this case was based on the same risk problem as in Paper I (Nordgård and 
Sand, 2009), the analyses were performed using different input data and different 
models, and therefore the results are not directly comparable. The purpose of the case in 
Paper IV (Nordgård et al., 2010b) was to illustrate the procedure using a realistic 
problem, and not to replicate the case analysed in Paper I (Nordgård and Sand, 2009). 
 
5.4.2.1   Case: Using life curves as an input to QRA  
The detailed description of the risk problem is found in Paper IV (Nordgård et al., 
2010b). 
 
Slow movement of the switch during operation is regarded to be the main reason for 
obtaining uncontrolled electric arcs in the switchgear. Based on a qualitative evaluation 
of the criticality of a set of identified failure modes, the failure mode of Slow operation 
of switch was chosen to be further analysed in the case. 
 
A life curve model consisting of two condition states was chosen for the modelling of 
the risk problem, as illustrated in Figure 20. The reason why only two states were 
chosen for this case was that there exist no well-defined condition description available 
for such switch disconnectors, and that it was considered hard to observe more than two 
condition states in practice. 
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Figure 20  Two-state life curve model 
– based on Paper IV (Nordgård et al., 2010b). 
 
The life curve represents the time before failure occurs, starting from an As-good-as-
new condition, via Degraded to Fault. Estimates for mean sojourn time and 10th 
percentiles for the failure mode Slow operation of switch are presented in Table 9. 
 
Table 9  Mean sojourn times and 10th percentiles in the condition states  
– from Paper IV (Nordgård et al., 2010b). 
 
State 1 – As-good-as-new State 2 – Degraded Failure mode 
Mean value 10th percentile Mean value 10th percentile 
Operating mechanism causing 
slow operation of the switch 
6 years 2 years 6 years 2 years 
 
Based on these values, using the methodology described in Paper IV (Nordgård et al., 
2010b), time varying failure probabilities were computed for the failure mode. For the 
purpose of this case, the hazard rate, z(t), was chosen to be the most suitable model 
input parameter. The hazard rate gives an estimate for the number of occurrences in 
year t given that no incidents have happened before that time. This is a suitable measure 
when using the model to say something about maintenance intervals. The hazard rate, 
z(t), is illustrated in Figure 21. 
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Figure 21  Hazard rate z(t) for the failure mode “Slow operation of switch” 
– from Paper IV (Nordgård et al., 2010b). 
 
The hazard rate shown in Figure 21 was used as an input to the fault tree and event tree 
analysis. The event tree used in Paper IV is shown in Figure 22. The details concerning 
the event tree parameters are described in the paper. 
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Figure 22  Event tree modelling following the event ”Slow operation of switch” 
– from Paper IV (Nordgård et al., 2010b). 
 
The bow-tie model was analysed for three different types of encapsulations; 
- Fully encapsulated switchgear, where the switch disconnector is placed in 
cubicle covered by steel plates with pressure release in safe directions. 
- Semi-encapsulated switchgear, where the switch disconnector is placed behind 
steel plated cubicle fronts, but the top and bottom of the cubicle is open. 
- Wire fence switchgear cubicles, where there are only wire fences between the 
operator and the switchgear. 
 
The results from the calculation, the safety risk measure, E(PLL(t)), are shown in  
Figure 23. 
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Figure 23  E(PLL) as function of time for three different types of encapsulation 
– from Paper IV (Nordgård et al., 2010b). 
 
The results show that the wire fence encapsulation results in approximately a five-fold 
higher safety risk compared to the fully encapsulated switchgear. 
 
Also here it is relevant to ask: What is acceptable risk in this case? Previous practice in 
electricity distribution companies indicates that 4-5 years (and also more) have been 
used as a maintenance interval for wire fence encapsulated switch disconnectors. 
 
If 5 years is chosen (time = 5 in Figure 10), this results in an implicitly given 
acceptance level of (at least) E(PLL) = 0.0003. Transferred to the other types of switch 
encapsulations, this gives a maintenance interval of approx 7 years for semi-
encapsulated and 11-12 years for fully encapsulated switch disconnectors. 
 
 
5.4.3 Summary of results 
 
The following results summarise the work related to this sub-objective: 
 
¾ When analysing intangible risks, it is necessary to use expert judgment to 
estimate model parameters. 
¾ Paper IV (Nordgård et al., 2010b) shows that life curve models are a feasible 
way of providing input to a QRA model, using expert judgment about condition 
states and sojourn times as input. 
¾ The proposed procedure in Paper IV states a structured way of using life curve 
models as input to a bow-tie model, resulting in a time-varying risk estimate that 
for example can provide a basis for comparing alternatives. 
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5.5 FRAMEWORK FOR RISK-INFORMED DECISION MAKING IN 
DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM ASSET MANAGEMENT 
 
This part of the work was undertaken with the aim to use results from some of the other 
sub-objectives to formulate a framework describing how QRA can be used for decision 
support in electricity distribution companies. This framework is presented in Paper VI 
(Nordgård, 2009b), and illustrated in Figure 24. 
 
Compared to the general frameworks for risk assessment (which is one of the parts of 
risk management described in section 4.2), the proposed framework highlights the use 
of QRA to analyse selected risk problems. 
 
In Paper VI (Nordgård, 2009b) it is also emphasised that throughout the process it is 
important to keep in mind the aspect of risk communication to relevant stakeholders. 
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- Analysis
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- Technical analyses
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Figure 24  Proposed framework for risk-informed decision support in electricity distribution 
system asset management – from Paper VI (Nordgård, 2009b). 
 
The different parts of the proposed framework are described in detail in Paper VI 
(Nordgård, 2009b), but two important aspect, Initial risk analysis and QRA for selected 
problems are highlighted in the following. 
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5.5.1 Initial risk analysis 
 
Risk analysis deals with finding answers to Kaplan’s triplet of questions, as listed in 
section 4.1, through identifying undesired events and estimating the probabilities and 
consequences of these events. 
 
In the initial risk analysis, it is proposed to use simplified risk analysis methods in 
combination with risk matrices. This is done to gain an overview of the risks with 
minimum use of resources, see e.g. (Nordgård and Samdal, 2010). 
 
Identification of undesired events  
The aim of this part of the framework is to identify relevant sources of risk and to 
pinpoint undesired events that might origin from these sources. Input to this can be: 
- Expert knowledge, 
- Results from inspections, 
- Data from databases, 
- Results from previous analyses. 
 
Experience shows that only limited information can be found in statistical databases 
related to the analysis of intangible risks (due to the fact that the information simply 
does not exist), and previous analyses are also few in numbers. Expert judgment and 
results from inspections will hence often be the best available sources for identifying 
undesired events. 
 
Risk estimation and mapping 
The risk estimation includes assessing probability and consequence estimates for the 
undesired events (ISO/IEC, 2002). To map the risk results, risk matrices should be used 
for each of the consequence categories that are relevant for the decision. Typical 
examples of such consequence categories can be economic impact, safety, 
environmental impact and reputational impact, see e.g. (Nordgård et al., 2005, Nordgård 
and Samdal, 2010) 
 
Potential sources of data for such estimates will be the same as for the sources to 
identify the undesired events, and expert judgment will also be of great importance in 
this context. Probability and consequence estimates can be in qualitative or semi-
quantitative forms, e.g. “High”, “Medium”, “Low” or “1 – 10 occurrences per year”. 
An example of risk mapping from Paper VI (Nordgård, 2009b) is shown in Table 10. 
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Table 10  Plotting of 6 undesired events in a risk matrix – from Paper VI (Nordgård, 2009b). 
 
 C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 
P5      
P4      
P3      
P2  1(rep.) 1(env.)   
P1  
2(ec./rep.) 
5(ec./rep.) 
3(rep.) 
6(rep.) 
4(ec.) 
3(saf.) 
6(saf.) 
 
Abbreviations: ec. = Economy, saf.= Safety, env. = Environment, rep. = Reputation. 
 
The probability and consequence scales are denoted with the following qualitative terms 
(based on (Nordgård et al., 2007b)): 
P5 – Highly Probable   C5 – Catastrophic 
P4 – Very Probable   C4 – Serious 
P3 – Probable   C3 – Medium 
P2 – Less probable   C2 – Small 
P1 – Improbable  C1 – Negligible 
 
Risk evaluation 
The initial risk mapping will in many cases provide sufficient information concerning 
the risk picture, and there will be no need for more detailed analyses. The risk 
evaluation may however reveal risks that may call for a more in-depth investigation, by 
using QRA methods. Candidates for more thorough QRA modelling can be: 
- Critical undesired events, 
- Undesired events with potentially large consequences, 
- Undesired events where the uncertainty in the initial estimate is high, 
- Evaluation of alternative solutions for risks considered unacceptable. 
 
The motivation for performing a QRA is to provide better understanding of the problem 
and a better basis for making decisions. 
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5.5.2 QRA for selected problems 
 
The process of using QRA includes (Paper VI (Nordgård, 2009b)): 
- Describing the system – including relevant barriers, maintenance actions, etc. 
- Establishing models representing causal relations. 
- Estimating model parameters. 
- Calculating and presenting results. 
- Having dialogue and discussions with relevant stakeholders regarding model 
assumptions, numerical inputs and results. 
 
The results from QRA can provide valuable input to and structuring of the decision 
problem, as illustrated in section 5.3. 
 
The framework proposed in Figure 24 also emphasises that risk analyses are not the sole 
input to decision making. Other technical analyses, such as load flow analyses, 
reliability analyses (which are another type of risk analysis that are outside the scope of 
this thesis) and various economic analyses will also be important input to the basis for 
decision making. 
 
5.5.3 Summary of results 
 
The following results summarise the work related to this sub-objective: 
 
¾ A framework for risk-informed decision making is described in Paper VI 
(Nordgård, 2009b). The framework proposes the use of simplified risk analysis 
methods for initial risk assessment, and QRA methods to perform more in-depth 
studies of selected problems. 
¾ QRA methods will be more laborious to perform compared to simplified risk 
analyses. QRA should therefore be limited to a selected number of problems. 
¾ The results from the risk analyses will – together with results from also other 
types of analyses – contribute to a more solid basis for making decisions. 
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5.6 TESTING AND VERIFICATION THROUGH CASES 
 
The last sub-objective stated for the work was to test and exemplify the methods and 
approaches through their application in distribution system asset management cases. 
Table 11 summarises the cases that were used in this thesis. 
 
Table 11  Cases presented in this thesis. 
 
 Method(s) Case description 
Paper I Bayesian networks 
Analysis of safety risk and maintenance options for 12 kV MV 
switch disconnectors 
Paper II Bow-tie model 
Analysis of working routines for decommissioning of LV 
overhead lines 
Paper III 
Bow-tie model 
Reliability 
importance indicators 
Sensitivity analysis 
Monte Carlo 
simulation 
Analysis of potential oil spill from MV/LV transformers, and 
the impact of uncertainty in input parameters 
Paper IV 
Bow-tie model 
Life curve model 
Use of expert judgment and life curves as inputs for the 
analysis of safety risk and maintenance intervals for MV switch 
disconnectors 
Paper VI 
Simplified risk 
analysis 
Bow-tie model 
Risk analysis of MV/LV distribution transformers, including 
detailed analysis of potential oil spill 
 
Paper V and Paper VII do not contain cases where risk analysis methods have been 
used. 
 
The cases were chosen based on input from Norwegian electricity distribution 
companies as examples of risk related problems, and risk analysis was applied to see if 
the methods can provide useful inputs to such decision making problems. 
 
The cases reflect a range of applications, from making maintenance strategies with 
respect to safety, to analysis of environmental impacts from potential oil emissions from 
transformers, and analysis of working procedures for decommissioning of LV overhead 
lines. 
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The following results summarise the work related to the last sub-objective: 
 
¾ The cases have exemplified and illustrated the feasibility of using QRA methods 
to provide input to distribution system asset management decision making. 
Feedback from distribution company practitioners indicate that the methods can 
provide valuable decision support in this context. 
¾ Compared to performing simplified risk analyses only, QRA will give the 
decision maker(s) a better basis for comparing results for different alternatives. 
¾ The choices of modelling and input data used in the cases, can obviously be 
debated. In practical use this will be one of the advantages of using QRA, in that 
it facilitates constructive discussions concerning important risk influencing 
factors, and how they should be included in the analysis. 
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6 DISCUSSION 
 
“Looking through a glass onion”22 
 
This chapter presents a discussion of the results from the work and an evaluation of the 
applicability of the results for electricity distribution companies. 
 
 
6.1 DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS 
 
The concepts of risk 
There are a number of definitions of risk available, as described in sections 4.1 and 5.1, 
and there is an ongoing debate concerning their appropriateness. 
 
For practical applications in electricity distribution system asset management, the 
definitions stated in (Kaplan, 1997) and (ISO/IEC, 2002), presented in section 4.1, have 
shown to be well-suited to the purpose of providing a framework for structured analyses 
and discussions concerning risk. This is illustrated through the cases included in this 
thesis. 
 
As of today, the results from the ongoing debate about definitions will not pose a 
significant change in how to think about risk, at least not for the purpose of the work 
presented in this thesis. But it is important to be aware of the discussion, and to see if 
future developments in the conceptual frameworks can contribute to improve risk-
informed decision making also in electricity distribution system asset management. 
 
Risk perception and communication 
There are many aspects that influence how stakeholders perceive risk, and hence how 
they judge the acceptability of a risk. It is important to acknowledge these social and 
psychological aspects of risk management, especially in decision situations where more 
than one stakeholder is involved. For electricity distribution companies, this can 
typically involve (members of) the general public or governmental bodies. 
 
Even though there are discrepancies concerning how stakeholders perceive risk, one 
should not draw the conclusion that risk analysis is of little value as input to decision 
                                                 
 
22 Text line from the song Glass Onion, by John Lennon and Paul McCartney, issued on the White Album, 
1968. Glass onion is slang for monocle. 
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making. A structured and transparent risk analysis will document what has been 
considered when addressing the risk problem, and help to identify the source of 
potential disagreements and where to look for solutions. 
 
Risk analyses can therefore contribute to align perceptions of risk and provide an arena 
for communication and problem solving. 
 
Quantitative risk analysis methods used for decision support 
The results presented in several of the papers included in this thesis show that QRA 
methods can structure and analyse problems addressing intangible risks in distribution 
system asset management. Bayesian networks and bow-tie models have been used for 
the purpose, and both methods provide results which can give useful input when 
evaluating risk problems. 
 
To compare the two methods, a qualitative evaluation has been performed taking into 
account the aspects of: 
- Transparency of the methods, 
- Computational complexity of the methods, 
- Need for data to support the analysis, 
- Ability to represent complex relations, and  
- Competence required to model risk problems. 
These aspects are discussed in the following. 
 
With regards to transparency, the bow-tie modelling is considered better, compared to 
Bayesian networks. In a bow-tie model it is apparent by visual inspection what is 
included in the model or not. In a Bayesian network more of the cause / effect relations 
are modelled in conditional probability tables, and hence it may require more 
investigation to understand the modelling. 
 
The computational complexity is further considered somewhat higher for Bayesian 
networks compared to that of bow-tie models. By this it is meant the possibility for an 
analyst to understand the results from the model; for example it is considered 
significantly easier to check a bow-tie model “by hand” (especially the event tree 
analysis) than to do the same with the results of a Bayesian network. 
 
The need for data is also considered to be higher with regards to constructing 
conditional probability tables in a Bayesian network, compared to the probability 
estimates used in bow-tie models. Even though the origin of the data will be the same, 
and stem from the same expert judgment, one will often have to make more 
assumptions in order to establish data for a Bayesian network. 
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Concerning the methods’ ability to represent complex relations, Bayesian networks are 
considered to be more flexible and better suited than bow-tie models. Complex relations 
will result in complex fault and event trees, which can be demanding to understand. In a 
Bayesian network, complex relations can be included in the condition probability 
functions for the nodes, still leaving a relatively simple overview in the model graph. 
This aspect will be in somewhat opposition to the aspect of transparency, reflecting that 
when problems get more complex, the advantage that bow-tie models have concerning 
transparency, may diminish in the potential confusion of complexity. 
 
Finally; the competence required to model risk problems is regarded to be higher when 
using Bayesian networks compared to that of bow-tie models – due to a more complex 
computational framework and more specialised methods. 
 
The evaluation can be summarised as shown in Table 12. 
 
Table 12  Qualitative comparison of Bow-tie models and Bayesian networks applied to the types of 
problems presented in this thesis. 
Evaluation aspects Bow-tie models Bayesian network 
Transparency High* Medium – Low 
Computational complexity Medium* Medium – High 
Need for data Low – Medium* Medium – High 
Ability to represent complex relations Low – Medium High* 
Competence requirements Medium* Medium – High 
The most favourable outcome for each of the evaluation aspects is indicated by *. 
 
Based on this evaluation, bow-tie models have been regarded as the most applicable 
method for the type of problems treated in this thesis. The main disadvantages regarding 
Bayesian networks are considered to be more extensive need for data to construct 
conditional probability tables and less transparency of the model itself. 
 
One possible approach to combine the strengths of both methods is to use the high-level 
graphs of Bayesian networks as an aid in the process of capturing the essence of the risk 
problem, and further to adapt this graph into a more simplified bow-tie model. This was 
done in (Nordgård, 2008a), but has not been further elaborated further in the PhD work. 
 
Generally, Bayesian networks can be considered to be a more advanced risk analysis 
approach, which have its main advantages when exploring more composite risk 
problems, requiring higher expertise and more specialised computational tools. For 
distribution system asset management, Bayesian networks can be the preferable method 
when more experience using QRA is gained and better data are available. But for the 
time being, and for the type of problems analysed in this thesis, this is not the case. 
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Even though QRA methods result in numerical risk estimates, this will not necessarily 
make it easier to state whether a risk is acceptable or not, since the question of 
acceptability is also influenced by the stakeholders’ risk perceptions and the values and 
beliefs of the decision maker(s.) To use risk analysis results to judge the acceptability of 
risk will require a thorough calibration of risk analysis models and clearly stated risk 
acceptance levels. For the application within electricity distribution system asset 
management there is still some way to go before this can be achieved. 
 
Exploring uncertainty in input data in QRA 
There will always be uncertainty related to risk analysis modelling and input 
parameters. Exploring the effects of uncertainty should therefore be an important part of 
any risk analysis. 
 
For the QRA models explored in this thesis, sensitivity analysis is considered to be the 
most suitable way to explore uncertainty – giving acceptable results with relatively low 
computational effort. Reliability importance measures can be used to give direction of 
where to look for risk reducing measures, but it should be accompanied with sensitivity 
analysis to illustrate the effect of the changed parameters. Monte Carlo simulation will 
give a broader risk picture, but it will demand more sophisticated modelling, and the 
results provided will not give significantly more information compared to what can be 
provided by sensitivity analyses. 
 
One important aspect that should be highlighted from the exploration of uncertainty, is 
the fact that risk analyses will provide figures that are subject to some level of 
uncertainty and that are more or less sensitive to changes in model input parameters. It 
is hence unrealistic to believe that risk analyses will converge towards a “true value” if 
only “we get the numbers right”. 
 
One should acknowledge that uncertainty is an inherent property of risk, and that it 
should be explored, rather than attempted to eliminate. This is important to recognise 
for the risk analyst(s), but also for the decision maker(s) using risk analysis results as 
input. 
 
Numerical input data for QRA 
QRA require numerical inputs for various model parameters, and experience shows that 
it is hard to find statistical data that can support the choice of parameters when 
analysing intangible risks. The major data source will therefore (at least in a short-to-
medium time perspective) be expert judgment. 
 
To obtain parameter estimates, both direct estimates and results from life curve models 
have been used in this thesis. Which approach to use depends on the purpose of the 
study, and what input data that are available. For most of the cases illustrated in this 
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thesis, direct estimates were used, providing reasonable results. But as life curve 
modelling are getting more developed, being advocated by ongoing research projects, 
this kind of input data can be used to improve and also calibrate quantitative risk 
analyses; for example by using input data that are consistent with condition monitoring 
observations. 
 
The validity of the experts’ judgment (concerning both direct estimates and life curve 
inputs), can obviously be questioned, and such judgments should be used with caution. 
But it is also very relevant to ask, what is the alternative to the use of expert judgment? 
Both the options of giving up risk analyses due to lack of data, or taking decisions 
without any attempt to structure and analyse the risk, seem worse than using a risk 
analysis approach with explicitly stated expert-based assumptions. 
 
Even though it has been shown that expert judgment can provide valuable inputs to 
QRA, it is also important to improve the foundation for estimating risk analysis 
parameters by gathering data from condition monitoring activities and historical 
performance. Such data can facilitate the use of also statistical approaches to estimate 
model parameters, as supplement to expert judgment. 
 
Framework for risk-informed decision making in distribution system asset 
management 
The framework presented in Paper VI (Nordgård, 2009b) puts the QRA methods into a 
broader decision making context. 
 
The framework underscores the need for combining simplified risk analysis and QRA 
depending on the problem at hand. Compared to simplified risk analyses, QRA methods 
will provide a better basis for comparing alternatives, although it will require more 
work to obtain these results. 
 
In many cases it will be sufficient to perform a simplified risk analysis only, since this 
can provide a risk picture that is considered informative enough for decision making. 
But in some situations, a more in-depth study should be performed, using QRA to 
illuminate the problem further and provide a better basis for comparison of alternatives. 
 
It will be difficult to formulate a general rule for when to apply QRA. This will be a 
“decision within the decision”, based on an evaluation of the criticality of identified 
undesired events. 
 
Testing and verification through cases 
Throughout the work, the testing of methods and approaches on realistic cases, has been 
emphasised. The cases reported in the papers illustrate the feasibility of using 
quantitative risk analysis for decision support in distribution system asset management. 
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Some of the cases have been used in several of the papers. For example, the case related 
to the analysis of potential oil spills from transformers was first used in (Nordgård and 
Solum, 2009), then updated and expanded to include methods to explore uncertainty in 
QRA in Paper III (Nordgård, 2010), and also combined with a simplified risk analysis 
in Paper VI (Nordgård, 2009b). 
 
The same risk problem was also used as basis for the cases in Paper I (Nordgård and 
Sand, 2009), described in section 5.3.1, and Paper IV (Nordgård et al., 2010b), 
described in section 5.4.2. Even though the cases were not designed for it, it is 
unavoidable that some comparison is made. What can be seen is that the general trend in 
the results is the same, even though the numerical values differ. The reasons for the 
differences can be explained by the fact that different aspects were included in the 
models and different input data were used. For example; in the case in Paper I, a 
stepwise constant failure rate was used, while in Paper IV, time varying failure rates 
from life curves was used. The numerical values used for the barriers were also 
different. 
 
The somewhat diverging numerical results emphasise that one should be careful in 
comparing risk analysis results that originate from different models, without first 
performing a thorough calibration. 
 
Finally, it can also be questioned if it is necessary to use QRA methods to analyse risk 
problems as exemplified in this thesis. It is the author’s opinion that such analyses can 
contribute to better understanding of risk problems, and that they hence (in some cases) 
should be performed. But the cases also show that even simple problems will require 
quite complex models, and there is a potential danger that the analyses will go into 
devastating detail. Therefore one will always face the challenge of deciding when to 
stop and what simplifications to accept in the analyses. 
 
 
6.2 APPLICABILITY IN ELECTRICITY DISTRIBUTION COMPANIES 
 
As stated in section 1.3, the PhD work has emphasised on the potential practical 
application of risk analysis methods in electricity distribution company decision 
making. 
 
The work performed in this thesis shows the feasibility of using QRA for decision 
support, but it is still valid to ask if the methods and results are applicable for use in 
distribution system asset management among Norwegian electricity distribution 
companies. As of today, there is no – or at least very limited - use of such quantitative 
methods to analyse intangible risk. 
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The process of developing risk-informed decision making can be seen on as consisting 
of several steps; for example: 
- Understanding the fundamental concepts of risk and risk analysis, 
- Applying simplified risk analyses in a structured and well-founded manner, 
- Using QRA methods to elaborate more thoroughly on selected problems. 
 
Several companies have gained experience on the first two steps of such a process, 
having built a foundation for their future risk management. The inclusion of QRA in 
their asset management decision making is therefore within reach, but it will require 
new ways of thinking and new expertise among company professionals. 
 
To summarise; it can be stated that risk analysis in general, and QRA methods in 
particular, can contribute to better decision support and documentation of risk 
assessment in electricity distribution companies. The use of such methods should 
however follow the principles of continual improvement (as described in section 3.2), 
starting with basic applications, and sophisticating the approaches as experience and 
confidence is gained. 
 
In (Apostolakis, 2004), three phases in the application of QRA are outlined, based on 
the experiences from the nuclear energy sector and space exploration: 
- Phase 1 is characterised by scepticism about the usefulness of such approaches. 
- Phase 2 is when engineers and decision makers get more used to the methods, 
and start paying attention to the insights provided by QRA. Typically, decision 
makers focus on the “negative insights”, for example through taking into 
account failure modes which previously have not been identified. 
- Phase 3 is reached when confidence is gained in the methods, which allows also 
for using the “positive insights”, for example through relaxing previously 
imposed safety requirements because the new insight give reason to prioritise 
otherwise. 
 
If similar phases are to be observed within electricity distribution, is yet unknown. But 
since the distribution companies can use the insights of QRA to improve their asset 
management practices, it can be worth the effort of trying to follow the footprints of 
nuclear and rocket science. 
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7 CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER WORK 
 
“The end”23 
 
This chapter presents conclusions from the work, and proposes topics for further 
research. 
 
 
7.1 CONCLUSIONS 
 
The work presented in this thesis contributes to the fulfilment of the overall objective, 
which has been to explore risk analysis methods that can be used to support decision 
making in electricity distribution system asset management, with an emphasis on the 
analysis of intangible risks. This has been achieved through the elaboration of sub-
objectives that together address the composite overall objective. 
 
The main contributions of this thesis can be summarised as: 
 
¾ An exploration and testing of quantitative risk analysis (QRA) methods to 
support decisions concerning intangible risks. 
¾ The development of a procedure for using life curve models to provide input to 
QRA models. 
¾ The development of a framework for risk-informed decision making where 
QRA is used to analyse selected problems. 
 
In addition, the thesis contributes to clarify the basic concepts of risk, and describe 
concepts and challenges related to risk terminology, risk perception and risk 
communication; recognising that risk analysis and risk management have facets that go 
beyond the methods for analysis and acquisition of data. 
 
Risk analysis in general, and QRA in particular, can provide a more solid foundation for 
making decisions, but it should be emphasised that it will not deprive the decision 
maker neither the privilege nor the responsibility of making the final decision. 
 
 
                                                 
 
23 Song by John Lennon and Paul McCartney, issued on the Abbey Road album, 1969. 
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7.2 FURTHER WORK 
 
The work presented in this thesis has explored several aspects related to risk analysis 
that are relevant to distribution system asset management. The work has also revealed 
issues that still need to be addressed. Some research tasks are proposed in the following: 
 
Perform studies concerning risk perception and communication in electricity 
distribution companies. 
Risk management in electricity distribution companies have so far been concentrated on 
the technical aspects of risk analysis. As stated in sections 4.2 and 5.2, there are also 
social and psychological aspects of risk which are highly relevant in decision making 
contexts. It would be relevant to investigate this further; for example through looking 
closer into potential differences in perception of risk among various stakeholders. 
 
Test and evaluate the use of formal multi-criteria decision making methods applied 
to the analysis of multi-dimensional risk problems. 
It is evident that decision making in electricity distribution asset management very often 
will include more than one decision criterion. Multi criteria decision making (MCDM) 
methods are hence highly relevant candidates to support decision making, as illustrated 
in e.g. (Nordgård et al., 2003, Catrinu et al., 2007, Catrinu and Nordgård, 2010). It has 
been beyond the scope of this thesis to go into MCDM theory and methods, but such 
approaches should be further explored for their usefulness in e.g. aggregating multiple 
risk analyses results into a common decision framework. 
 
Investigate ways of using expert judgment and also other data sources to provide 
input to risk analysis. 
The cases presented in this thesis show the need to rely on expert judgment when 
analysing intangible risks in electricity distribution system asset management. Direct 
estimates and life curves models have been applied in this work, but there are also other 
methods that can be applicable to provide input data (including both expert judgment 
and other data sources). It would therefore be useful to investigate further on how to 
provide data for QRA in this context. 
 
Develop tools for risk analysis in electricity distribution companies. 
In order to make risk analyses in general and QRA in particular more available for 
distribution companies, there is a need to develop tools intended for practical 
implementation in decision making. This is an area of research that could make risk 
analysis methods more available and adapted for the specific purpose of risk analysis in 
electricity distribution companies. This work can also contribute to validate the 
usefulness of such analysis methods in asset management. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
During the last decade the electricity distribution 
sector has been ever more focusing on asset man-
agement as the guiding principles for their activities 
- see e.g (Brown & Spare, 2004) and (Kostic, 2003). 
Maintenance is an important part of the asset man-
agement scheme, as a means of controlling the com-
panies’ risk (BSI, 2004). 
There is now an increasing trend among distribu-
tion companies on developing maintenance strate-
gies where different aspects of risk are sought in-
cluded in a holistic way. The different consequence 
categories of risk relevant for distribution companies 
include economy, safety, reputation, environmental 
impact, quality of supply and fulfilling of contrac-
tual obligations (Brown & Spare, 2004; Nordgård et 
al., 2007a; Sand et al., 2007). 
The distribution companies regard a risk-based 
approach as a good philosophy to meet the overall 
asset management challenge. For some of the risks 
there are methods and tools already used within the 
electricity distribution sector – such as economical 
risk analyses and quality of supply risk analyses (re-
liability analyses). For others – e.g. safety issues - 
there is less culture and practice for performing 
structured analyses to support decisions. In some 
cases semi-quantitative methods have been applied 
to analyse and document priorities and decisions re-
garding maintenance, e.g. using risk matrices 
(Nordgård et al., 2007b). 
Deciding maintenance activities have until now 
been based largely on existing practice, producers 
recommendations and to some extent direct regula-
tion from authorities, with little application of for-
mal analyses within the electricity distribution com-
panies to support or reject the existing paradigms. 
The electricity distribution companies therefore 
have potential to improve their analytical approach 
of maintenance assessment, in order to increase un-
derstanding, find solutions and optimise the spend-
ing on maintenance activities. This is also supported 
by an increasing demand from authorities for the 
companies to perform and document risk assess-
ments. 
This paper addresses the challenge of including 
formal and structured risk assessment in electricity 
distribution maintenance management, focusing on 
application in medium voltage (MV) systems. The 
paper describes the application of Bayesian net-
works (BNs) for modelling and analysing mainte-
nance strategies and their impact on occupational 
safety. The application is illustrated by an example 
analysing MV switches. The paper concludes with 
some remarks on benefits and challenges which dis-
tribution companies are facing when using such 
methods as a part of their maintenance management. 
2 MV ELECTRICITY DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM 
MAINTENANCE MANAGEMENT 
MV electricity distribution systems are the electric-
ity distribution infrastructure on voltage levels from 
1 to 35 kV, connecting the transmission and sub-
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transmission grids to the regular customers of the 
low-voltage (LV) distribution level. 
MV distribution systems are characterized by be-
ing widely geographically dispersed and having vast 
numbers of components. Component lifetimes are 
typically 30 to 60 years, but there are large varia-
tions around the average values. 
The condition of the distribution system directly 
affects the quality of supply to end-use customers. 
Due to its widespread distribution, huge numbers of 
components and little degree of remote control and 
automation, this infrastructure is also important with 
regard to safety aspects of both operators and third 
parties. 
Most of the MV distribution systems have been 
built during the last 50 years, and the distribution 
companies are now facing the challenges of ageing 
and end-of-life issues. Hence, maintenance and rein-
vestment strategies have a more prominent position 
than before on the companies agendas. Distribution 
companies recognise a general need for methods and 
tools to support maintenance and reinvestment deci-
sions in a structured manner (Sand et al., 2007). 
Risk assessment for different consequence cate-
gories should play an important role when establish-
ing maintenance strategies. Risk assessment can be 
performed by various methods – from informal ap-
proaches to more structured and analytical ones. One 
group of methods are Quantitative risk assessment 
(QRA) methods, which are analytical methods used 
to explicitly model causal relations and achieve 
quantitative measures of risk (Apostolakis, 2004). 
The application of QRA methods can be advanta-
geous for different tasks of maintenance manage-
ment. One example of the usefulness of QRA is the 
ability to structure input data (expert knowledge 
and/or statistical data) into an analytical framework 
for analysis of specific problems of concern, e.g. 
safety related issues. 
QRA results should never be the sole basis for 
decision making, but rather be a part of the decision 
basis, contributing to better decisions than would be 
the case without risk assessment inputs (Apostolakis, 
2004). One should therefore not forget that the pur-
pose of any risk assessment should not be to pre-
scribe the “correct” solution, but rather to provide 
insight and understanding – and thus contribute to a 
risk informed decision basis. 
Bayesian networks (BNs) is one of the promising 
QRA methods which is applicable for assessment of 
quantitative measures of risk. The general modelling 
capabilities of the method can applied to a variety of 
risk related challenges (Langseth, 2007). 
The following section gives a brief description of 
the principles of BNs. 
 
3 BAYESIAN NETWORKS SUPPORTING RISK 
ASSESSMENT 
Bayesian Networks is a modelling framework which 
has been used in many domains of application, e.g. 
diagnostic systems and general reliability modelling. 
BNs generally offer a compact presentation of the 
interactions in a stochastic system by visualizing 
system state variables and their dependencies. Due 
to their versatility, it is of interest to test the useful-
ness of BNs in electricity distribution system risk 
management. 
BNs have shown to be a robust and efficient 
framework for dealing with uncertain knowledge. 
They represent a modelling framework which is easy 
to use in interaction with domain experts. 
A BN consists of two main parts: a qualitative 
part; and a quantitative part. The qualitative part is a 
directed acyclic graph where the nodes mirror the 
random variables, and the edges of the graph repre-
sent the conditional dependence between variables. 
The quantitative part is a set of conditional probabil-
ity functions. 
3.1 Simple illustration 
Figure 1 shows a simple example of a Bayesian net-
work established to model how vegetation growth 
and adverse weather may influence the occurrence 
of overhead line interruptions in electricity net-
works. 
Vegetation growth rate
High
Normal
50.0
50.0
Adverse weather
Much
Normal
30.0
70.0
Climate
Warmer
Normal
50.0
50.0
Overhead Line Interruption
No interuptions
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Figure 1 Simple example of Bayesian network 
 
The network consists of four two-state random 
variables given by the nodes in the graph: 
• {Climate} 
• {Vegetation growth rate} 
• {Adverse weather} 
• {Overhead line interruption} 
 
The arrows in the diagram represent dependen-
cies between nodes and can be interpreted as causal 
relationships. Hence, the probability of overhead 
line interruptions is dependent on the two parent 
nodes: {Vegetation growth rate} and {Adverse 
weather}. 
The example also indicates a causal relationship 
between the overall node {Climate} and both {Ad-
verse weather} and {Vegetation growth rate}. 
The arrows in the graph represent the assumption 
that a variable is conditionally independent of its 
non-descendants given its parents in the graph. 
Hence, {Overhead line interruption} is conditionally 
independent of {Climate} given the parent nodes 
{Vegetation growth rate} and {Adverse weather}. 
The underlying assumptions of conditional inde-
pendence encoded in the graph allow calculating the 
joint probability function as: 
 
∏
=
=
n
i i
xpaixfxxf n 1
))(()( .....1          (1) 
 
Hence, the conditional probability can be calcu-
lated, e.g. the probability of overhead line interrup-
tion given the parents: 
 
f(Overhead line int.|Adv. weather, Veg. gr. rate)  (2) 
 
One of the interesting properties of BNs is that 
they can be extended to represent decisions using so-
called influence diagrams (Langseth, 2007). The ba-
sis for the representation is utilities, which are quan-
tified measures for preference. Exploiting the prob-
ability updating of the BN framework, it is easy to 
calculate the expected utility for each decision op-
tion for a modelled case. 
4 EXAMPLE OF APPLICATION – RISK 
MODELLING OF MV AIR INSULATED 
SWITCHES 
To illustrate the potential application of BNs in 
maintenance management, an example is provided 
where a BN is used for safety risk assessment. 
4.1 Description of the system 
The modelling of air insulated switches is based on 
work done in cooperation with Norwegian distribu-
tion companies. A semi-quantitative risk assessment 
was performed where relevant risk influencing fac-
tors were identified and discussed based on the 
knowledge of company experts (Nordgård et al., 
2005). The risk analysis is now taken further using a 
Bayesian network. 
The analysis is focused on safety aspects regard-
ing 12 kV air insulated switches in indoor MV/LV 
substations. The switches in question are not re-
garded as particularly unsafe, but since there are 
quite a large number of them in service, they have 
been chosen for closer analysis. 
The switches are used to break load current when 
sectioning the MV distribution network. In the tran-
sient period after the opening of the switch – when 
there is no longer physical contact between the 
switches’ poles – the current will continue to flow 
through an electric arc until the natural zero-crossing 
of the alternating current. 
Normally the electric arc will then extinguish in a 
controlled manner, and the breaking of the current is 
successful. However, in some cases the arc will re-
ignite and current will continue to flow through the 
electric arc, generating energy dispersion through 
heat (with accompanying pressure rise). 
The main reason for electric arcs not to extin-
guish is, in our case, assumed to be slow movement 
of the switch during operation. When the switch op-
erates slowly, there will be less cooling of the arc, 
and the arc has time to establish stable burning con-
ditions. (It should be noted that the electric arc usu-
ally will be detected by upstream protection devices 
de-energizing the system and will not burn for a long 
period of time. But since the energy dispersion is 
high, even short duration electric arcs will involve 
hazards.) 
The failure mode of slow operation of the switch 
is the initiating event in the risk scenario presented 
in this example. When slow operation of the switch 
occurs, there are still barriers which can prevent the 
situation from becoming a threat to safety: 
• The electric arc might still extinguish  
(for example due to too small load current to 
obtain viable arcing conditions). 
• The cubicle encapsulating the switch can 
protect the operator from the electric arc. 
• The operator can wear protective clothing – 
that prevents physical injury in case of ex-
posure to an electric arc. 
 
Three encapsulations are considered in this ex-
ample: 
• full encapsulated switch (steel plate covered 
cubicles, with pressure relieving outlets in 
safe directions) 
• semi encapsulated switch (steel plated cubi-
cle fronts, but the top and bottom of the cu-
bicle is open) 
• wire fence switch cubicles (only wire fences 
- supplies little protection from electric arcs 
coming from the switchgear) 
The reason for the differences in encapsulation is 
that the substations have been built over quite a long 
period of time, during which the technical solutions 
have improved from the wire fence solution to the 
full encapsulated switches. 
Figure 2 shows a sketch of the operating situa-
tion, where the operator stands in front of the cubicle 
while operating the switch by pulling an inserted 
handle. 
 
Switch cubicle Switch
Operating handle
Operator  
Figure 2 Top view sketch of the situation when operator 
handles the switch 
4.2 Risk influencing factors 
The following factors have been identified by com-
pany experts as relevant for differentiating the popu-
lation of switches with regard to risk: 
• switch age 
• operating environment 
• maintenance interval 
• encapsulation of the switch. 
The use of protective clothing will also influence the 
safety risk. 
4.3 Bayesian network modelling 
A Bayesian network – shown Figure 3 - is con-
structed to perform a structured and quantitative 
modelling of this safety related problem. 
The network contains altogether 11 different 
nodes, of which 6 nodes have conditional probability 
tables that are functions of their parent nodes. 
The documentation for all of the conditional 
probability tables are not included in this paper, due 
to limited space, but the most important features are 
explained in the following. 
4.4 Slow switch operation 
Two states are identified as being critical with re-
gards to the correct operation of the switch: Switch 
poles stuck and Slow operating mechanism. Both 
states affect the probability of slow operation of the 
switch, which is regarded as critical with respect to 
safety due to the possible exposure of the switch op-
erator to a burning electric arc. 
The same maintenance action – functional control 
– will affect both of the critical states. The choice of 
maintenance interval, τm, is modelled as a decision 
node in the network. 
4.4.1 Switch poles stuck 
The node Switch poles stuck is modelled as depend-
ent on the age of the switch, its operating environ-
ment and the maintenance intervals used. The node 
is represented by two states only: 
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Figure 3 Bayesian network for safety model for air-
insulated switches 
 
No (meaning that the switch poles are OK) and Yes 
(meaning that the poles are more or less stuck which 
gives possible slow operation of the switch). 
The base value for the failure rate for this failure 
mode is chosen to be λpole = 0.01, based on expert 
judgements. 
4.4.1.1 Age of the switch 
The failure rate is modelled as being constant within 
given time frames. Based on discussions with ex-
perienced company experts, 25 years is chosen as 
threshold value in the failure rate modelling. It is as-
sumed that switches aged 25 years or older have a 
failure rate which is twice the failure rate of newer 
switches. This is illustrated in Figure 4. It is of 
course an approximation, but regarded to be the best 
available estimate. 
4.4.1.2 Operating environment 
The operating environment is regarded as a factor 
that influences the probability of failure of the 
switches. For the purpose of categorisation, a two-
level qualitative scale has been used: Clean and Ex-
posed operating environment. A switch operating in 
a clean environment is assumed to have a failure rate 
1/3 the failure rate of a switch in an exposed envi-
ronment. 
The categorisation is also a rough approximation, 
but it is used by distribution companies in their 
semi-quantitative approach (Nordgård et al., 2005). 
It is therefore also used for risk differentiation in this 
model. The modelling is illustrated in Figure 4. 
4.4.1.3 Unavailability modelling 
Using the approximation of a constant failure rate, 
the unavailability due to the failure mode switch 
poles stuck, qpole, is modelled as  
2
m
pole
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λ τ⋅=  
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Figure 4 Failure rate modelling for the switch poles, λpole, 
in Clean and Exposed environment as function of age 
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Figure 5 Availability of switch poles as function of main-
tenance interval for different alternatives 
 
where τm is the maintenance interval in years (Vatn, 
1997). 
The availability of the switch poles for various 
configurations is illustrated in Figure 5. 
In the Bayesian network the data shown in Figure 
5 is included in a conditional probability table stat-
ing the probability for the switch poles being stuck. 
4.4.2 Slow operating mechanism 
The node Slow operating mechanism is modelled as 
being dependent on the operating environment and 
the maintenance intervals. The node is represented 
by two states: No (meaning that the operating 
mechanism is OK) and Yes (meaning that the operat-
ing mechanism is slow which gives the possible 
slow operation of the switch). 
The base value for the failure rate for this failure 
mode is chosen to be λop.mech = 0.005. 
4.4.2.1 Operating environment 
A switch operating in a clean environment is as-
sumed to have a failure rate 1/3 of the failure rate of 
a switch in an exposed environment. 
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Figure 6 Availability of the operating mechanism as 
function of maintenance interval 
4.4.2.2 Unavailability modelling 
The unavailability due to the failure mode slow op-
erating mechanism, qop.mech, is modelled as: 
.
.
2
m
op mech
op mechq
λ τ⋅=  
 
(4) 
where τm is the maintenance interval in years. The 
availability of the operating mechanism in the two 
different operating environments is shown in Figure 
6. The data shown in Figure 6 is represented by a 
conditional probability table in the BN. 
The impact of the two failure modes on the main 
unwanted event Slow operation of the switch is 
modelled by the conditional probability table shown 
in Table 1. The modelling reflects that the slow op-
erating mechanism is considered the most serious 
failure mode. 
 
Table 1  Conditional probability table for slow operation of the 
switch ______________________________________________ 
Switch poles  Slow operating Slow operation of switch 
stuck     mechanism  Normal  Slow 
            [%]   [%] ______________________________________________ 
Yes     No     20    80 
Yes     Yes     1    99 
No     No     99    1 
No     Yes     10    90  ______________________________________________ 
4.4.3 Personnel injury 
It is assumed that 75 % of all cases of slow operation 
of the switch result in a burning electric arc. 
The potential injury to people is dependent on the 
possible burning electric arc, the encapsulation of 
the switch and whether the operator is wearing pro-
tective clothing or not. 
The states of the model are shown in Table 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2  Excerpts from conditional probability table – probabil-
ity of injuries from burning electric arc with different combina-
tions of encapsulation and protective clothing ______________________________________________ 
Burning  Encaps-  Protective    Injuries 
arc   ulation  clothing   No  Small Severe 
             [%]  [%]  [%] ______________________________________________ 
Yes   Full   Yes    90   10   0 
Yes   Full   No    75   20   5 
Yes   Semi   Yes    75   22.5  2.5 
Yes   Semi   No    50   40   10 
Yes   Wire   Yes    0   75   25 
Yes   Wire   No    0   25   75 
No   All   All    100  0   0 ______________________________________________ 
 
To aggregate the impact of injuries into a single 
measure, Potential Loss of Life (PLL) is used to 
weigh the severity of the various types of injuries. 
Table 3 summarises the weights which have been 
used in the model to aggregate the impact of differ-
ent injuries into a measure for the aggregated num-
ber of fatalities. No injury adds 0 to the total PLL, 
while a severe injury contributes 0.8 to the total 
PLL. 
 
Table 3  PLL modeling from the different degrees of injuries ______________________________________________ 
Injuries   PLL ______________________________________________ 
No    0 
Small   0.1 
Severe   0.8 ______________________________________________ 
4.5 Results from model analyses 
The quantitative safety risk assessment model estab-
lished in the BN can be used to increase the experts’ 
understanding of the problem and to see how their 
input to the BN aggregate to results in terms of esti-
mated PLL for the alternative configurations. 
It should be emphasised that the absolute value of 
PLL should be used with caution, but the relative re-
sults for the different analysis alternatives give com-
parable results which can be used to quantify the 
differences between alternatives. 
4.5.1 Systematic parameter changes 
By systematically changing the parameters in the 
model, one can obtain results which provide input to 
the decision basis. 
Figure 7 shows that the safety risk related to the 
switches is estimated to be approximately 20 times 
higher for the switches in the wire fence encapsula-
tions than for the full encapsulation, and that the 
doubling of maintenance intervals less than doubles 
the estimated PLL. 
Figure 8 shows that to obtain the same estimated 
PLL level one can have approximately 3 times 
longer maintenance intervals in a clean operating 
environment, than in an exposed operating environ-
ment. 
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Figure 7 Estimated PLL for three different encapsula-
tions as function of maintenance interval 
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Figure 8 Estimated PLL for Clean and Exposed envi-
ronment as function of maintenance interval  
(Full encapsulation only) 
 
Such results may contribute to differentiating the 
maintenance intervals depending on the risk influ-
encing factors, in order to spend maintenance re-
sources where it is needed the most. 
4.5.2 Updating the model 
The model can also be used to simulate the effect if 
the state of one or more variables in the model is 
known. Figure 9 shows the BN updated with the 
knowledge that the switch poles are in a poor condi-
tion, and that the switch cubicle has a wire fence en-
capsulation. The probability of a severe injury has 
now increased by more than two orders of magni-
tude compared to the expected value; this may result 
in a decision of not to operate such a switch unless 
de-energized. 
5 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Bayesian networks are an appealing method for 
quantitative risk assessment due to their versatility 
for different problem situations. This paper illus-
trates the application of a Bayesian network to 
model a safety risk maintenance challenge where the 
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Figure 9 Bayesian network model updated with informa-
tion about the states of nodes. 
results contribute to establishing a risk informed ba-
sis for making maintenance decisions. 
In the example, a Bayesian network is used to 
structure and quantify the knowledge and assump-
tions of the company experts into an analytical 
model. The explicit modelling may also help to iden-
tify whether vital input is missing, and thus identify 
topics for closer investigation. 
The purpose of the modelling has not been to cre-
ate an “objective and true” model of the problem at 
hand, but rather to encourage and increase learning 
and understanding, and to provide a structured 
framework for risk communication and discussions. 
The qualitative and quantitative input to the ex-
ample was provided by judgements of experts and 
the analysts, because no relevant statistics were 
available. Generally, to provide input data for the 
representation of conditional probabilities in the 
network, one should look into what sources are 
available – both from statistical analyses and from 
expert judgements or, preferably, the combination of 
both. This is one aspect which obviously should be 
further emphasised when working with establishing 
such quantitative models. 
The example illustrates that even a relatively sim-
ple example requires quite a comprehensive model-
ling of conditional probabilities. Hence the applica-
tion of BNs for QRA should be used with some 
caution. 
The electricity distribution companies today are 
motivated by the customers and the regulators to cut 
costs so that tariffs could be lowered. Reducing 
maintenance and reinvestments are cost-cutting op-
tions that have to be weighed against increased risk 
that cost reductions might impose on safety, quality 
of supply etc. Distribution companies might do well 
to incorporate analytical approaches to prescribe 
maintenance strategies, e.g. through using quantita-
tive risk assessment methods to have better risk con-
trol, to optimize the spending of maintenance re-
sources, and to increase the understanding of where 
to focus the companies’ attention and efforts. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In Norway, there is a trend among electricity distri-
bution companies towards using risk assessment for 
decision support in their asset management – see e.g. 
(Nordgård et al. 2005; Istad et al. 2008). The distri-
bution company risks cover many consequence cate-
gories, incorporating tangible as well as intangible 
risks, e.g. safety, quality of supply (including reli-
ability), environmental impact and economy (Sand 
et al. 2007). 
Historically, risk assessment methods concerning 
reliability analyses in power systems have been 
given much attention, with numerous methods avail-
able and still being developed – see e.g. (Billinton et 
al. 2001; Xie & Billinton 2009). 
However, for the other risk consequence catego-
riesthere has been a lack of structured analyses 
available. The electricity distribution companies 
therefore see the need to develop methods and tools 
to support decisions also within these areas. Risk 
analyses (for other purposes than reliability analy-
ses) are hence being developed, tried and evaluated 
– see e.g (Hamoud et al. 2007; Nordgård 2008; 
Nordgård & Sand 2008). 
This paper shows how quantitative risk assess-
ment (QRA) can be applied to analyze intangible 
risks, with special emphasis on approaches for in-
cluding uncertainty in the analyses. It first gives a 
brief description of risk and uncertainty in electricity 
distribution – stating the basis for how we look at 
uncertainty in this context. It further presents three 
approaches for exploring uncertainty in QRA. The 
approaches are exemplified through a case where a 
bow-tie model is used to analyze environmental risk 
related to accidental emissions of transformer oil. 
The paper concludes with some remarks concerning 
what can be achieved through exploring uncertainty 
explicitly in risk analyses. 
2 RISK-INFORMED DECISION MAKING IN 
ELECTRICITY DISTRIBUTION 
2.1 Risk decision problems 
Almost every activity will include risk, and even 
though striving to reduce it, it will be impossible to 
achieve a complete elimination of risk. Hence we 
will always face the problem of what is acceptable 
risk (Fischhoff et al. 1981; Vatn 1998). 
In electricity distribution asset management, we 
want to use risk assessment as a tool to analyze risk, 
to provide increased understanding of the risk prob-
lem and to structure and document the results. The 
aim is to provide input to the decision making proc-
ess, where the acceptable risk problem is addressed. 
2.2 Uncertainty 
Uncertainty – the fact that there are things that we 
do not know – is a prerequisite for risk, and should 
be kept in mind throughout risk assessment and de-
cision making. 
Like ‘risk’, the term ‘uncertainty’ is used with 
different interpretations in the risk analysis society. 
In some contexts a distinction is made between deci-
sion made under uncertainty (meaning decision 
situations with unknown probability distributions), 
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and decision made under risk (meaning decision 
situations with known probability distributions). 
If we should have used this terminology for deci-
sion making concerning intangible risk in electricity 
distribution systems, we would most probably be 
talking about ‘decisions under uncertainty’ – since 
the knowledge and data available rarely will provide 
known probability distributions. However, the 
broadly accepted term for such analyses is risk 
analyses, and hence we shall use this term in this 
paper. 
In other contexts we encounter the distinction be-
tween aleatory uncertainty (due to the stochastic na-
ture of a process or system) and epistemic uncer-
tainty (due to our lack of knowledge) – see e.g. 
(Stamatelatos et al. 2002). This distinction can be 
useful to recognize the fact that even with ‘perfect’ 
information available, there will still be uncertainty 
related to our decisions – i.e. that the decision mak-
ing process will not converge into a deterministic 
analysis no matter the extent of our knowledge. 
For the purpose of this paper we will not elabo-
rate further on distinction between the two concep-
tual parts of uncertainty, and will address uncer-
tainty in a common term – representing the fact that 
we do not know, focusing on uncertainty in risk 
analysis input parameters. This use of the term is in 
line with e.g (Aven 2008). 
2.3 Setting the scene for distribution system asset 
management 
The decision maker(s) in distribution system asset 
management will typically be the asset manager(s) 
in the companies. Decision support is needed to ad-
dress risk in a structured manner. 
One challenge when analyzing intangible risks 
within electricity distribution is that there is little 
experience with such analyses, and hence a lack of 
analyzing competence. 
Another challenge is the availability of data to 
use in the risk analyses. Our experience indicates 
that relevant historical data are hard to find when 
addressing intangible risks (Nordgård et al. 2005). 
Promoting the hunt for data is a task that should also 
be addressed in the years to come, but we can not sit 
around waiting for “hard data” to arrive, because de-
cisions still have to be made.  
Expert judgment will hence be the input we can 
rely on, representing the best available knowledge 
based on system understanding and experience 
(Apostolakis 2004; Nordgård 2008). 
The input from distribution company experts may 
e.g. be elicited as: 
- “My best guess is that there is a 5-10% 
change for a failure on this component during 
the next year. But it might as well be twice 
this number.” 
- “I think that the introduction of this barrier 
will almost eliminate the chance of the most 
severe consequences – let’s say a barrier effi-
ciency of 95-100 %.” 
 
With this type of statements as basis for estimat-
ing numerical input to the risk analyses, there is an 
apparent need to investigate the “what-if’s” - i.e. to 
perform analyses where the effects of changing input 
parameters are investigated and evaluated. 
Our aim is to make the uncertainty of expert 
judgment explicitly included in the risk analysis, 
making the uncertainties a transparent part of the de-
cision making basis. 
2.4 Quantitative risk assessment as input to 
decision making 
Risk assessment is a central part of the process of 
providing input for decision making, and this can be 
performed using different types of methods - from 
qualitative to quantitative ones. 
In this paper we explore quantitative risk assess-
ment using a bow-tie model to analyze intangible 
risk – combining fault tree analysis and event tree 
analysis in order to establish the cause/effect rela-
tions describing a specific undesired event, see e.g. 
(Vatn et al. 1996). 
A conceptual bow-tie model is shown in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1  A conceptual bow-tie model. 
 
Bi represents basic initiating events in the fault tree 
analysis, leading to an undesired event, and Cj repre-
sents different possible end events resulting from the 
event tree analysis. CΣ are the aggregation of the 
consequences of all end events into a common risk 
measure. 
2.5 Methods to explore the effects of uncertainty in 
risk analyses 
The motivation for exploring the effects of uncer-
tainty in risk analyses, are that we want to see how 
changes in input parameters will affect the risk 
analysis results; Will perturbations in input parame-
ters give significant impact on the result? Will the 
ranking of decision alternatives change as a conse-
quence of this? 
In the risk literature there are launched a variety 
of approaches to investigate the impact of uncer-
tainty in risk analyses – see e.g. (Aven 1992; Aven 
2008). Three approaches are described in the follow-
ing, and exemplified in the case later in this paper, 
namely: 
- Reliability importance measures 
- Sensitivity analysis 
- Monte Carlo simulations. 
 
The approaches are chosen due to the fact that 
they represent different ways of addressing the prob-
lem requiring different computational efforts. 
2.5.1 Reliability importance measures 
Reliability importance measures can be used in risk 
analysis to provide information concerning how the 
system will behave with regards to changes in input 
parameters. A variety of different measures have 
been developed. Two classic measures are briefly 
commented in the following. 
 
Improvement potential 
The improvement potential, IAi is given by the fol-
lowing equation: 
 hhI i
A
i −=  (1) 
where h is the reliability of the system and hi is 
the reliability assuming that component i is in the 
best state (Aven 1992). 
IAi hence expresses the systems improvement po-
tential if element i in the risk model is replaced with 
a failure-free element. 
 
Birnbaum’s measure 
Birnbaum’s measure of reliability, IBi, is given by 
the following equation: 
 
i
B
i p
hI ∂
∂=  (2) 
To compute IBi the following formula is often 
used: 
 ),0(),1( phphI ii
B
i −=  (3) 
where h(·i,p) = h(p1,p2,..,pi-1,·, pi+1,..,pn) (Aven 
1992). IBi expresses the system’s sensitivity with re-
gards to changes in element i and is hence a measure 
for how small changes in parameter i will affect the 
system. 
IAi and IBi can both provide information concern-
ing the robustness of the obtained solutions and 
where to look for efficient ways of reducing risk. 
2.5.2 Sensitivity analysis 
Sensitivity analysis is performed using performing 
repetitive analyses where model parameters are 
changed, to investigate how the changes affects the 
risk results and hence get information concerning the 
robustness of the obtained solution. 
Results from reliability importance measures can 
provide input concerning which parameters to inves-
tigate closer in sensitivity analyses. 
For the purpose of this paper we only look into 
single parameter sensitivity analyses, i.e. the effects 
of changing one parameter at the time. 
2.5.3 Monte Carlo simulations 
In Monte Carlo simulations input parameters are 
represented by probability distributions, and the re-
sults are obtained through calculations sampling 
from these distributions. 
Monte Carlo simulation will require higher mod-
elling efforts compared to sensitivity analyses. For 
the purpose of this paper we look at Monte Carlo 
simulations where several input parameters are mod-
elled using probability distributions. 
In our case, the expert’s judgments are translated 
into probability distributions which again are the ba-
sis for parameter sampling in the simulations. 
3 ILLUSTRATIVE CASE 
We use a case to illustrate the use of methods to ex-
plore uncertainty in QRA as input in electricity dis-
tribution decision making. The case is based on a 
quantitative risk assessment model established in 
(Nordgård & Solum 2009), being further elaborated 
for the purpose of this paper. It is emphasised that 
the case is for illustrative purposes only and that it 
does not represent the decision basis for a real deci-
sion. 
For the analysis we use a bow-tie model combin-
ing fault tree and event tree analysis. 
3.1 Problem description 
Distribution transformers are located throughout the 
electricity distribution system, containing typically 
150-300 litres of oil depending on their size and rat-
ing. The oil which is used in the majority of distribu-
tion transformers is considered a potential threat to 
the environment and to human health. The case 
evaluates environmental and health risk related to 
potential oil spill from distribution transformers lo-
cated within the drainage basin of a drinking water 
reservoir. 
3.2 Numerical input to the risk modelling 
Due to the fact that it is hard to find statistical mate-
rial which can support the choice of numerical val-
ues to use in the modelling, we have to rely on input 
from expert judgment. All numerical data used in 
this case study is hence based on the judgment of 
company experts and the analyst. 
3.3 Fault tree analysis 
Through discussions with company experts two 
main failure modes have been identified: 
- Oil spill due to degradation of the transformer 
casing, and 
- Oil spill due to strokes of lightning destroying 
the transformer. 
With the first failure mode the transformer may 
still be working, and the oil spill can be detected by 
inspections. The second failure mode will destroy 
the transformer. These two failure modes can be 
modelled in a fault tree as shown in Figure 2, con-
tributing to the top event; “Oil spill from trans-
former”. 
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Figure 2  Fault tree - oil spill from transformer. 
 
The following information has been provided by 
company experts: 
- Approximately 1 - 5 out of 1500 transformers 
have a leakage due to degradation each year. 
- Approximately 2 – 3 out of 1500 transformers 
experience breakage due to lightning strokes 
each year. 
 
Based on this information the following ‘best es-
timates’ are chosen for the fault tree parameters: 
- qDegradation = 2.0·10-3 [events/year] 
- qLightning = 1.5·10-3 [events/year] 
 
where qDegradation and qLightning expresses the prob-
abilities for leakage due to casing degradation and 
lightning respectively. 
Assuming independence between the two basic 
events, the probability of occurrence for the top 
event is computed according to equation (4): 
 
LightningDegradLightningDegradspillOil qqqqq ⋅= −+  (4) 
 
This gives qOil spill = 0.0035. Given a case where a 
company have 25 transformers within a drinking wa-
ter drainage basin, this gives 0.0875 occurrences of 
the top event per year - i.e. one can expect the event 
occurring on average every 11 years. 
3.4 Event tree analysis 
In order to establish the event tree – see Figure 4 – 
the following barriers are considered, based on dis-
cussions with the company experts: 
- Whether an oil collector is present 
- Whether less than 10 litres of oil leaks 
- Whether the transformer is located near a wa-
terway (stream or river) leading directly to the 
drinking water reservoir. 
The amount of oil spilled can not be considered 
as an ordinary barrier, but rather a statement of pos-
sible outcome. 
Only substations located on the ground are 
equipped with oil collectors. The majority of trans-
formers in the area are pole-mounted arrangements, 
as shown in Figure 3. 
 
 
Figure 3  Pole-mounted transformer arrangement 
 
The following numerical estimates are chosen for 
these barriers: 
- qOil collector = 0.9, i.e only 10 % of the trans-
formers in the area have oil collectors 
- q< 10 liters = 0.8, i.e. in only 20 % of the cases 
the oil spill are less than 10 litres 
- qFar from waterway = 0.6, i.e. 60 % of the trans-
formers are located near a stream or river 
leading directly into the drinking water reser-
voir. 
The background for choosing these probability 
estimates is input from distribution company experts 
and the analyst. 
 
Based on the previous results from the fault tree 
analysis, the structure of the event tree in Figure 4 
and the probability estimates for the barriers, the re-
sults presented in Table 1 are obtained. 
We can see that the total expected oil spill within 
the drainage basin is estimated to be approximately 
12.1 litres/years. The most critical event (event 5) – 
with an oil spill of 250 litres – will expectedly occur 
every 26 years. 
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Figure 4  Event tree model for possible outcomes following the start event ‘Oil spill from transformer’ 
 
 
Table 1  Results from the event tree analysis _________________________________________________ 
End event   1   2   3   4   5   Sum _________________________________________________ 
Oil spill1)  0   1   10   100  250  - 
Freq.2)   0.009 0.006 0.009 0.025 0.038 - 
Time3),   114  159  106  40   26   - 
E(oil spill) 4) 0.0  0.0  0.1  2.5  9.5  12.1 _________________________________________________ 
1) Estimated oil spill of the end event, [Litres] 
2) Frequency of occurrence of end event I [year-1] 
3) Expected time between occurrences [years] 
4) Expected annual contribution to oil spill from end event i [Litres] 
3.5 Investigating uncertainty in input parameters 
The purpose of investigating the effects of uncertain 
parameters is to illustrate the effect of the changes in 
the risk analysis model, and to gain understanding 
and confidence in the risk analysis results. 
3.5.1 Reliability importance measures 
The risk analysis model is first analysed using im-
portance measures to analyze the impact of changes 
in the input parameters. 
 
Table 2  Calculated reliability importance measures for the  
input parameters ____________________________________________ 
Model parameter Improvement  Birnbaum 
potential, IAi  measure IBi ____________________________________________ 
qDegradation      6.9     3448.8 
qLightning      5.2     3448.8 
qOil collector     12.1      5.7 
q< 10 litre      11.6     6.2 
qFar from waterway    5.8     4.1 ____________________________________________ 
 
The improvement potential is the largest for the 
model parameter qOil collector. It should however be 
noted that the values for the improvement potential 
are dependent on the values chosen as the base case 
reference (the value of h in equation (1)). 
The Birnbaum measures indicate that the esti-
mated oil spill is clearly most sensitive to the 
changes in the two fault tree parameters qDegradation 
and qLightning, but since the failure probabilities here 
already are very small numbers – the improvement 
potential is not so large for these parameters. 
3.5.2 Sensitivity analyses 
In order to examine the effects of changing model 
parameters, sensitivity analyses are performed for 
low and high estimates for the input parameters. The 
analyses have been performed by repetitive calcula-
tions changing one parameter at the time – seeing 
how this affects the results. The results for low and 
high estimates are shown in Table 3, while the ‘best-
estimate’ results are given in Table 1. 
 
Table 3  Results from investigating the effects of uncertainty of 
input parameters – Low and High estimates __________________________________________________ 
     Parameter estimate  Sum annual oil spill, 
[Litres]  
     Low   High   Low  High __________________________________________________ 
qDegradation  1.0·10-3  3.0·10-3  8.6  15.5  
qLightning   1.33·10-3 1.67·10-3 11.5  12.7 
qOil collector  0.85   0.95   11.4  12.7 
q< 10 litres   0.6   1.0   9.2  15.0 
qFar from waterway 0.5   0.7   11.1  13.0 __________________________________________________ 
 
The variation in results (best estimates from Ta-
ble 1, and Low/high estimates from Table 3) are il-
lustrated in Figure 5. 
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Figure 5  Variation of E(annual oil spill) for low / best / high 
parameter values 
 
Figure 5 indicates that the largest variation is 
found for the high/low estimates for the parameters 
qDegradation and q<10 litres. 
3.5.3 Monte Carlo simulation 
A Monte Carlo simulation model is established to 
investigate the effect of simultaneous variation of 
input parameters. 
The simulation model is made using triangular 
distributions for the five input parameters stated in 
Table 3 with mean values equal to the best estimates 
and low and high values (Table 3) giving the low 
and high ends of the probability distributions. 
Results from a simulation of estimated annual oil 
spill are shown in Figure 6. The simulation was 
made using 1000 iterations sampling from the above 
given distributions for the five input parameters. 
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Figure 6  Monte Carlo simulation results of annual oil spill 
 
The centre of gravity for the results corresponds to 
the expected value we have computed earlier (12.1 
litres/year), but we have a widespread variation of 
results around this value – wider than what is ob-
tained when varying only one parameter at the time, 
as done in the sensitivity analysis. 
We can see from the results that the sensitivity 
analyses and the Monte Carlo simulations give a 
more balanced risk picture compared to only the ex-
pected values stated in Table 1. 
3.5.4 Evaluation of the initial results 
To evaluate the results – we use a taxonomy pro-
posed in (Wessberg et al. 2008) to evaluate the con-
sequences of potential accidental emissions. The 
taxonomy uses three consequence categories for 
ground water / water intake: 
- Moderate. No harm to water intake 
- Extensive: Water intake is temporarily pre-
vented 
- Serious: Water intake is prevented for the 
long-term 
 
Table 4 shows the risk categorisation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4  Risk matrix – risk categorisation – based on Table 3 
(Wessberg et al. 2008) _________________________________________________ 
Moderate Extensive  Serious _________________________________________________ 
5 - More than once a month   II    I    I 
4 - More than once a year   II    I    I 
3 - More than once in 10 years  III    II    I 
2 - Once in a lifetime1)     IV   III    II 
1 - Situation is known2)     IV   IV   IV _________________________________________________ 
1) The lifetime of the industrial site 
2) It has happened sometimes somewhere 
 
The risk categories in Table 4 are classified as 
follows (Wessberg et al. 2008): 
- I: Risk elimination actions must be started 
immediately 
- II: Risk reduction needed. Proposals for ac-
tions as soon as possible. 
- III: Proposals for actions to risk reduction 
should be given within a year. 
- IV: No actions needed 
 
The estimated expected consequence for our case 
is regarded to be in the categories Moderate to Ex-
tensive, while the probability of occurrence is in 
categories 2 – 3. The investigated uncertainty in the 
risk results supports the choice of these categories. 
We can draw the conclusion that the risk can not 
be considered unconditionally acceptable, and pro-
posals for risk reduction should be considered – but 
that there is no need for immediate action. 
3.6 Decision alternatives 
To address this problem further the following deci-
sion alternatives have been identified for the risk 
analysis as means to reduce risk: 
- Alternative 1: Leave as is. (basis alternative) 
- Alternative 2: Redesign of transformer ar-
rangements to include oil-collectors. 
- Alternative 3: Relocation of transformers – 
location further away from waterways. 
- Alternative 4: Redesign of transformer 
earthing system – making it less exposed to 
lightning strokes. 
- Alternative 5: Replace transformers with new 
design with environmentally friendly insulat-
ing oil. This alternative is regarded to elimi-
nate the negative consequences from oil spill. 
The model parameters chosen for the alternatives 
are stated in Table 5, and the expected values of an-
nual oil spill for the chosen alternatives are illus-
trated in Figure 7. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5  Model parameters used for the different alternatives*  _____________________________________________ 
     Parameter estimates      
     Alt. 1   Alt. 2   Alt. 3    Alt. 4  _____________________________________________ 
qDegradatio    2.0·10-3  2.0·10-3  2.0·10-3  2.0·10-3 
qLightning   1.5·10-3  1.5·10-3  1.5·10-3  0.5·10-3 
qOil collector   0.9    0.1    0.9    0.9   
q< 10 litre oil   0.8    0.8    0.8    0.8   
qFar from waterway  0.6    0.6    0.1    0.6   _____________________________________________ 
 
* Alternative 5 eliminates the environmental impact of the transformer oil. The 
system reliability parameters for alternative 5 remain unchanged – i.e. equal 
to alternative 1. 
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Figure 7  E(annual oil emissions) for Alternatives 1-4 with par-
tial contribution from the different end events. 
 
The different alternatives can also be investigated 
with sensitivity analyses too see how the changes in 
parameter estimates will affect the results. 
Figure 8 shows an example on how changes in 
one parameter – in this case qLightning – influences the 
estimated expected annual oil spill. 
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Figure 8  E(annual oil emissions) for Alternatives 1-4 for low, 
best and high estimates of qLightning. 
 
The analysis clearly indicates that alternative 2 is 
the most efficient one with regards to risk reduction. 
3.7 Comments to the case 
The case illustrates some possibilities of exploring 
uncertainty in input parameters in a quantitative risk 
assessment model. 
The purpose of performing such analyses should 
be to provide the decision maker with information 
concerning the robustness of his or hers risk analysis 
results. It should also be emphasised that the risk 
analyses will provide indicative rather than absolute 
answers as illustrated by the results from the case. 
The risk analysis results should further be 
brought into a decision making process, where other 
aspects such as cost, reputational impact, etc. should 
also be included. The uncertainty in the risk analysis 
results should also be taken into account in the final 
decision making process. 
The final decision making process is not further 
elaborated in this paper. An example on how such 
decision support can be performed can e.g. be found 
in (Catrinu & Nordgård 2009). 
4 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This paper has presented three different methods for 
how uncertainty in input parameters can be explored 
in quantitative risk analysis and how the results can 
be used to provide decision support. 
For the purpose of providing decision support in 
relatively simple QRA models in electricity distribu-
tion system asset management, sensitivity analysis 
will provide an efficient way to give useful informa-
tion with a relatively low computational effort. Reli-
ability importance measures can be used to give di-
rection of where to look for risk reducing measures, 
but it should be accompanied with sensitivity analy-
sis to illustrate the effect of the changed parameters. 
Monte Carlo simulation will give a broader risk pic-
ture, but it will demand more sophisticated model-
ling, and the results provided will not give signifi-
cantly more information compared to sensitivity 
analyses. 
What should be emphasised when exploring un-
certainty in QRA is highlighting the fact that risk 
analysis results are not objective, crisp values – but 
uncertain figures which are more or less sensitive to 
changes in model input parameters. 
We see that the results based on ‘best estimates’ 
will represent only part of the risk picture which the 
decision maker should be aware of. 
In practical application, a realistic ambition is to 
use risk analysis to increase the understanding of the 
risk problem, and to provide input to risk-informed 
decisions. It should be kept in mind that also other 
input than risk analyses are relevant in the decision 
making context. The risk analysis should hence 
never be the sole basis for making decisions, but 
rather contribute to making decisions risk-informed 
(Apostolakis 2004). Exploring uncertainty is an im-
portant part of this task. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Electricity distribution systems are a vital infrastruc-
ture in modern society. The management of such 
systems consists of balancing cost, performance and 
risk – taking into account different aspects such as 
economic performance, quality of supply, safety and 
environmental impacts (Brown & Spare 2004; Sand 
et al. 2007). These aspects often constitute conflict-
ing objectives in the decision making processes. 
Electricity distribution is by definition a so-called 
natural monopoly – i.e. it is not socio-economic effi-
cient to build competing parallel infrastructures to 
provide this service. In order to prevent abuse of 
monopoly power, the industry is subject to extensive 
regulation from authorities. 
During the last two decades substantial changes 
have taken place in the electricity distribution sec-
tors worldwide, changing it from generally being a 
protected business to being exposed to efficiency re-
quirements and benchmarking through the monopoly 
regulation of electricity distribution. The process has 
lead to efficiency improvements throughout the 
business. Motivated by these efficiency require-
ments, the electricity distribution companies have in-
tensified their efforts of creating more efficient ways 
of managing their business, trying to be on the com-
petitive edge as measured by the regulatory authori-
ties benchmarking practices (NVE 2007). 
On main trend is that the electricity distribution 
companies have been increasingly focusing on the 
concept of asset management as guiding principle 
for performing their business – see e.g. (Kostic 
2003; Brown & Spare 2004; Tor & Shahidehpour 
2006). The area of asset management has emerged 
from different industries which all have in common 
the importance of an infrastructure of physical assets 
for performing their business Asset management 
covers widely – encompassing a multitude of aspects 
in distribution system planning and operation (BSI 
2004a). Risk management is important among these 
aspects, being a part of asset management decision 
support methodology. 
There is an increasing awareness among electric-
ity distribution companies on developing holistic 
strategies for asset management, seeking solutions 
where all relevant risks consequence categories are 
being sufficiently taken care of – see e.g. (Nordgård 
et al. 2007; Istad et al. 2008). 
This paper highlights major trends in the applica-
tion of risk analysis in electricity distribution system 
asset management. 
The paper first gives a description of the concept 
of asset management, pointing out how this is ap-
plied in the electricity distribution sector. It further 
states how risk assessment is included in electricity 
distribution system asset management, and how risk 
assessment methods are used to address various 
risks. Different risk consequence categories which 
are relevant for electricity distribution are listed, and 
each of them is described both in terms of their char-
acteristics, their type of impact and what methods 
are applicable for analyzing them. Finally some con-
cluding remarks are made concerning using risk-
based approaches in distribution system asset man-
agement. 
Risk assessment methods applied to electricity distribution system asset 
management 
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ABSTRACT: This paper highlights some aspects of the many facets of electricity distribution system risk as-
sessment – describing the different risk consequence categories which are relevant in the whole risk picture 
with regards to their characteristics, their type of impact and applicable risk analysis methods. The paper illus-
trates that distribution system asset management constitutes of a variety of more or less conflicting objectives 
– and that there is no single risk assessment method which cover all the different aspects of distribution sys-
tem risk. 
 
2 ELECTRICITY DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM 
ASSET MANAGEMENT 
The electricity distribution sector has been increas-
ingly focusing on the concept of asset management 
as guiding principle for performing business. 
For example, the UK regulator, Ofgem, has ex-
plicitly encouraged the distribution companies to get 
certified according to the publicly available specifi-
cation PAS 55 “Asset Management” (BSI 2004a; 
BSI 2004b), in order to establish a adequate level of 
competence in asset management within the distribu-
tion companies, to assure long term asset risk man-
agement and establish greater clarity of the policies 
and processes that underpin the investment decisions 
of network companies (Williams et al. 2007). 
The concept of asset management covers (at 
least) two aspects; the management of the physical 
infrastructure, and the management of the organiza-
tional aspects. In this paper we focus on the first of 
these two aspects, namely the infrastructure man-
agement. 
A very general definition of asset management is 
given in specification PAS 55-1 (BSI 2004a): “Asset 
management is simply the optimum way of managing 
assets to achieve a desired and sustainable out-
come”. 
The importance of risk management (as a means 
of avoiding undesired events) is highlighted in the 
more formal definition of asset management: “sys-
tematic and coordinated activities and practices 
through which an organization optimally manages 
its assets, and their associated performance, risk 
and expenditure over their lifecycle [..]” (BSI 
2004a). 
This definition emphasizes the lifecycle aspects 
of cost, performance and risk exposure – where per-
formance is a measure of what is achieved, while 
risk exposure represents foresight – looking into po-
tential future outcomes, with the aim to avoid unde-
sired events. 
From this definition we can see that risk man-
agement is well integrated in the asset management 
scheme. The principle of continuous process im-
provement is also a guiding star of asset manage-
ment, integrating the different aspects of a sound as-
set management in a plan-act-review-improve circle. 
Risk assessment as a part of the asset management 
process of continual improvement, is illustrated in 
Figure 1 (BSI 2004b). 
3 RISK AND RISK ASSESSMENT IN 
ELECTRICITY DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM 
ASSET MANAGEMENT 
The understanding and management of risk are key 
issues for distribution companies in their asset man-
agement approaches. 
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Figure 1.  Asset management system elements – Continual im-
provement – based on (BSI 2004b). 
 
Much work within risk management in distribu-
tion systems have focused on the aspects of reliabil-
ity, see e.g. (Fangxing & Brown 2004; Bertling et al. 
2005). This focus is understandable, since it is surely 
an important feature of the product delivered by the 
electricity distribution infrastructure, being a focal 
area for regulatory authorities in many countries 
(Eurelectric 2005). 
However, electricity distribution companies are 
also concerned with other important decision criteria 
representing relevant risks for their business. This 
typically involves more intangible risks such as 
safety, environmental impact and company reputa-
tion. 
In contrast to the numerous methodologies devel-
oped for reliability calculations and decision support 
(Billinton et al. 2001), one will find less application 
of structured analyses to support decisions concern-
ing other risks, even though they represent an impor-
tant motivation for decisions taken in electricity dis-
tribution systems. Some examples can yet be found 
– see e.g. (Hamoud et al. 2007; Nordgård 2008). 
3.1 Distribution system risk 
The electricity distribution companies acknowledge 
that there are many facets to the risk picture that 
they face. In (Sand et al. 2007) a study is presented 
identifying different aspects of the electricity distri-
bution company risks. The consequence categories 
are shown in Table 1. 
All of these risks are not applicable to every deci-
sion situation in the distribution companies, but the 
consequence categories constitute a whole of risk as-
sessments that should be kept in mind when address-
ing distribution company risk. 
 
 
Table 1  Different consequence categories in distribution sys-
tem asset management – based on (Sand et al. 2007). _________________________________________________ 
Risk consequence categories  _________________________________________________ 
 - Economic risk 
 - Safety risk 
 - Environmental risk 
 - Quality of supply risk 
 - Reputational risk 
 - Vulnerability risk 
 - Regulatory risk __________________________________________________ 
 
In the following chapters we look further into 
each of these risk consequence categories. The pres-
entation is based on the authors’ knowledge and ex-
perience regarding the application of risk assessment 
methods in electricity distribution – first and fore-
most among Norwegian distribution companies. 
Some of the risks are well defined with respect to 
risk analysis methods, while others have less history 
of being subject to structured risk assessment. 
3.2 Taxonomy for categorisation 
To describe the various risks we have chosen a 
taxonomy consisting of descriptions of their: 
- Risk characteristics, 
- The type of impact the risks will have, and  
- The type(s) of risk assessment methods which 
are applicable. 
3.2.1 Risk characteristics 
The characteristics of each risk consequence cate-
gory are provided as a high level description, not go-
ing into detail. 
Some important aspects of each risk are high-
lighted as to why this is an area of concern for the 
distribution companies. 
3.2.2 The degree of impact of risk 
The different risk consequence categories have their 
differences with regards to the extent of their impact. 
In our review of the risk consequence categories, 
three types of impact are used: 
- Local impact – denoting impact coming from 
dedicated components causing “concentrated” 
accidents or incidents. 
- System impact – denoting impact occurs when 
failure in component(s) or sub-systems pro-
vides widespread impact affecting extensive 
parts of the distribution system. 
- Corporate impact – denoting risks which im-
pact on foundation for performing the busi-
ness. This may be as a consequence of a pre-
ceding local or system impact, or due to a 
independent incident 
3.2.3 Categories of methods for risk analysis 
In (Aven 2008) three main categories of risk assess-
ment methods are presented, as stated in Table 2. 
These categories are used to provide a generic 
grouping of the different categories of methods for 
risk analysis. 
The three categories represent an increasing de-
gree of formalism and modelling sophistication. The 
choice of method depends on the purpose of the 
study, the need for resolution, input data available, 
etc. 
 
Table 2  Categories of methods for risk analysis – grouping 
based on (Aven 2008) 
Category Type of analysis Description 
Example of 
methods 
Simplified 
risk  
analysis 
Qualitative Informal proce-
dures that 
analyses risk 
using e.g. brain-
storming ses-
sions and group 
discussions. 
 
- Coarse risk 
  analyses 
- Brainstorming 
  sessions 
Standard 
risk  
analysis 
Qualitative 
or  
quantitative 
More formal-
ized procedures 
in which recog-
nized risk 
analysis meth-
ods are used. 
Risk matrices 
are often used 
to present the 
results. 
 
- Risk analysis  
  assisted by  
  HAZOP 
- Risk matrices 
- Job safety  
  analysis 
Model-
based risk 
analysis 
Primarily 
quantitative 
Formal methods 
using e.g. event 
tree analysis 
(ETA) and fault 
tree analysis 
(FTA) are used 
to calculate risk. 
- Fault tree 
  analysis 
- Event tree  
  analysis 
- Reliability  
  analyses 
- Bayesian net- 
  works 
- Electrical sys-
  tem simulation 
- Benchmarking 
  methods 
 
Table 2 indicates that the more sophisticated the 
method gets, it will inevitably get more specialised. 
For model-based risk analyses there are a variety of 
analysis methods which can be used to analyse spe-
cific risk scenarios in detail. 
The need for data - and its resolution - is also in-
creasing significantly from the simplified risk analy-
sis methods to the model-based ones. 
4 DESCRIPTION OF VARIOUS ASPECTS OF 
RISK VALID FOR DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS 
In the following chapters the risk consequence cate-
gories listed in Table 1 are described closer, using 
the taxonomy presented in chapter 3.2. 
4.1 Economic risk 
4.1.1 Characteristics of economic risk 
Economic risk is related to the potential loss of 
money – i.e. through higher cost than anticipated or 
through loss of income. Potential economic loss in-
fluences all aspects of electricity distribution system 
asset management. 
Before the introduction of income cap regulation 
it was sufficient to analyse investments with respect 
to costs (because of cost coverage). In an income cap 
(or price cap) regulatory regime distribution compa-
nies also evaluate projects with respect to income ef-
fects, since the difference between the allowed in-
come (stated by the regulatory authorities) and the 
total costs (opex + capex) constitute the company 
profit. 
Hence, the main economic planning objective for 
the distribution companies is to minimize all rele-
vant costs while meeting relevant restrictions. 
The Norwegian regulator, NVE, has in their regu-
lations given incentives for the companies to mini-
mise the expected net present value of the following 
cost elements (NVE 2007): 
- Investment cost (including reinvestment and 
renewal costs) 
- Operating and maintenance costs - including 
utility repair and damage costs 
- Cost of electrical losses 
- Customer outage costs i.e. costs of energy 
not supplied (CENS) 
- Congestion costs. 
Uncertainty – and hence risk – is related to all of 
these cost elements, some more than others. 
4.1.2 Impact of economic risk 
Economic risks will typically have impact on corpo-
rate level. 
4.1.3 Methods applicable for analysing  
economic risk 
To analyse economic risk net present value (NPV) 
analyses are widely used – preferably accompanied 
with sensitivity analyses to investigate the effect of 
variation of input parameters. In some case risk ma-
trices can be used to present and visualise the eco-
nomic risk being part of a decision basis. 
Input to the economic analyses can be provided 
through by other model based analyses, e.g. reliabil-
ity analysis, load development forecasts, etc. 
4.2 Quality of supply risk 
4.2.1 Characteristics of quality of supply risk 
The distribution companies are being increasingly 
subjected to regulatory regimes that explicitly take 
into account the quality of supply to the consumers 
(Eurelectric 2005). 
One example is the Norwegian regulation scheme 
of Quality adjusted revenue caps, where the network 
companies’ revenue caps are adjusted in accordance 
with the customers’ interruption costs (Langset et al. 
2001). 
In addition to regulation of the interruption, there 
are also standards regulating the technical phenom-
ena of quality of supply (CENELEC 2007). 
4.2.2 Impact of Quality of supply risk 
Quality of supply may impact both on local and sys-
tem level – depending on the type of problem, its’ 
size etc. 
4.2.3 Methods applicable for analysing Quality of 
supply risk 
Costs related to power supply interruption is a part 
of the economical risk – and hence NPV calculations 
are a methods also here. Model based methods for 
estimation of expected reliability and interruption 
conditions may provide input data for the NPV cal-
culations. 
To estimate potential impact on the technical 
quality of supply phenomena, various electrical sys-
tem simulations may be utilised, e.g. load flow 
analyses, short circuit analyses, etc. The power sys-
tem physical laws are well defined and the system 
therefore relatively easy to model and simulate. 
 
It should be noted that depending on the regula-
tory regime, quality of supply phenomena might be 
dealt with in a purely economical way and hence 
contribute as an economical risk scenario. The cost 
of energy not supplied is one example – penalties 
when exceeding contract values another. So, care 
should be taken to avoid double counting of risk im-
pact. 
4.3 Vulnerability risk 
4.3.1 Characteristics of vulnerability risk 
Vulnerability is a characteristic of a system’s inade-
quate ability to withstand an unwanted event, limit 
the consequences, and recover and stabilize after the 
occurrence of the event (Doorman et al. 2006). 
The electricity supply is essential for the quality 
of everyday life, for the safety of people and for the 
economy. Vulnerability of the electric power net-
works therefore affects the society as a whole. 
In our context vulnerability risk is used to de-
scribe high impact, low probability events that might 
have such a widespread effect on important societal 
functions. 
Norms regarding the security of electricity supply 
considers the supply to end-users irrespective of the 
causes for a power system of not being able to en-
sure a sufficient security of supply. 
4.3.2 Impact of vulnerability risk 
By its nature vulnerability risk have widespread 
impact on system level and also on corporate level. 
4.3.3 Methods applicable for analysing  
vulnerability risk 
To analyse vulnerability risk various system simula-
tions are applicable; e.g. contingency analyses, dy-
namic analyses etc. Other – more generic – model-
based risk analysis methods are also applicable (e.g. 
fault tree and/or event tree. Simplified and standard 
risk analyses methods (brainstorming, plotting in 
risk matrices) can also be used for more coarse 
analyses of vulnerability. Risk matrices can be used 
as a tool to visualise the results. 
4.4 Safety risk 
4.4.1 Characteristics of safety risk 
Safety considerations are often decisive for actions 
in the distribution system. The risk covers both oc-
cupational and third party safety. 
For third party safety the concern is mainly com-
ing from the potential accidental touching of live 
electrical system parts, e.g. the conductor wires of 
overhead lines. 
Occupational safety is in addition covering vari-
ous aspects related to the construction, operation and 
decommissioning of components in the distribution 
system. 
4.4.2 Impact of safety risk 
Safety risk will in most cases have a local impact, 
affecting people being relatively close to the scene 
of the incident or accident. Severe incidents or acci-
dents affecting safety may also have a corporate im-
pact. 
4.4.3 Methods applicable for analysing safety risk 
For analysing safety risk simplified and / or standard 
risk analyses methods are mostly applied – e.g. 
through performing brainstorming sessions to iden-
tify undesired events, and illustrating the results in 
risk matrices. Job safety analysis is yet another rele-
vant approach used in the operational phase of asset 
management. 
4.5 Environmental risk 
4.5.1 Characteristics of environmental risk 
Environmental hazards emerging from distribution 
companies are mainly related to pollution (e.g. emis-
sions of oil from oil-filled components, SF6-gas 
leakages, etc). Visual pollution – e.g. from overhead 
lines crossing through nature - is also a factor, to-
gether with electric and magnetic fields emerging 
from distribution system components. 
Another potential environmental risk aspect is 
that pollution-abatement equipment such as pumps 
and filters often depend on electricity. Power out-
ages might hence have environmental effects. 
4.5.2 Impact of environmental risk 
Environmental risk related to distribution system 
components can both have a local impact, affecting 
the sites being close to the scene of the incident / ac-
cident, and a global impact, since some pollutants 
have a global impact e.g. emissions the green house 
gas SF6 used in various types of switchgear. 
4.5.3 Methods applicable for analysing  
environmental risk 
To analyse environmental risk simplified or standard 
risk analyses are most often applied. Risk matrices 
are often used to present and visualise the risk analy-
sis results. 
4.6 Reputational risk 
4.6.1 Characteristics of reputational risk 
Goodwill among various stakeholders are important 
aspects of running a business and this is also valid 
for distribution companies. They are aware of their 
reputation in order to improve or maintain it, and 
also to brand other business areas that the companies 
might be directly involved in –e.g. broadband ser-
vices, alarm services, installation services etc. 
Reputational risk will often be closely linked to 
other risk – such as quality of supply, safety, envi-
ronmental risk, vulnerability and so on. The compa-
nies’ performance on the other risk areas may hence 
affect the reputational risk. 
4.6.2  Impact of reputational risk 
Reputational risk related to distribution system com-
ponents can both have a local impact, affecting only 
people being close to the scene of the incident. De-
pending on the type of incident or accident the repu-
tational risk may also have corporate impact. 
4.6.3 Methods applicable for analysing reputa-
tional risk 
To the extent that reputational risk are formally ana-
lysed, this is done through simplified or standard 
risk analyses, using risk matrices to present and 
visualise the results. 
4.7 Regulatory risk 
4.7.1 Characteristics of regulatory risk 
Due to the fact that electricity distribution compa-
nies are natural monopolies, they are being subject 
to extensive regulation from the authorities. Changes 
in the regulatory framework – e.g. due to political 
decisions, new regulatory models, etc. – can have 
large impact on companies. 
If the regulatory regime is not well designed, a 
socio-economic beneficial project (i.e. a project with 
positive net present value of the cost minimisation 
objective function) might give a negative net present 
value income-wise and hence not be realised. Regu-
latory risk might play an important role when assess-
ing strategies, and might for example lead to a rein-
vestment and maintenance adverse philosophy. 
Regulation concerning certain component design 
may also enforce replacements, etc. 
4.7.2 Impact of regulatory risk 
Regulatory risk will by its nature have impact on 
corporate level. 
4.7.3 Methods applicable for analysing regulatory 
risk 
To analyse regulatory risk, all types of risk analyses 
is applicable; from simplified standard risk analyses, 
to highly detailed analyses using simulations to in-
vestigate the effects of various future scenarios on 
the company situation in changing regulatory 
frameworks - e.g. through data envelopment analysis 
(DEA), etc. 
4.8 Summary 
The survey of various distribution company risks in 
the previous chapters illustrate a variety of different 
aspects which are included in the total risk picture, 
and the variety of applicable approaches to analyse 
these risks. 
Table 3 summarises the results of the different 
consequence categories, indicating the predominant 
attributes of the various risk consequence categories. 
What can be seen from the table is that there is no 
single method or approach which can be said to 
cover all aspects in one common risk analysis 
framework. It will rather encourage the use of many 
different approaches to analyse distribution system 
risk, depending on the type of problem. 
5 THE MULTI CRITERIA NATURE OF RISK 
MANAGEMENT IN ASSET MANAGEMENT 
The different risks listed in the chapters 3 and 4, all 
constitute parts of the rather complicated jig-saw 
puzzle of distribution system asset management, and 
should all to be kept in mind in a holistic asset man-
agement framework. 
For a majority of asset management decisions 
there will not be relevant to include all risk aspects 
into the decision, but for a great deal we need to take 
into account more than one risk (e.g. safety and eco-
nomic performance) and these risk may often be 
counteractive, meaning that the optimum solution 
for one risk will not be favourable for other(s), and 
vice versa. In a decision making context we will 
therefore have to deal with compromises between 
various aspects representing expected performance 
and risks. 
5.1 Decision problem example 
As an illustration we can consider the reinvestment 
of a MV overhead line, including rebuilding of pole-
mounted MV/LV transformers to arrangements on 
the ground. 
 
 
 
Figure 2  Example: Reinvestment of MV overhead line 
 
The potential reinvestment will have risk related 
to cost occurring during the building process, and 
the future impact on the allowed company income is 
subject to regulatory risk. A new overhead line with 
ground mounted transformers will represent a reduc-
tion in occupational safety risk (due to less need for 
climbing), but leave the third party safety risk rela-
tively unchanged. Environmental risk due to poten-
tial transformer oil emissions can be reduced, if re-
building transformed on the ground with oil 
collectors, while the visual pollution remain un-
changed. The reinvestments impact on vulnerability 
risk is neglectable. 
This simple case illustrates the multi-criteria na-
ture of such decision problems. 
 
Table 3  Summary of risk consequence categories, their predominant impact and risk analysis methods.  _________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
             Risk impact        Risk analysis methods 
Risk consequence categories  Local System Corporate  Simplified  Standard  Model-based   Methods used ________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Economic / financial risk         +           +     +      NPV-analyses 
 
Safety risk        +      +      +     +           Brainstorming,  
                                       Risk matrices 
 
Environmental risk     +   (+)  +      +     +           Coarse risk analysis 
 
Quality of supply risk    +   +         +     +     +      NPV-analyses, 
                                       Power system 
Analysis 
 
Reputational risk     +       +     +     +           Coarse risk analysis 
                                       Risk matrices 
 
Vulnerability risk        +    +     +     +     +      Coarse risk analysis 
Risk matrices, Power 
system analysis 
 
Regulatory risk             +          +     +      Coarse risk analysis 
Risk matrices, Simu-
lation (e.g. data en-
velopment analysis) 
 _________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
5.2 The challenge of optimizing  
To perform a formal optimization we have to be able 
to express some objective function with its restric-
tions, and to find the solution which minimizes (or 
maximises) this function. 
To do this it is necessary to formulate each of the 
risks in the same terms (usually money or utility 
value) – see e.g. (Vatn 1998). 
Monetisation raises some ethical questions – e.g. 
on putting value on safety and loss of life, and 
whether it is representative for the companies and 
society’s attitude towards risk to use the expected 
values when dealing with safety risks or environ-
mental risks, or if we should be more risk averse for 
such consequence categories. 
For decision support purposes it can also be ques-
tioned if the purpose of a decision support tool is to 
compute the answer of the decision or whether its’ 
role is to provide input for the decision maker to use 
in his or her own considerations. 
In the process of utilising risk assessment in a 
more structured manner in electricity distribution, it 
is our opinion that one should try to establish better 
analysis approaches for each of the risk aspects be-
fore jumping to the aggregation of risks into on 
common measure with the aim to perform a full op-
timization – emphasising to provide decision support 
rather than decision optimization. 
There are however multi-criteria decision meth-
ods which can contribute to bridging the gap to-
wards aggregating partial results into a common de-
cision framework – see e.g. (Catrinu & Nordgård 
2009). This is not further elaborated in this paper. 
6 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This paper highlights some aspects of the many fac-
ets of distribution system risk assessment – charac-
terising the different consequence categories which 
are relevant in the whole risk picture. 
The application of holistic risk analyses in distri-
bution system asset management is relatively new – 
and the companies have to get more experience us-
ing risk assessment approaches in their distribution 
system asset management. 
The purpose of risk assessment should be to ana-
lyse uncertainty about future outcomes in a struc-
tured and traceable manner and to provide better 
foundations for making asset management decisions. 
To obtain a structured approach to analyze the 
various aspects of distribution company risk, there is 
a need for strengthening the distribution companies 
with regards to: 
- Competence 
- Methods and tools 
- Input data. 
All of these aspects need to be elaborated further 
in the years to come 
It is the authors’ opinion that it is not realistic to 
obtain one unified risk assessment method which 
can cover all the different risks, but rather to develop 
analyses for the different risks, each of them consti-
tuting a part of the total decision basis. 
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Electricity distribution companies are to an increasing extent using risk assessment methods 
in their asset management practices. This paper presents an overall framework for risk-
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 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Electricity distribution companies throughout the world are adopting the principles of asset 
management as guidance for how to optimally handle their infrastructures, see e.g. [1-3]. 
 
In the core of asset management lies decisions concerning balancing the aspects of cost, 
performance and risk, in order to ensure an optimal utilization of the physical assets, [4, 5]. 
This gives the motivation for developing methods for risk analysis, with the aim to support 
asset management decision making. 
 
Risk analysis for electricity distribution has often focused on reliability analyses, analyzing 
how the system behaves with regards to interruptions in the electricity supply, see e.g. [6-8]. 
Reliability is surely an important feature of the product delivered by the electricity 
distribution infrastructure, being a focal area for regulatory authorities in many countries [9]. 
However, electricity distribution companies are also concerned with other important decision 
criteria which represent relevant risks for their business. These risks typically involve safety, 
environmental impact and company reputation, see e.g. [10-12]. In this paper we refer to such 
risks as intangible risks. The impact of intangible risks on decisions is especially important on 
medium and low voltage distribution levels, where the consequences of system reliability 
failures are not as large and widespread as on higher voltage levels. Hence, there is a need to 
include the analysis of these risks in the decision making. 
 
This paper describes an overall framework for risk-informed decision making in electricity 
distribution asset management. The basic steps of the framework is coherent with general risk 
management principles, as described in e.g. [11, 13-15], but in addition the framework 
emphasizes the use of quantitative risk analysis (QRA) methods for in-depth studies of 
selected risk problems. Candidates for more thorough risk analysis can be critical undesired 
events, undesired events with potentially large consequences, or undesired events where the 
uncertainty in the initial estimate is high. 
 
Section 2 gives a background description of risk, risk analysis and risk management, referring 
to general risk management concepts found in the literature. Then the proposed framework is 
presented in section 3, before the framework is exemplified using an asset management 
decision case, shown in section 4. The paper concludes with some remarks concerning the 
practical use of the framework. 
 
2. BACKGROUND 
 
2.1 Risk 
 
Risk and risk analysis is relevant in most decision situations since we by assessing risk seek to 
look into the future, aiming to use this providence to make good decisions. 
Kaplan [16] defines that when we ask “What is the risk?” for a given process or activity, we 
really ask three questions: 
- What can go wrong? 
- How likely is that to happen? 
- If it does happen, what are the consequences? 
For the purpose of this paper this definition of risk is used, and the three questions will form 
the basis of risk analysis. 
 
2.2 Methods for risk analysis 
 
Numerous methods have been developed for risk analysis, and they represent different levels 
of detail and resolution. In [14] three main categories of risk analysis methods are presented, 
as shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1  Categories of methods for risk analysis – grouping based on [1] 
Category Type of analysis Example of methods 
Simplified risk  
analysis Qualitative 
- Coarse risk analyses 
- Brainstorming sessions 
Standard risk  
analysis 
Qualitative or  
quantitative 
- Risk analysis assisted 
  by HAZOP 
- Risk matrices 
- Job safety analysis 
Model-based risk 
analysis Primarily quantitative 
- Fault tree analysis 
- Event tree analysis 
- Reliability analyses 
- Bayesian networks 
- Electrical system  
  simulation 
- Benchmarking methods 
 The three categories represent an increasing degree of formalism and modelling 
sophistication. Which method to choose will depend on the purpose of the analysis, the need 
for resolution, etc. In the framework described in section 3 a differentiation of risk analysis 
methods is proposed, based on the problem at hand. 
 
2.3 General frameworks for risk management 
 
The literature provides several general frameworks which give an overview of risk and risk 
management. 
 
In [15], five steps are listed presenting the essentials of the risk assessment and management 
process: 
- Risk identification 
- Risk modelling, quantification and measurement 
- Risk evaluation 
- Risk acceptance and avoidance 
- Risk management. 
 
In [14] three high-level elements are stated: 
- Planning 
- Risk assessment (execution) 
- Risk treatment (use) 
 
[13] also addresses risk management, and Figure 1 illustrates a conceptual risk management 
process based on structure and terminology presented in this reference. 
Risk management
Risk assessment
Risk analysis
Risk estimation
Source identification
Risk evaluation
Acceptable risk?
Risk treatment
Risk retention
Risk optimization
Risk transfer
Risk avoidance
No
Yes
Risk acceptance Risk communication
 
 
Figure 1  Risk management process – based on structure and terminology from 
(ISO/IEC, 2002). 
 
All of these general frameworks encompass the same basic principles, even though emphasis 
is somewhat different in the different sources. But all frameworks deal with risk 
identification, risk analysis and risk evaluation – leading towards risk-informed decision. 
 
 
2.4 Risk in electricity distribution system asset management 
 
Electricity distribution companies face a variety of risks, with potential impact on many 
consequence categories. In [11] and [12] the following risk consequence categories are 
presented as being the most relevant for distribution companies: 
 Economy 
- Safety issues (for employees and the public) 
- Reputation 
- Environmental issues 
- Quality of supply 
- Fulfilment of contractual obligations. 
 
In order to address these risk consequence categories, different methods are used in electricity 
distribution companies. In [12] a summary of risk analysis methods in use is presented – 
spanning from simplified analyses to advanced model-based approaches. 
In the framework proposed in this paper, simplified risk analysis, supported by risk matrices, 
is used to perform an initial risk analysis and to provide a mapping of risks. For selected 
problems these initial results can be complemented using QRA. 
The steps of the framework are described in the section 3, followed by a case in section 4. The 
case is based on an example of risk-informed decision making in a distribution company, 
based on [17]. 
3.  A FRAMEWORK FOR RISK-INFORMED DECISION SUPPORT UTILIZING 
QUANTITATIVE RISK ASSESSMENT 
In order to structure the process of using risk assessment as input to decision making, an 
overall framework for decision support is proposed, as shown in Figure 2. 
Compared to the general frameworks for risk-management described in section 2, the 
framework emphasizes the use of QRA to analyse selected risk problems. The selection of 
what problems to analyse with QRA will be based on a qualitative evaluation of the results 
from the initial risk analysis process, but also from other decision inputs – e.g. from economic 
analyses. 
 
The steps of the proposed framework are described in the following. 
 
Decision study planning
Initial risk analysis
- Identification of undesired events
- Risk estimation and mapping 
Risk evaluation 
QRA for selected 
problems
- Modelling
- Analysis
- Evaluation
Decision making basis
Other analyses
- Technical analyses
- Economic analyses
Decision making
Risk assesment
 
 
Figure 2  Proposed framework for risk-informed decision support in electricity 
distribution system asset management 
 
3.1 Decision study planning 
 
The formulation of the problem is a key factor for all decision making, because the purpose of 
the analysis needs to be clearly formulated. Some other aspects which must be addressed in 
this phase are [11]: 
- Delimitation of system boundaries 
- Identification of stakeholders, and 
- Stating objectives and decision criteria. 
 
In addition it is important to state the time horizon for the analyses, and to clarify the 
terminology to be used. 
 
 
 
 
 
3.2 Risk assessment 
 
The purpose of the risk assessment is to establish a risk picture for the decision maker(s). This 
can be done through the following steps. 
3.2.1 Initial risk analysis 
Risk analysis deals with finding answers to Kaplan’s triplet of questions listed in section 2.1. 
This is done through identifying undesired events and estimating probabilities and 
consequences for these events. 
To perform the initial risk analysis, the use of simplified risk analysis methods – in 
combination with risk matrices - is proposed, in order to gain a overview of the risks with 
minimum use of resources, see e.g. [18]. 
 
Identification of undesired events  
The first, but very important step of the risk analysis is the identification of potential 
undesired events; i.e. answering the question “What can go wrong”? 
In this part of the framework the aim is to identify relevant sources of risk and to pinpoint 
undesired events which might be caused by these sources. 
Input to this task can be: 
- Expert knowledge 
- Results from inspections 
- Data from databases 
- Results from previous analyses 
 
Experience shows that concerning analysis of intangible risks it is very limited what we can 
find in databases [18, 19], e.g. due to the fact that statistics simply do not exist. Previous 
analyses are also few in numbers so far, since there is limited experience available when it 
comes to performing risk analyses for intangible risks. Expert judgement and results from 
inspections will hence in most cases be the available sources for information. 
The output from the identification will be a listing a potential undesired events. 
 
Risk estimation and mapping 
The risk estimation includes assessing probability and consequence estimates for the 
undesired events [13] – i.e. answering question two and three of Kaplan’s triplet. To map and 
visualise the risk results, risk matrices should be used. The mapping in risk matrices should be 
done with respect to each of the consequence categories found relevant for the decision. 
Typical examples of such consequence categories can be economic impact, safety, 
environmental impact and reputational impact, see e.g. [18, 20]. 
 
Potential sources of data for such estimates will be the same as for the sources to identify the 
undesired events, and also in this context will expert judgment be of great importance. 
Probability and consequence estimates can be on qualitative or semi-quantitative form, e.g. 
“high”, “medium”, “low” or “1 – 10 occurrences per year”, see e.g. [18, 19]. 
3.2.2 Risk evaluation 
Risk evaluation deals with determining the significance of risks [13], and judging whether the 
risks are acceptable or not. 
Even though the risk analysis will provide a risk picture with a classification of undesired 
events, the key question is still: What is acceptable risk? 
The literature treats this problem in numerous ways. In e.g. [21] it is concluded that 
acceptable-risk problems are decision problems, requiring choices among alternatives, 
assuming that no risk is unconditionally acceptable, but that the acceptability of a given risk 
will depend on what are the alternatives. The decision is dependant on the values and beliefs 
of the decision maker(s), among also other factors. It is therefore impossible to give a 
universal answer to what is acceptable risk. For the purpose of this work, Fischhoff et al.’s 
[21] conclusion is used as a basis; that there are no universal acceptance threshold for risk 
acceptance, and that it is decision context dependent. 
 
Guidance can however be found in what previously has been accepted for similar risks or 
through comparison with other risks in society. This is however not a trivial task. For the 
purpose of this thesis, it can be concluded that the acceptability of a risk will be for the 
decision maker(s) to decide. 
 
The initial risk mapping will in many cases provide sufficient information concerning the risk 
picture, and there will be no need for more detailed analyses, see e.g. [18]. 
The risk evaluation may however reveal potential risks which may call for a more in-depth 
investigation – e.g. by using quantitative risk assessment (QRA) methods. The identification 
of candidates for QRA will be based on a qualitative evaluation performed by the decision 
maker. Candidates for a more thorough investigation may include: 
- Undesired events which are found critical 
- Undesired events with potentially large consequences 
- Undesired events where the uncertainty of our initial estimates is high 
- Evaluation of alternative solutions for risks considered unacceptable.  
The motivation for performing a QRA is to provide better understanding of the problem and a 
better basis for decision making. 
3.2.3 Quantitative risk assessment for selected problems 
There are several methods for quantitative risks analyses available. The QRA methods have in 
common that they require a mathematical representation of the system, and that they result in 
numerical risk estimates for a given risk, expressed in e.g. PLL (Potential loss of life), FAR 
(fatal accident rate), litres of oil spilt during one year, kg SF6 gas accidentally released into 
the atmosphere, or expected annual cost. 
The process of using QRA includes: 
- Describing the system – e.g. relevant barriers, maintenance actions, etc 
- Establishing models representing causal relations 
- Estimating model parameters 
- Calculating and presenting results 
- Dialogue and discussion with relevant stakeholders regarding model assumptions, 
numerical inputs and results. 
 
The choice of QRA method depends on the problem at hand, the data availability, etc. For 
cases concerning analysing intangible risks – see [17, 22-25] bow-tie models (combining fault 
tree and event tree analysis) and Bayesian networks have been tested. 
 
3.3 Other analyses 
 
While being in the context of electricity distribution risk analysis, it is still important to bear 
in mind that risk analysis results are only parts of the decision basis, and that it should not be 
the sole basis for decision making, see e.g. [26]. Other aspects and analysis results will 
contribute to the total decision basis, e.g. load flow analyses, short circuit analyses, reliability 
analysis (covering risks related to loss of electricity supply) results from economic analyses, 
company policies, etc. 
 
 
3.4 Decision making basis 
 
The decision making will typically have to take into account more than one decision criterion, 
hence we face multi-criteria decisions – see e.g. [27-29]. 
The basis for the asset manager to make her or his decisions will constitute of several pieces 
of information for each analysis; e.g. risk analysis results for more than one consequence 
category, technical analyses (load flow analysis, short circuit analysis) and results from 
economical analyses. 
 
3.5 Decision making 
 
In the end, the final decision making is the task of the decision maker(s) – i.e. judge what is 
acceptable risk, what is the better alternative, how to control the identified risks, etc. 
The decisions can be performed on a qualitative basis or by using more formal decision aid 
tools as support. Examples of multi-criteria decision making methods are discussed and 
illustrated in [28, 29]. 
The decision making process may also include iterative risk analyses to investigate potential 
solutions to risk problems, through considering the effects of various risk mitigating 
measures. Throughout the process it is also important to focus on the aspect of risk 
communication to relevant stakeholders. 
4. CASE STUDY 
In this chapter the proposed framework is applied to a decision making case to illustrate the 
procedure. The case is based on application of risk-informed decision making in a distribution 
company, as described in [17] and [25]. 
 
4.1 Decision study planning 
The case addresses risk-informed decision making related to pole mounted transformers in a 
distribution company. The motivation for the analysis was to provide basis for maintenance 
strategy making and reinvestment planning. The stakeholders were the asset manager(s) in the 
company. 
The risk consequence categories which were considered relevant were economy, safety, 
environmental impact and reputational impact. 
 
4.2 Risk assessment 
4.2.1 Initial risk analysis 
Table 2 shows an excerpt of undesired events identified for pole mounted MV/LV distribution 
transformers, and the undesired events’ impact on the four risk consequence categories. 
The undesired events were identified through guided discussions with distribution company 
experts. 
 
Table 2  Case: undesired events identified for pole mounted MV/LV distribution transformers and their 
impact on the consequence categories. 
 
Undesired events 
Number  and description  
Ec
on
om
y 
Sa
fe
ty
 
En
vi
ro
nm
en
t 
R
ep
ut
at
io
n 
1. Oil leakage from transformer   + + 
2. Wrong voltage to customer du to earth fault +   + 
3. Fall from pole mounted platform  +  + 
4. Short-circuit on transformer +    
5. Internal fault in transformer +   + 
6. Third party climbing and assessing the platform  +  + 
 
The following qualitative probability and consequence scales were used for risk estimation, 
based on [19]: 
 
P5 – Highly Probable    C5 – Catastrophic 
P4 – Very Probable    C4 – Serious 
P3 – Probable    C3 – Medium 
P2 – Less probable    C2 – Small 
P1 – Improbable   C1 – Negligible 
 Each of the undesired events was assigned a probability and a consequence estimate based on 
input from company experts. The results are visualised in the risk matrix in Table 3. 
 
Table 3  Case: Plotting of the undesired events in risk matrix 
 C1 C2 C3 C4 C5 
P5      
P4      
P3      
P2  1(rep.) 1(env.)   
P1  
2(ec./rep.) 
5(ec./rep.) 
3(rep.) 
6(rep.) 
4(ec.) 
3(saf.) 
6(saf.) 
 
Abbreviations: ec. = Economy, saf.= Safety,  
env. = Environment, rep. = Reputation. 
 
 
4.2.2 Risk evaluation 
In the case most of the undesired events were not considered to be critical, and that they could 
be controlled through standard maintenance activities. The decision makers have however 
identified uncertainty concerning undesired event # 1 – Oil leakage from transformer - and 
the risk related to potential oil spill from transformers located within the drainage basin of 
drinking water reservoirs. The potential impact of such events and the uncertainty concerning 
the nature of the undesired event called for a closer investigation. 
 
4.2.3 Quantitative risk assessment for a selected problem 
For the purpose of the case a bow-tie model was chosen to perform the quantitative risk 
analysis. A bow-tie model is a high-level modelling for risk analysis – combining the results 
from fault tree analysis and event tree analysis in order to explicitly establish the cause/effect 
relations related to an undesired event, see e.g. [30, 31]. 
 
Problem description 
MV/LV transformers are located throughout the distribution system, and they typically 
contain 150-300 litres of oil depending on their MVA rating. The case evaluates 
environmental risk related to oil spill from distribution transformers located within the 
drainage basin of drinking water reservoirs. 
Statistical material which can provide valid support in choosing numerical values to use in the 
modelling was not found. All numerical data used in the case were therefore based on the 
judgment of company experts and the analyst. 
 
Fault tree analysis 
Two main failure modes were identified: 
- Oil spill due to degradation of the transformer casing 
- Oil spill due to strokes of lightning destroying the transformer. 
The two failure modes was modelled in a fault tree as shown in Figure 3, contributing to the 
top event; “Oil spill from transformer”. 
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Figure 3  Fault tree for the undesired event “Oil spill from transformer” 
 
The following information was provided by company experts: 
- Approximately 1 - 5 out of 1500 transformers have a leakage due to degradation each 
year. 
- Approximately 2 – 3 out of 1500 transformers experience breakage due to lightning 
strokes each year. 
 
Based on this the following estimates are chosen for the fault tree parameters: 
- qDegradation = 2.0·10-3 [events/year] 
- qLightning = 1.5·10-3 [events/year] 
where qDegradation and qLightning expresses the probabilities for leakage due to casing degradation 
and lightning respectively. Assuming independence between the two basic events, the 
probability of occurrence for the top event is computed according to equation (1): 
 
LightningnDegradatioLightningnDegradatiospillOil qqqqq ⋅−+=  (1) 
 
This gives qOil spill = 0.0035. Given a case where a company have 25 transformers within a 
drinking water drainage basin, this gives 0.0875 occurrences of the top event per year - i.e. 
one can expect the event occurring on average every 11 years. 
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Figure 4  Event tree for the undesired event “Oil  spill from transformer” – based on 
(Nordgård, 2009a) 
 
Event tree analysis 
In order to establish the event tree – see Figure 4 – the following barriers are considered, 
based on discussions with the company experts: 
- Presence of an oil collector 
- Less than 10 liters of oil will leak 
- If the transformer is located near a waterway (stream or river) leading directly to the 
drinking water reservoir. 
 
The amount of oil spilled can not be considered as an ordinary barrier, but rather a statement 
of possible outcome. 
Only substations located on the ground are equipped with oil collectors. The majority of trans-
formers in the area are pole-mounted arrangements. 
The following numerical estimates are chosen for these barriers: 
- qOil collector = 0.9, i.e. only 10 % of the trans-formers in the area have oil collectors 
- q< 10 liters = 0.8, i.e. in only 20 % of the cases the oil spill are less than 10 litres 
- qFar from waterway = 0.6, i.e. 60 % of the trans-formers are located near a stream or river 
leading directly into the drinking water reservoir. 
 
The probability estimates were based on input from distribution company experts and the 
analyst. 
Based on the results from the fault tree analysis, the structure of the event tree and the 
probability estimates of the barriers, the results presented in Table 4 are obtained. 
We can see that the total expected oil spill within the drainage basin is estimated to be 
approximately 12.1 litres/years. The most critical event (event 5) – with an oil spill of 250 
litres – will according to the estimates on average occur every 26 years. 
 
Table 4  Case: Results from event tree analysis 
 
End 
event   
1 2 3 4 5 Sum 
Oil 
spill 1) 
0 1 10
  
100 250 - 
Freq.2) .009 .006 .009 .025 .038 - 
Time3), 114 159 106 40 26 - 
E(oil 
spill) 4) 
0.0 0.0 0.1 2.5 9.5 12.1 
 
1) Estimated oil spill of the end event, [Litres] 
2) Frequency of occurrence of end event I [year-1] 
3) Expected time between occurrences [years] 
4) Expected annual contribution to oil spill from end event i [Litres] 
 
In order to explore the effects of uncertainty concerning the numerical estimates chosen for 
modelling, various sensitivity analyses should be performed. This is done in [25]. It is beyond 
the scope of this paper to go further into the details of this. 
The analysis of alternatives to meet potential unacceptable risks can also be supported by the 
bow-tie model. This can give comparable quantitative estimates on the effects of various risk 
mitigating measures. 
 4.3 Other analyses 
 
Other aspects and analysis which will contribute to the decision basis for the case are, e.g. 
load flow analyses to establish the loading of transformers, short circuit analyses, reliability 
analysis, and economic figures concerning costs of various possible measures. 
 
4.4 Decision making basis 
 
The decision making basis will consist of input from the various analyses, constituting the 
parts of a multi-criteria decision. The basis for the asset manager to make decisions will hence 
constitute of several pieces of information. 
 
4.5 Decision making 
 
This part of the process can be aided by using decision support methods and tools, but in the 
end, the final decision is the task of the decision maker(s). Factors which influence the 
decision are the values and beliefs of the decision maker, company policies, available 
alternatives, etc. This paper will not go into the detail of the decision making. 
 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Asset management decision making is in many aspects a jig-saw puzzle, with parts supplied 
from different sources. To solve the puzzle, there is a need to use methods for risk-informed 
decision support. 
 
This paper describes an overall framework for risk-informed asset management decision 
making. This is done through the use of simplified risk analysis methods for initial risk 
assessment, and quantitative risk analysis methods to perform more in-depth studies for 
selected problems. Due the fact that QRA methods are far more laborious compared to 
simplified analyses, it is important that such analyses are limited to a small number of 
problems. 
 
We should keep in mind that the basis for risk analysis is uncertainty about future outcomes. 
This uncertainty can be explored by performing risk analyses, but it can never be eliminated. 
The aim of risk analysis should therefore be to contribute to increase problem understanding 
and to make robust decisions which can deal with future risk in a good manner, rather than 
providing the “right” answer. 
The results from risk analyses will – together with results from other analyses – constitute a 
more solid the basis for making decisions. 
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ABSTRACT 
The principles of risk management are widely recognised as useful when making maintenance 
and reinvestment decisions in electricity distribution systems. But when doing this in practice, the 
distribution companies may encounter challenges. This paper describes the areas of risk 
communication and perception, highlighting some aspects concerning terminology and 
psychology which one should be aware of as important parts of risk management as a whole. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The electricity distribution system is to a large degree an already existing infrastructure - most of 
it being built during the last 50 years. Hence, the distribution companies are now facing the 
challenges of managing a generally ageing infrastructure. This gives maintenance and 
reinvestments more prominent positions than before. 
 
There is now an increasing trend among distribution companies on developing maintenance 
strategies where different aspects of risk are included in a holistic way [1-3]. The risk aspects 
typically involve safety, environmental concerns, company reputation, quality of supply and 
economy. 
 
The principles of risk management is widely recognised as intuitively right when making 
decisions concerning maintenance and reinvestments (see e.g. [4]), but when doing risk analyses 
in practice, the distribution companies encounter challenges. These challenges are related to 
assessing as well as communicating and perceiving the various aspects of risk, and may include: 
• Choosing methods for modelling and analysis 
• Estimating parameters to be used in the models 
• Understanding the risk analysis and it’s results, including it’s uncertainties 
• Presenting results to various stakeholders 
• Understanding responses from various stakeholders 
 
Several of these challenges are related to risk communication and perception, and will typically 
involve multiple stakeholders - both inside and outside the distribution companies. 
 
This paper describes some general characteristics of risk communication and risk perception to 
illustrate why this is a non-trivial task. It further points out how this can be relevant and 
applicable to the setting of electricity distribution companies, and shows a list for illustrating 
some relevant cases applicable to electricity distribution. 
RISK COMMUNICATION AS PART OF RISK MANAGEMENT 
 
There are different ways of defining and structuring the aspects of risk management. For this 
paper, the structure and terminology proposed in [5] is used as the basis for the presentation.  
Risk communication is regarded as a part of the risk management framework and is defined as 
exchange or sharing of information about risk between the decision-maker and other 
stakeholders [5]. 
 
Risk communication will typically not be an isolated task, and in order to obtain good 
communication about risk, the interaction and dialog between risk analyst(s), decision-maker(s) 
and other stakeholders should be an integrated part of the whole of risk management, reaching 
into the processes of risk assessment, risk treatment and risk acceptance as illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
Risk communication will also be an important part of the final decision making process, where 
also other relevant inputs to the decision are incorporated. 
 
Risk management
Risk assessment
Risk analysis
Risk estimation
Source identification
Risk evaluation
OK?
Risk treatment
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Risk optimization
Risk transfer
Risk avoidance
No
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Decisions
 
 
Figure 1. Risk management process flowchart – based on Risk Management terms from [5] 
 
There exist several general models for information and communication processes. One simple 
model is illustrated in Figure 2, where four main steps of communication from a sender 
(“source”) to a receiver (“Destination”) are shown. 
 
Source Message Distribution Destination
 
 
Figure 2. Simple communication model – based on [6] 
 
Along the communication chain one will encounter challenges regarding getting the message 
through to the receiver as intended by the sender. The sender and the receiver will typically be 
different stakeholders in a risk related situation. What the receiver hears, and how he or she 
reacts, will depend on the person’s background, current situation, relation to the risk problem, etc.  
 
There are some specific points which are of interest when looking into the challenges of risk 
communication, and in the following chapters two of these challenges are elaborated, namely: 
• The terminology challenge of risk, and 
• The psychological challenge of risk perception. 
 
 
RISK - A TERMINOLOGY CHALLENGE 
 
Dangers will always be present in life, and there is no way that these can be totally eliminated. 
The chance of such dangers or hazards appearing is what we may call risk. Risk is generally a 
concept that denotes a potential negative impact that may arise from some present process or 
future event. 
 
For analytical purposes this can be defined as risk being the combination of the probability of an 
event and its consequence – see e.g. [5] – or even the product of these two quantities. In technical 
analyses this definition is quite widespread. 
 
But when communicating with people having a different background one can encounter problems 
regarding even this basic terminology regarding risk. There are a number of more or less 
accepted definitions and use of risk from a number of different fields of application – covering 
both formal and informal uses of the term. In [7] an overview is given on how the term risk is 
used in everyday language and across disciplines. A summary of this is given in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Definitions and usage of the term risk (based on [7]) 
Risk (usage / definition) Description / Example of usage 
1: An unwanted event which may or may 
not occur. 
‘Lung cancer is one of the major risks that affect smokers.’ 
2: The cause of an unwanted event which 
may or may not occur 
‘Smoking is by far the most important health risk in industrialized 
countries.’ (The unwanted event implicitly referred to here is a 
disease caused by smoking.). 
3: The probability of an unwanted event 
which may or may not occur 
“The risk that a smoker's life is shortened by a smoking-related 
disease is about 50%.” 
4: The statistical expectation value of an 
unwanted event which may or may not 
occur. 
The expected value of a possible negative event is the product of its 
probability and some measure of its severity. Today this is the 
standard technical meaning of the term “risk” in many disciplines 
(first introduced by the Reactor Safety Study, WASH-1400 in 1975). 
5: The fact that a decision is made under 
conditions of known probabilities 
“Decision under risk” as opposed to “Decision under uncertainty” – 
which refers to decisions made under conditions of unknown 
probabilities. 
 
Even among risk analysts there is difficulty in converging on a common definition of the term. 
The following anecdote from [8] illustrates the complexity to achieve a cross disciplinary 
definition of risk: 
 
“One of the first initiatives from the Society for Risk Analysis was to establish a 
committee to define the word risk. The committee laboured for 4 years and then gave up, 
saying in its final report, that maybe it is better not to define risk and let each author 
define it in his own way, emphasizing that each should explain clearly what way that is.” 
 
It is therefore important to be explicit about what understanding of risk is used when performing 
and documenting risk assessment, and one should also be aware of the possible different 
interpretations of the term when presenting results from risk analyses. 
 
The terminology challenge will presumably be most relevant when communicating risk and risk 
analysis results to receivers who do not have a technical background, but even when sending the 
message to engineers one should be cautious to specify what is meant by the term. 
 
 
RISK – A PSYCHOLOGICAL CHALLENGE 
 
Risk perception is the judgement that people (often referred to as ‘stakeholders’) make about the 
characteristics and severity of a given risk. Their perception of risk will further influence on the 
way they act upon risk information. The acceptability of a given risk lies in the “eyes of the 
beholder” – and is hence stakeholder-dependant [9, 10]. 
 
There are several aspects which affect a stakeholder’s perception of risk. In the pioneer work of 
Chauncey Starr [10] two main aspects are pointed out, being voluntariness of being exposed to a 
risk, and which benefits are perceived from the risk exposure - stating that it is much easier to 
accept risk which is of your own choice, rather than risk which is felt forced upon you; and that it 
is much easier to accept a risk of which you benefit yourself. Starr also pointed out the influence 
of the number of people affected by a risk, and the magnitude of a risk event. 
 
Much work has been done within this area during the last four decades, and much focus has been 
on communication of risk in the interface between risk analysts and the general public [11], but 
risk perception is relevant for also other stakeholder interfaces [12]. 
 
In the case of electricity distribution there are also other very relevant communication interfaces 
– e.g. risk communication between the distribution company and governmental bodies, risk 
communication as input to decision makers within the company and risk communication between 
asset manager and internal or external service providers. 
 
In [13] a comprehensive summary is given over aspects which may play a role in a stakeholder’s 
perception of risk. Some main findings of this summary are shown in Table 2. 
 
 
 
Table 2. Aspects affecting stakeholders’ perception of risk, based on [13]. 
Risk aspect Description 
Voluntariness 
Risks from activities considered to be involuntary or imposed (e.g., exposure to chemicals 
from a industrial facility) are judged to be greater, and are therefore less readily accepted, 
than risks from activities that are seen to be voluntary (e.g., smoking or sunbathing) 
Controllability 
Risks from activities viewed as under the control of others (e.g., releases of toxic chemicals 
by industrial facilities) are judged to be greater, and are less readily accepted, than those 
from activities that appear to be under the control of the individual (e.g., driving a car). 
Familiarity 
Risks from activities viewed as unfamiliar (e.g. chemicals or radiation from waste disposal 
sites) are judged to be greater than risks from activities viewed as familiar (such as 
household work). 
Fairness 
Risks from activities believed to be unfair or to involve unfair processes (e.g., inequities 
related to the siting of industrial facilities) are judged to be greater than risks from fair 
activities (e.g., vaccinations). 
Benefits 
Risks from activities that seem to have unclear, questionable, or diffused personal or 
economic benefits (e.g., waste disposal facilities) are judged to be greater than risks from 
activities that have clear benefits (jobs, monetary benefits, automobile driving). 
Catastrophic potential 
Risks from activities viewed as having the potential to cause a significant number of deaths 
and injuries grouped in time and space (e.g., airplane accidents) are judged to be greater 
than risks from activities that cause deaths and injuries scattered or random in time and 
space (e.g., automobile accidents). 
Understanding 
Poorly understood risks (such as the health effects of long-term exposure to low doses of 
toxic chemicals or radiation) are judged to be greater than risks that are well understood or 
self-explanatory (such as pedestrian accidents or slipping on ice). 
Uncertainty 
Risks from activities that are relatively unknown or that pose uncertain risks (e.g., risks 
from genetic engineering) are judged to be greater than risks from activities that appear to 
be well known to science (e.g., actuarial risk data related to automobile accidents). 
Delayed effects 
Risks from activities that may have delayed effects (e.g., long periods of time between 
exposure and adverse health effects) are judged to be greater than risks from activities 
viewed as having immediate effects (e.g., poisonings). 
Effects on children 
Risks from activities that appear to put children specifically at risk (e.g., milk contaminated 
with toxic chemicals, pregnant women exposed to radiation or toxic chemicals) are judged 
to be greater than risks from activities that do not (e.g., workplace accidents). 
Victim identity 
Risks from activities that produce identifiable victims (e.g., a child who falls down a well 
or a miner trapped in a mine) are judged to be greater than risks from activities that produce 
statistical victims (e.g., statistical profiles of automobile accident victims). 
Dread 
Risks from activities that evoke fear, terror or anxiety (e.g., exposure to cancer-causing 
agents or AIDS) are judged to be greater than risks from activities that do not arouse such 
feelings or emotions (e.g., common colds and household accidents). 
Trust 
Risks associated with institutions or organizations lacking in trust and credibility (e.g., 
industries with poor environmental track records) are judged to be greater than risks from 
activities associated with those that are trustworthy and credible. 
Media attention 
Risks from activities that receive considerable media coverage (e.g., accidents at nuclear 
power plants) are judged to be greater than risks from activities that receive little attention 
(e.g., on-the-job accidents). 
Accident history 
Risks from activities with a history of major accidents or frequent minor accidents (e.g., 
leaks at waste disposal facilities) are judged to be greater than risks from those with little or 
no such history (e.g., recombinant DNA experimentation). 
Personal stake 
Risks from activities viewed by people to place them or their families directly at risk (e.g., 
living near a waste disposal site) are judged to be greater than risks from activities that 
appear to pose no direct or personal threat (e.g., disposal of waste in remote areas). 
Human vs. natural 
origin 
Risks generated by human action, failure or incompetence (e.g., accidents caused by 
inadequate safeguards or operator errors) are judged to be greater than risks believed to be 
caused by nature (e.g., exposure to geological radon or cosmic rays). 
Research and experience have shown that there is no ”right” answer on how to handle the these 
challenges related to risk perception, but it is important the distribution companies to be aware of 
the terminological and psychological mechanisms which may affect an efficient communication 
of risk. 
 
 
RISK COMMUNICATION AND PERCEPTION WITHIN ELECTRICITY 
DISTRIBUTION 
 
The electricity distribution business involves the interaction between different stakeholders with 
different roles to play. There are therefore multiple stakeholder interfaces where risk 
communication aspects are of interest. 
 
The stakeholders hold roles both inside and outside the distribution companies themselves. A 
schematic mapping of stakeholders and stakeholder interfaces is given in Figure 3, showing the 
roles of the company asset management (in the centre of the figure) with other influencing 
stakeholders surrounding. 
 
Governmental body 1
(NVE)
Governmental body 2
(DSB) Asset manager
Service provider
Board of directors
General public
Asset owner
Distribution company
 
 
Figure 3. Electricity distribution business: Schematic mapping of internal and external 
stakeholders and stakeholder interfaces. 
 
Outside the core of the distribution company there are governmental bodies which the company 
has to relate to, the board of directors which require risk informed information, and the general 
public – including the customers of the company and people affected someway or another by the 
distribution system infrastructure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The stakeholder interfaces can roughly be divided into two main categories of risk 
communication: 
• Risk communication to decision makers, and 
• Risk communication to the public. 
 
Table 3. Categorisation of stakeholder interfaces. 
Categories of risk communication Stakeholder interface 
Risk communication to decision makers 
Asset manager / Asset owner to board 
Asset manager to asset owner 
Asset manager / Asset owner to governmental body 
Risk communication to the public Asset manager to service provider Distribution company to general public 
 
The aspects influencing risk perception given in Table 2 are most representative for the 
communication interface between the distribution company and the general public, and between 
asset manager and service provider. 
 
For the other stakeholder interfaces it is more relevant to focus on aspects related to risk 
assessment methods, choices of input parameters, treatment of uncertainty, etc. [12]. 
 
In [11] (p. 156-157) Bier makes the following remark concerning the aspects of communicating 
risk analysis to decision makers: 
 
”Little research has been done on effective methods of communicating risk analysis 
results to decision-makers. With the advent of risk-informed decision-making, decision 
makers are increasingly being asked to take highly technical risk analysis results into 
account in their decisions. Therefore, it is important to pilot-test risk communication 
messages and approaches whenever possible, and to share the results of such evaluations 
as widely as possible to disseminate knowledge about how to most effectively 
communicate risk information to support regulatory decision-making.”  
 
This stresses the importance on further work on risk communication to (and between) company 
decision makers, acknowledging that this holds somewhat other challenges compared to what is 
experienced in risk communication to the public. 
 
 
EXAMPLES OF RISK COMMUNICATION TOPICS 
 
In Table 4, a brief list is given of some risk related topics which are relevant for some of the 
different stakeholder interfaces shown in Figure 3. The listing is not intended as a complete and 
unabridged listing of risk topics, but rather to present some examples which are seen as relevant 
to illustrate the diversity of risk challenges within distribution system asset management. 
 
 
Table 4. Stakeholder interfaces and examples of risk communication topics. 
Stakeholder interface Risk communication topics Keywords 
Electro-magnetic fields near 
power system components 
- Electromagnetic fields themselves are invisible 
- Children are believed to be more vulnerable to 
the risk 
- Uncertainty about risk, but severe consequences 
(fearing increased chance of leukemia among 
children being exposed to high levels of 
electromagnetic fields)  Distribution company vs. general public 
Large scale interruptions of 
electricity supply 
- The society is highly dependent on a reliable 
electricity supply 
- Large consequences (economic, safety, 
reputation) when occurring, but (relatively) rare 
events 
- Minimize what risk to what cost 
Asset manager vs.  
service provider 
Communicating the identified 
risks and providing two-way 
communication 
- The decision of “acceptable risk” done by the 
asset manager, while first line working 
experience with the ageing infrastructure is felt 
by the employees of the service provider 
- Communication of the risk assessments which 
provide the background for the priorities in the 
grid, and to provide feed-back regarding 
observations of the component condition 
Distribution Company vs. 
governmental bodies 
Providing common 
understanding regarding risk 
assessment and management 
- Regulations for the distribution business have 
changed, emphasizing the use of risk assessment 
as input to decisions 
- Changing the way of thinking and acting from a 
black-and-white rule regulation to a risk informed 
shades-of-gray application, is a challenge partly 
still unsolved 
Asset manager / owner vs. 
company board 
Presenting risk assessment 
results 
- The board is responsible for the performance of 
the company, requiring information concerning 
different risk aspects of the electricity distribution 
business 
- Asset managers and/or the asset owner provides  
such information 
- A challenge to provide compact information to 
the board presenting risk evaluations and 
solutions (including uncertainty) - e.g. regarding 
larger reinvestments in the grid 
Asset managers vs.  
asset owner 
Performing and presenting risk 
assessment 
- To provide a bi-directional flow of information 
concerning strategic risk priorities of the 
company, and to show how these priorities are 
used in risk informed decisions 
- Challenges regarding uncertainty assessment 
regarding priorities in the grid e.g. evaluation of 
the technical condition of assets, etc. 
- People in different positions may have different 
backgrounds (education, working experience) – 
which may be a challenge with regards to 
understanding the challenges related to assessing 
distribution system risk 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The paper points out some aspects which are relevant when discussing risk perception and 
communication within the electricity distribution sector. Some are more prominent than others, 
but they are all parts of a rather complex jig-saw puzzle of holistic distribution system asset 
management. 
 
Until recently the concept of risk has only to a minor degree been systematically applied in the 
electricity distribution industry – and when applied it has been in the strictly ‘technical sense’, 
where risk is set equal to probability of an event multiplied with consequence of the event. Risk 
assessment in electricity distribution has also further been focused on mainly one aspect of risk, 
namely the reliability of the system (and hence the quality of supply). 
 
Risk communication and perception have many aspects which go beyond the “technical” risk 
analysis, including how the basic understanding of risks differs between stakeholders, and how 
results are interpreted and used. The purpose of addressing this challenge is to build under-
standing and knowledge, and to contribute to a better foundation for risk management within the 
industry as a whole. 
 
Risk management is about tackling the inherent uncertainties related to future outcomes, and in 
this context is imperative to understand the nature of risk and risk analysis, with its possibilities 
and limitations. It is important to acknowledge that risk analysis will not provide the “correct 
objective answer”, as all risk analyses will provide subjective results – i.e. the results are 
dependent on the choices made by the analyst regarding modeling, input parameters, numerical 
values used, etc. Risk analysis results should therefore rather be used to contribute to a risk 
informed decision basis where other aspects of risk management – e.g. risk communication and 
perception – are included. 
 
Future work within this field of application should encompass these different areas, but special 
emphasis should be put on the topics of risk communication between stakeholders within the 
distribution companies – and hence risk communication to (and between) company decision 
makers, [12], acknowledging that this includes somewhat other challenges compared to what is 
experienced in risk communication to the public. 
 
The challenge is (at least) two-fold; as it calls for increased knowledge and skills among both 
analysts performing risk assessment and the receivers of the results for such analyses. 
 
Incorporating risk communication as an integrated part of the decision making process is a key 
feature for further work, with the aim to provide the distribution companies with tools for making 
better decisions. 
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